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Preface
A common fault of multiauthor works is their lack of unity. The editor
may strive for at least a semblance of unity by imposing a common
theme, tone, and style on the contributors to a book. But he seldom
succeeds. It is practically impossible, and most people would agree
that it is not even desirable, to smother individual differences in in-
terests and ways of thinking, with the result that these differences more
often than not manage to frustrate the editor’s efforts to impart a
sense of continuity and purpose to the volume he has undertaken to
put together.
In this book no attempt has been made to achieve unity. Except for
the fact that they all deal with Africa, the twelve essays that make up
this volume have nothing in common. They have been contributed by
Africanists with different disciplinary and other interests. All of them,
however, were at one time or another close associates or disciples of
William O. Brown, one of the most prominent figures in the struggle
to promote African studies in the United States. Professor Brown’s
main objective was to correct the widespread tendency, especially in
America, to view Africa in greatly oversimplified terms. He did not
believe that this could be done by relying on a single discipline or a
single approach to African studies. Though a trained sociologist, he
tried to encourage others to study Africa from other points of view
as well as that of the sociologist. With so many dimensions to the
reality of Africa and its populations, he believed that only through
serious studies at the university level could one hope to break the
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myths dominating the public mind and begin to travel the long road
to genuine understanding. Diversity was the keynote to Professor
Brown’s approach to African studies, and it seemed appropriate that a
collection of papers prepared in his honor should try, at least symboli-
cally, to express it.
Strict objectivity and painstaking attention to details are most
evident in Philip Gulliver’s description of traditional methods of
handling and settling a land dispute in East Africa. His paper typifies
the research methods of a social anthropologist working along conven-
tional lines. Another distinguished anthropologist, Elizabeth Colson,
makes a powerful plea for change not in methodology but in the re-
search orientation of anthropology, especially in the choice of topics
for investigation, in view of the political changes Africa has undergone
during the last two decades.
Historians are generally concerned with the reconstruction of
Africa’s past, but their methods and emphases vary. Relying on
European sources, Harold Marcus covers a segment of Ethiopia’s diplo-
matic history. Norman Bennett sketches the career of a relatively ob-
scure African chief in nineteenth-century Tanganyika. He tries to
show that the European interpretation of Africa’s past need not be the
only valid one and that certain events take on a different meaning
when viewed from an African standpoint. George Brooks focuses on
the tiny island of Goree to demonstrate that there is no necessary
continuity between past and present. Goree, which once played an
important commercial role in West Africa, no longer does so today,
and for that reason its history risks being neglected. On the other
hand, Douglas Wheeler emphasizes the ancient roots of the current
unrest in Angola.
In discussing the troublesome racial scene of South Africa, Newell
Stultz, a political scientist, offers the thought-provoking thesis that
the greater the external pressure on the South African government to
adopt a liberal racial policy, the more likely is that government to
harden its attitude toward the Black African population under its
control. In a carefully documented paper citing the experience of
Katanga, Edouard Bustin points out that post-colonial governments are
no less uncertain and ambiguous in their attitudes toward native cult
movements than were colonial governments. Another political scientist,
John Montgomery, examines some of the lessons and wider implica-
tions of American development aid in sub-Saharan Africa.
Economic development is Idrian Resnick’s concern as well. What
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specifically interests this economist is the conceptual framework for
manpower training—an important issue in underdeveloped countries.
Elliot Berg, a specialist in labor problems, presents a comparative
analysis of labor unions in Ghana and the Ivory Coast during the
colonial period. He shows how the different traditions of British and
French labor unions influenced the development of labor organizations
in Africa. While Berg thus focuses on the impact of Western ideas on
African institutions, the editor, in a paper relating the religiously
motivated economic conduct of a Moslem brotherhood in Senegal to
Max Weber’s discussion of the role of the Protestant Reformation in
Western economic development, tries to show how the analysis of
African institutions can sometimes be used to reexamine interpreta-
tions of Western experience.
The editor wishes to thank professors Adelaide Gulliver and Daniel
McCall for their help in the preparation of this book. Unfortunately,
the book could not be presented to Professor Brown, who died sud-
denly while it was in preparation. It is hoped that his numerous
friends and the general public will accept the book as a fitting
posthumous tribute.
Mark Karp
African Studies Center
Boston University
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A Land Dispute in
Arusha, Tanzania
bj Philip H. Gulliver
The Arusha, living on the slopes of Mount Meru and the surrounding
lowland plains, are divided among locally autonomous parishes, aver-
aging some two square miles on the mountain slopes and containing
about 2,000 people. The adult males of a parish are arranged into
corporate age groups occupying the grades of retired elders, senior
elders, junior elders, senior miirran, and junior murran.^ For ritual
and political purposes senior elders are linked with senior murran and
junior elders with junior murran in the idiom of “fathers” and “sons.”
Each age group has several spokesmen, all of whom, together with their
age-mates, constitute an assembly to deal with parish affairs and dis-
putes, with the seniormost spokesman of the junior elders acting as
chairman.
Land rights are held individually by homestead heads and are in-
1. Murran: from ilmurran (s. olmurraniy which means “younger men,’’ in con-
trast to ilwayiani, which means “elders.’’ See Philip H. Gulliver, Social Control in
an African Society. A Study of the Arusha: Agricultural Masai of Northern Tan-
ganyika (Boston: Boston University Press, 196.S), pp. 26-27.
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herited patrilineally. Close agnates—brothers, father’s brothers, cousins
—comprise an inner lineage in which there is continuous mutual assis-
tance. A number of inner lineages form a maximal lineage. If a dispute
breaks out, the members of a maximal lineage select one, sometimes
two, of their number to act as counselor—that is, as advisor, negotiator,
and advocate. A number of such lineages make up a subclan, which,
however, is not a corporate unit. Disputes can be discussed in an ad-
hoc “moot,” in which each disputant is actively supported by his coun-
selor and by other patrilineally linked kinsmen who live reasonably
near. A moot is a semiformal meeting in which there is no adjudicator,
and decisions are reached by negotiation and bargaining. An even less
formal and smaller conclave for the same purpose includes only the
counselor and a few close agnates of the disputant. A disputant can
usually choose the forum he prefers from among parish assembly (if
both disputants belong to the same parish), moot, and conclave. Re-
course is also available to local government courts, though the Arusha
dislike this for settling private disputes.
The dispute discussed below occurred in 1957. In following its dis-
cussion, the reader may find the accompanying genealogy and sketch
map helpful. Three hearings were held: the first in the parish as-
sembly, the second in a conclave, and the last again in the parish
assembly.2
First Hearing in the Parish Assembly
A senior murran, Saruni, raised a plaint at the regular weekly
assembly of a mountain parish. He asked the assembly to acknowledge
his rights to a certain piece of land of about two acres. The occupant
of this land, a tenant named Kewa, wished to vacate it, for he had
recently inherited a larger farm some distance away. Kewa made no
claim to the land; he only wanted to obtain the customary compensa-
tion for the coffee bushes he had planted there and for improvements
he had made to the irrigation system, to hedging, and to fencing.
Saruni explained that he had reversionary rights to this land by in-
heritance from his father, Olorishon, who had originally cleared the
virgin woodland adjacent to the farm of his father, Saruni’s grand-
father, Rikoyan. Saruni stated that he had no quarrel with Kewa and
that he was prepared to pay him proper compensation; but he had
2. The author was present at all three meetings.
Skeleton Genealogy to Illustrate
Relations between Participants in the Dispute.
Only people directly relevant to the case are shown.
3
Sketch
Map
of
Disputed
Land
and
Its
Environs
4
A Land Dispute in Arusha, Tanzania 5
discovered that the land was being claimed by another neighbor,
Kiranga, who had already offered compensation to Kewa. Saruni de-
clared that Kiranga would be a thief if he took the land, and he asked
the assembly to prevent Kiranga from interfering further.
When Saruni sat down, Kiranga, a junior elder, came to the center
of the assembly and explained his claim to the land. By his account,
the land in dispute, together with much more now occupied by himself
and his agnatic kinsmen, was originally claimed by his grandfather
Mainoro as first pioneer. As had been the custom, Mainoro had laid
claim to more land than he immediately needed in order to allow for
later expansion. The disputed area along with other land including
that now occupied by Kiranga was allocated to Mainoro's son Sikorei,
and the still uncleared part was later lent by Sikorei to his sister’s son
Olorishon, father of the plaintiff. On Sikorei’s death his land rights
were inherited by his son Ndaletia. When Ndaletia died without sons
or brothers, the inheritance went to Kiranga.^ In reply to a question
by Saruni, Kiranga admitted that Kewa had been granted his tenancy
by the plaintiff but, he claimed, only with the explicit approval of
Ndaletia. Kiranga explained that he now needed the land because
his family, including a widow and daughters of Ndaletia, was growing.
He would not have sought to evict Kewa, he said, but Kewa wanted to
leave as soon as he obtained proper compensation. The amount had
been agreed upon, and Kiranga was ready to pay it. He planned to
take over his inherited land and incorporate it into his existing farm.
He ended by telling the assembly, “Everyone knows that Mainoro was
the big man long ago in this part of the parish.” “This truly is the
estate of Mainoro, and we are his grandsons. Saruni is our affine, so
how can he say this land is his?” He then sat down among his fellow
junior elders in the assembly.
The assembly’s chairman—a senior spokesman of the junior elders,
Kiranga’s own age group—then said that this was not a real dispute, for
clearly the land belonged to Kiranga. This was just an instance, he
stated, of the senior murran (Saruni’s age group) trying to make
trouble for their superiors “as usual.” Senior murran, spokesmen, and
others immediately protested, and one appealed directly to the senior
elders present. A senior elder spokesman called out, without rising to his
feet, that the case should be discussed. “You junior elders do not know
the proper ways of an assembly,” he said. “You cannot say there is no
3. Kiranga was the senior surviving member of the same olwashe as the deceased
Ndaletia. See Gulliver, Social Control, p. 72.
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dispute. Let us hear all the words. Then let us discuss them.” There
were calls of agreement.
“All right,” replied the chairman, “let these murran ask their fathers
[senior elders] to speak for them. They are only young and they know
nothing, for they are not yet elders.” And turning to the murran, he
told them to ask their “fathers” to speak on their behalf. The senior
murran protested indignantly, and one of their spokesmen stood up
and declared that “we are like elders now. We are no longer youths.
We know things and we know how to speak.” After further similar
exchanges during which the senior murran grew increasingly angry, it
was agreed that the senior elders should speak with, rather than for,
their “sons.”
Evidence was next given by two old men—Kilel for the defendant,
Seya for the plaintiff. Both claimed personal knowledge of the past,
but they merely reiterated the conflicting claims already made. A
junior elder spokesman gave the opinion that Seya was too old for his
memory to be trustworthy, but that Kilel was not senile and had truly
seen what had happened in the old days. “Look,” said the spokesman,
turning to the senior murran, “do you not believe your father who
tells you the truth?”
Leteti, a senior elder spokesman, declared his belief in what Kilel
had said. He mildly suggested that “my son, Saruni,” was mistaken
and misguided. “Is not Kilel the youngest son of Mainoro? Yes. So
that is how he knows. You murran, how can you know these things if
you do not listen to your fathers? And how can Seya know? He did not
live here but, as today, he lived over there, a long way away.”
Leteti’s remarks brought dissenting cries not only from senior mur-
ran but from some of his senior elder age-mates. The junior elders sat
quietly and watched. It became clear that although Saruni had the
unanimous support of his senior murran age-mates, their “fathers”
were divided and thus their support weakened. Eventually, a senior
elder spokesman suggested that the case should be taken to a moot, for
it was not a matter to be dealt with in the parish assembly. Kiranga
and a junior elder spokesman rejected this. “Are we not all neighbors
here?” Kiranga inquired. “This is a matter of neighbors, the people
who know. Those kinsmen of Saruni, what do they know about it?
They have always lived far from here. I say we have discussed this
enough. But if Saruni has more words, then let him bring them here.”
The chairman called out that the matter could be discussed further
at the next meeting of the parish assembly. Saruni protested that he
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could not be prevented from seeking a moot, and several of his age-
mates shouted their agreement. Leteti, the senior elder spokesman, said
that of course his “son” could do that but that he advised him not to
take it farther. The assembly chairman called out that the discussion
was finished and ostentatiously asked for the next plaintiff to start his
case before the assembly.
Hearing in the Conclave
Saruni was clearly unwilling to lose his claim by default, as his op-
ponents perhaps had hoped. Because the counselor of his own maxi-
mal lineage lived more than eight miles away, Saruni went instead to
consult with Kiriama, the counselor of a collateral lineage of the
same subclan who lived conveniently nearby, in the next parish.
Kiriama advised Saruni to continue to argue his case in the parish
assembly because it would be difficult to convene an adequate moot.
He pointed out that only one member of Saruni’s inner lineage re-
sided locally, while the rest of his near agnates lived in relatively
distant parishes in the plains. Furthermore, Saruni could not rely en-
tirely on their support as he had no brother and was on poor terms with
his father’s brother because of disagreement over a herding contract.^
In addition, only a few members of his maximal lineage lived within
four or five miles of Saruni’s homestead. Saruni would have to ask
agnatic kinsmen to come fairly long distances to attend a moot on his
behalf. The counselor thought that Saruni might not be able to obtain
a strong body of supporters for a moot; and he himself may have been
unwilling to accept the responsibility of acting as a leading advocate
for Saruni, who did not belong to his own maximal lineage.
Believing that the parish assembly was weighted against him, Saruni
persisted in the idea of trying to advance his claim in a different
forum. He finally persuaded the reluctant Kiriama to try to arrange
a patrilineal conclave. Kiriama went to see Mbaavi, the counselor of
Kiranga’s maximal lineage. After some argument, Mbaavi and Kiranga
acceded to the request, and a conclave was held in Saruni’s house.
There, supporting Saruni were Kiriama, Kiriama’s brother, and two
members of Saruni’s inner lineage, Seya and Ekaali. Supporting
4. Loilole, the father’s brother, had agreed to keep Saruni’s cattle on his low-
lands farm in return for milk and gifts of bananas from Saruni’s mountain farm.
But Saruni had been asked to remove his animals, though he had not yet done so.
8 Philip H. Gulliver
Kiranga were his counselor Mbaavi and the whole of his inner lineage
—Mevoro, Kilel, Laari, and Langerr—as well as Leteti. Leteti was not
an agnate, but he was a most influential man in the parish who
claimed knowledge of early land rights.
Kiranga and his supporters immediately pointed out Saruni’s sup-
porters’ lack of intimate local knowledge other than by the old man
Seya. Kiriama was in a poor position to refute this argument for he
had never lived in the parish nor was he an agnate of Saruni’s. He
could not claim first-hand knowledge of what had taken place in the
days of Saruni’s father; he had not even been a counselor then. All
he could do was argue that Saruni’s inheritance of his father’s land
some twelve to fifteen years before had been undisputed. Kiranga and
Mbaavi retorted that Kiriama had no personal knowledge of the facts
and was merely repeating Saruni’s allegations. They repeated that the
testimony of Kilel, Mbaavi, and Leteti was much more credible than
that of old Seya. Mbaavi added that it was not merely a matter of the
land occupied by Kewa, for Kiranga also had a good claim to the land
occupied by Saruni himself. Saruni, of course, strongly rejected this
view. Leteti then urged Kiriama to agree that the dispute be resumed
in the parish assembly. No settlement seemed possible in the conclave,
and the meeting ended after little more than an hour. It left Kiriama
as uncomfortable about the case as he had been before the conclave
met. He strongly advised Saruni to present his case again in the
parish assembly and added that if Saruni did not wish to take his
advice he should consult with the counselor of his own maximal
lineage.
A day or two later Saruni went to see his own counselor, Loringadek.
While declaring himself willing to arrange a moot if Saruni insisted,
Loringadek pointed out the probable weaknesses of Saruni’s position
in a moot. Finally, he repeated Kiriama’s advice that Saruni return to
the parish assembly.
Second Hearing in the Parish Assembly
At the next meeting of the parish assembly Saruni raised his claim
again. The chairman, a junior elder spokesman, told him that he
must wait another week, till the next regular meeting, for people were
not ready for his case; and, in any event, the assembly had all the
business it could conduct at that session. A spokesman of the senior
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murran (Saruni's age group) protested that the junior elders were
merely seeking to delay the matter to prejudice Saruni’s case. The
chairman denied this but pointed out that some of Kiranga’s sup-
porters were not present because “they did not know that Saruni is
still trying to take Kiranga’s land.’’ A senior elder spokesman declared
that “these junior elders are acting like Europeans. They listen to
no one and try to tell us what to do.’’ The senior murran spokesman
called out, asking him to support them in arranging a special meeting
of the parish assembly on the site of the disputed land in order to deal
specifically with that dispute. After further exchanges the chairman
announced that such a meeting would be held four days later at
midday.
The parish assembly met at the appointed time in the open space
next to the house of Kewa, the tenant. First Saruni presented his case
in full. This time, however, he gave more attention to the land he him-
self already occupied. He stated that it had been virgin woodland
lying between lands cleared by Rikoyan, his grandfather, and Mai-
noro, Kiranga’s grandfather. There had never been any understand-
ing that Saruni’s father, Olorishon, had received the land as a loan
from his mother’s brother Sikorei, son of Mainoro, or that Olorishon
was a tenant. Had he been a tenant, said Saruni, Olorishon would
have made annual gifts to his mother’s brother at harvest time, and
this he had never done. Nor had any such claim been raised at Olori-
shon’s death, when Saruni inherited. It was he, Saruni, who had per-
mitted Kewa to occupy and use the disputed area, which had until his
death been occupied by Saruni’s brother. Never before had Kiranga
claimed that land, nor had the previous holders of Kiranga’s land,
Ndaletia and Sikorei.
Kiranga spoke next. He reminded the assembly that his grand-
father Mainoro had been a “big man,’’ one of the earliest pioneers and
a founder of the parish. Mainoro had laid claim to all the land now
occupied by Saruni, Kewa, Kiranga, Kiranga’s brother, and Kilel. He
had been the chief architect of the main irrigation channel that ran
along the western edge of this land. The area now occupied by Saruni
sloped up slightly from this channel and, therefore, had not been
cleared by Mainoro, unlike the rest of the land, which was more
favorably situated for irrigation; but Mainoro’s claim had extended
up that slope to the crest of the low ridge where it met the boundary
of the land of Rikoyan, Saruni’s grandfather. Later Sikorei had al-
lowed Olorishon, Saruni’s father, to clear that slope for a farm. Sikorei
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had never demanded harvest gifts in formal recognition of this be-
cause, said Kiranga, that is only done when landholder and tenant
distrust each other and Sikorei and his sister’s son Olorishon had been
very friendly, “as everyone here remembers.’’ Nor had Sikorei’s heir,
Ndaletia, objected to Saruni’s inheritance of Olorishon’s tenancy
rights. “Why should he? Were they not kinsmen—neighbors and
friends? Today I do not wish to move Saruni off that land where his
house and fields and bananas are. That would be unfriendly. But
Saruni has not used this land here and I have need of it. It is the
engithaka [estate] of Mainoro and I am his grandson, his heir.’’
As in the previous hearing, Kilel affirmed the correctness of Ki-
ranga’s claim and stressed his own credentials as Mainoro’s son. A
spokesman of Saruni’s senior murran age group questioned both the
veracity and the impartiality of Kilel, and he reminded the assembly
of evidence to the contrary given by Seya, who was not then present,
in support of Saruni. The spokesman then appealed to the senior
elders, “who know these things of the old days.’’ A junior elder called
out that Kilel was a senior elder, but the murran spokesman ignored
that.
There was a pause. Then a junior elder spokesman declared, with-
out standing up, that there were no senior elders who knew better
than Kilel. A senior elder spokesman stood up and went to the
central open space to speak. “Land is scarce nowadays,’’ he said, “and
we cannot agree to people being driven off the land which they have
always cultivated because his neighbor wants to take it. What do we
know now about the old days? It was all different then; there was
much land and people were friendly.’’ He described how men had
been generous and had allowed others to use areas which they them-
selves did not need. Perhaps Sikorei had allowed his sister’s son to do
this; or perhaps it was untouched land that Olorishon had cleared as a
pioneer, thereby establishing legitimate right to it for his heir. In
either case, Kiranga could not now drive Saruni away. Saruni had
planted bananas, hedges, and coffee bushes, and no one had ever
interfered with all this. The spokesman ended his address to the
assembly with an emotional appeal to parish unity and peace.
Leteti followed. He agreed that Saruni should not be asked to give
up the land he occupied, even though it might be part of Mainoro’s
estate. But Saruni should give up his claim to the land occupied by
Kewa, for that land had been cultivated by Mainoro, as proved by
the irrigation channels on it leading off the main channel. “Let
A Land Dispute in Arusha, Tanzania 11
Saruni stay where he is,” he said. “That is good and we agree. But
let Kiranga take this land here, for that is not Saruni’s.”
Leteti was thus seeking to show the support for senior murran
expected of a senior elder and a spokesman and at the same time to
induce Saruni to accept a compromise—to give up his claim to Kewa’s
area in return for affirmation of his security on the land he already
occupied. Leteti also tried to show that Kiranga, being neither greedy
nor antagonistic to Saruni, was willing to accept the suggested com-
promise. Full consideration of Saruni’s claim was thus deliberately
obstructed by Kiranga’s counterclaim on Saruni’s title to the land he
already occupied. Saruni had certainly not expected any questioning of
that tenure and was put at a disadvantage. Now he was in danger of
seeming greedy and unwilling to compromise, while what might seem
a compromise for him was not one for Kiranga, who made no real
claim for more than Kewa’s land.
A junior elder spokesman accepted the compromise suggested by
Leteti. Kiranga, of course, voiced his agreement. Saruni protested that
his land was not in dispute, although several junior elders declared
that it was. Saruni persisted, saying that Leteti’s solution was no
solution at all since it ignored Saruni’s original claim. He asked
why Leteti was supporting Kiranga, a junior elder, instead of Saruni,
a “son” (senior murran). Leteti replied that he was seeking to show
his “son” a way of settling the matter. Saruni then asked why Kiranga
wanted the land—for his own use or for another purpose? Kiranga
merely replied that he needed it, but a senior murran called out that
Kiranga intended to pledge it to his brother-in-law. The chairman
said that this was irrelevant, since a man could do as he wished with
his own land. After more exchanges of this kind it seemed clear,
though not explicitly admitted by Kiranga, that he wished to pledge at
least part of the land to his wife’s brother Ndatia in lieu of bride-
wealth debt of two cattle.
This, said Saruni, was why Leteti, Ndatia’s father’s brother, was
supporting Kiranga instead of his “son”—Leteti himself would benefit
if Kiranga gained the land. Leteti denied this and argued that he acted
as a spokesman of the parish seeking a workable solution to the dis-
pute. He had, he pointed out, supported Saruni’s continued right to
the land he occupied. A murran spokesman declared that his age-mates
were being deserted by their “fathers” (senior elders). “We know,” he
said, “that you, our fathers, have been angry with us about your wives,
but you cannot desert us here. Are you trying to punish us all for
12 Philip H. Gulliver
what some of us have done to you?” He was referring to compensation
claims by senior elders for alleged adultery by their wives with some
senior murran. The adulteries may or may not have occurred, it being
customary for senior elders to make such claims when senior murran
were beginning to prepare for eventual ritual transfer to elderhood.
It was a standard method of emphasizing the corporate authority of
senior elders over their “sons.”
A junior elder spoke about the unruliness of the senior murran and
their inexperience. He urged the compromise suggestion of Leteti, and
Kiranga again voiced his assent. Senior elders were divided some for
and some against, but none seemed strongly in favor. One suggested
that the dispute ought to go to a moot, but no one took up the idea.
Another senior elder proposed that the men should “walk and look at
the land,” the recognized implication being an inspection with a view
to division of the land between the disputants. The age groups con-
sulted among themselves in whispers. After some time, a junior elder
spokesman said that his age-mates saw no value in the proposal; but
then a senior murran spokesman said that his age-mates agreed to it.
There was a pause, more whispered consultations, and then a senior
elder spokesman stood up and commended the wisdom of his “sons.”
He began to move out of the seated cluster of men, followed by some,
while others remained sitting. Junior elders conferred again, and
eventually they too got to their feet. There was confused movement,
as many men seemed not to know what was happening. The chairman
of the assembly took the initiative and called out: “Let us go and
look over there, beyond these bananas.” He moved that way accom-
panied by his age-mates, including Kiranga. Thus Kiranga and his
age-mates tacitly agreed to some division of the disputed land. By
following, Saruni and his age-mates indicated that they also accepted
this.
Between the banana grove and the boundary of Saruni’s farm to the
south was a field of about half an acre. “Let Saruni take this field,”
said the chairman. Kiranga showed agreement, while Saruni and his
supporters conferred among themselves. The chairman repeated his
words, and the senior murran remained silent, thus indicating absence
of disagreement. “These are the words. The matter is finished,” called
out a junior elder. There was no dissent. The parish headman said
that the new boundary should be marked out with hedge shoots, and
the chairman ordered some murran to do this. The rest of the men
returned to the place where they had been sitting and began to drink
beer supplied by both Kiranga and Saruni.
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Implications
In this dispute no unequivocal evidence was produced nor was a
firm decision reached concerning the first pioneering claims to the
land. It is possible that at that time, over seventy years ago, no well-
defined rights and boundaries were established, as land was then
plentiful. The manner in which this dispute was handled can be seen
as part of a general process of determining formerly undefined land
rights. Lack of clear definition, tolerable in the past, was no longer
acceptable. What may have been a tacit working arrangement among
kinsmen and neighbors was no longer tolerable among their heirs
who were but distantly related.^ Some compromise solution is typical
of the Arusha in cases involving conflicts over what has become, in
modern times, a critically scarce commodity. Population density ex-
ceeded 1,000 persons per square mile in 1957, and land was becoming
increasingly valuable for cash crops.
On the other hand, land rights and arrangements in earlier years
may have been quite well defined. But even established rights can be
challenged or circumvented, and they may be authenticated and de-
fended with varying adequacy. What is clear is that the conduct of
the hearings and the eventual solution depended inevitably on the
negotiating skills and power of the disputants and their supporters.
In other circumstances the evidence might well have been scrutinized
and weighed differently. Though both parties to the dispute appealed
to accepted norms and reasonable expectations, these norms and ex-
pectations could not be decisive in the absence of an adjudicator or
arbitrator. Saruni obtained only about a quarter of the disputed land,
mainly because of his weak negotiating strength.
Saruni’s weak position had several sources. In the first place, he had
very few close agnates and other patrilineal supporters in and near the
parish. Secondly, his maximal lineage counselor and the members of
his inner lineage, some of whom were poorly disposed toward him, all
lived at a distance. Thirdly, he was only a senior murran and had
rather inexperienced spokesmen and age-mates. They failed, for ex-
ample, to put enough stress on the previous occupation of the disputed
land by Saruni’s brother and on the fact that Saruni had granted the
tenancy to Kewa; they allowed themselves to be rattled and discon-
5. Neither disputant attempted to make a claim on the other in terms of kinship,
so slight was their relationship in that sense.
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certed by the junior elders’ tactics and to be hurried into a final di-
vision of the disputed land at the conclusion of the assembly. Finally,
the senior murran were already in some conflict with their logical and
experienced allies, the senior elders, who therefore failed to give them
undivided supp>ort.
Kiranga’s relative strength lay in his having several agnates in the
parish and a united inner lineage behind him; his being a junior
elder strongly supported by his experienced spokesmen and age-mates
in opposition to their rivals, the senior murran; and the valuable as-
sistance given him by Leteti, probably because Leteti stood to gain
from Kiranga’s intention to pledge land to Ndatia. The senior elders’
already weak support of the senior murran was further reduced by
Leteti’s disruptive action. Full consideration of the claim originally
raised by Saruni to the land occupied by Kewa was successfully de-
flected by the stratagem of questioning Saruni’s rights to his own
farm, as this enabled Leteti and the junior elders later to make much
of their readiness to acknowledge his rights there.
Throughout the dispute the junior elders took every opportunity to
belittle and harass their structural inferiors and rivals, the senior
murran. This was done both to weaken and obstruct Saruni’s case and
to emphasize their own superiority in the continuous conflict between
structurally and chronologically adjacent age groups.
Finally settlement of the dispute was reached, publicly witnessed,
and affirmed by the planting of hedge shoots along the newly agreed
boundary. It would be extremely difficult for either side thereafter to
raise the issue again. And to that extent, at least, it was a successful
settlement.
Changing Anthropology in Africa
bj Elizabeth Colson
Every generation is critical of the work of its immediate seniors,
though it may not always know the reasons for its disquiet. On the
whole, this discontent is a good thing. A discipline is alive only if it
continues to change, finding new problems to investigate and new so-
lutions for old problems. This is as true of anthropology as it is of
any other discipline, but the young anthropologist has more reason
than do specialists in other fields to query the relevance of old prob-
lems and old solutions for the organization of his own research. After
all, the societies and cultures that we study are changing rapidly and
the approaches and assumptions that dominated work done in earlier
years may no longer be appropriate or feasible. Changes occurring in
Africa and elsewhere with the removal of colonial rule and the coming
of independence are forcing us to give careful consideration to what
we have been doing and to reconsider some of our basic assumptions.
In part, the realization of the need for self-analysis is due to the
growing hostility to anthropology in many of the countries where we
have worked. If we wish to continue to base our discipline on the
whole range of human societies rather than on that limited portion
represented by Europe and the United States, we will have to under-
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stand and deal with this hostility. In doing so, we may learn some
things of value about the theoretical implications of some of the as-
sumptions that have guided us in our research, and this, in turn, may
help us in our search for new and better formulations.
Now, in part, our unpopularity is a fashion of the moment, voiced
by many who have probably never attempted to read an anthropologi-
cal account dealing with the region from which they come. It is
enough for them that too many of us continue to speak of primitive
peoples and that we illustrate our books with photographs emphasizing
the exotic. We will have a difficult time living down our current repu-
tations as students of the primitive even if we see that future publica-
tions are so written that they do not offend in this respect. Nevertheless,
this is only a minor matter. Such editing would not force the future
anthropologist to abandon any of the present methods of work or
require him to alter any of the formulations handed down to him by
his teachers. He could continue to work in the same way as did his
forerunners.
Some of our unpopularity, however, stems from a characteristic
much more fundamental in determining the nature of our research.
In a century in which the leaders of newly independent countries are
trying to develop a sense of national unity based upon citizenship in
a common territory, the anthropologist has taken as his basic unit for
the organization of research something we usually call “tribe.” There
are many definitions of “tribe,” but all of them carry some assumption
of homogeneity based on common language and common descent.
They also carry the implication of a limited development of political
institutions. The definitions also imply something about size—that the
tribal population is too small to sponsor a full-scale state. In Africa
today the new governments and their political leaders are attempting
to minimize the importance of smaller ethnic units, and they decry
both tribes and tribalism. If anthropology continues to be associated
with either term or appears to emphasize the importance of either
phenomenon, it continues to be an unacceptable form of research in
the new countries.
We would therefore be well advised to ask ourselves why we have
chosen to study tribes and whether it is necessary for us to continue
to phrase our research in these terms. Now certainly Africa, like any
other part of the world, has within it a multiplicity of languages, and
common language in the past has often encouraged the creation of a
social or political entity worthy of examination. But our emphasis
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upon tribe probably stems more from the founding fathers of anthro-
pology than it does from African realities. They were very much a part
of the intellectual milieu of the Western world of their period. The
question of nationalities was the dominant political question in
nineteenth-century Europe, gave rise to the doctrine of the self-determi-
nation of nations in the twentieth century, and continued to haunt the
European scene into the first years of World War II. Eor Europe and
for the social scientists of the Western world the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were the centuries of nationalism—a nationalism
of a peculiar kind. In Great Britain and the United States, where
political unity had been attained at an earlier period, a nation was
seen as created by a state organization; people born within the terri-
tory controlled by the state were its citizens and thus members of a
nation. 1 The rest of Europe, led by German humanists, developed
quite another conception of nationalism. “German nationalism,” as
Hans Kohn said, “substituted for the legal and rational concept of
‘citizenship’ the infinitely vaguer concept of ‘folk,’ which first dis-
covered by the German humanists was fully developed by Herder and
the German romanticists. ’’^ It was the romanticists who “established a
distinction between State and nation: they regarded the State as a
mechanical and juridical construction, the artificial product of histori-
cal accidents, while they believed the nation to be the work of nature,
and therefore something sacred, eternal, organic, carrying a deeper
justification than works of men.”^
These words strike an answering echo in the minds of anthropolo-
gists. We began as a study of the “folk” in the German sense. We
sought a natural unit lasting through time, having an organic unity,
capable of being analyzed as a natural system. Commonalities of
language and custom, were to us a sign that we had found such units
and that they implied political and social organization. Assuming that
they were natural systems that would persist through time, we set to
work to understand them.
The predilection given to anthropologists by their concern for cul-
tures as patterned wholes or societies as integrated systems was fostered
by the fact that they entered an Africa dominated by colonial powers
whose political thinkers had also been influenced by the idealization of
1. See Sir Lewis Namier, Vanished Supremacies (New York: Macmillan, 1963),
p. 32.
2. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 331.
3. Ibid., p. 249.
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the nation or the folk. It was the European administrations that
organized the political units of twentieth-century Africa. The ad-
ministrators were fully aware that the countries they had created
through the carving up of Africa were artificial units. They did not
expect that the new countries would necessarily persist in the form of
the moment. But within the artificial states they sought to sponsor the
development of what they regarded as the natural units of African
societies either by using existing political structures persisting from
the pre-colonial African states or by creating new units on the basis of
what they perceived as ethnic unities. No attempt was made to cater
to ethnic identities where they were at odds with international bound-
aries, but within the new countries the administrations tried to make
local political divisions coincide with ethnic or tribal divisions. No
doubt this reflected the awareness of European administrations of the
problems caused in Europe by the nationalities question and the
demands for national unity on the part of peoples speaking a common
tongue. The new administration sought to prevent similar problems
from arising and disturbing the future peace of Africa. Where possible,
therefore, district or provincial boundaries reflected linguistic or cul-
tural boundaries. Local governments were treated as the embodiment
of tribal or ethnic polities and indeed were customarily called
native authorities. The tribe or nation rather than the territorial
district was regarded as the ultimate reality, for nationality was
assumed to be inherited. Men were regarded as tribal members
wherever they might happen to be living. They were recognized as
having a legal claim only in the territory dominated by the tribe into
which they had been born. Each member of a tribe was assumed to
have an inherited culture received from his ancestors and passed on to
his descendants. His natural associates were those who shared this
same mystical bond with past and future.
The anthropologist was thus encouraged both by his own discipline
and by the current political scene to use the tribe or national polity as
his reference points, whether he came to Africa expecting to study
culture, as did many American anthropologists, or to study a society,
as did many trained in Britain. From the people inhabiting a common
area with their multitudinous relationships and actions he abstracted
a tribal entity for study, and his statements about society and about
culture referred to this entity.
When African leaders began to challenge the colonial regime, they
changed the definition of nationalism. They did not see their own
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development as a prolongation of the history of Europe. When they
organized for the future, they chose to employ the territorial state as
the natural political unit, and within the state they emphasized
common residence as the basis for common citizenship. They ignored
the nations or the tribes as politically irrelevant or noxious. The
anthropologist who studies tribes is to them as outmoded and perni-
cious as the colonial officials who sought to entrench the small societies
of the past as permanent groups with unchanging boundaries.
Until this happened, few anthropologists had sought to defend their
choice of the tribe or its culture as a research focus. The choice seemed
to them in many instances to be a self-evident one, though Schapera
had already argued in the 1930’s that the student of social change
should study the various relationships and institutions represented
within an area and that trader and missionary were as much a part of
the local scene as the chief. Even where this was accepted by anthro-
pologists who were beginning to talk about social systems and action
fields rather than societies and cultures, in actual practice the tribe
continued to be the focal point.
Conditions in Africa often encouraged this. Until after World War
II, communications were usually difficult. Like most residents of
Africa at that time, the anthropologist tended to be tied closely to a
small locality and had little opportunity to move widely about the
countryside. Until the improvement of communications, the rise of
national political parties, and the new stress on economic development,
it was usually not only possible to ignore what went on within the
country or district at large, it was also difficult to obtain much informa-
tion about what was occurring beyond one’s immediate purview.
Commercial and industrial centers might exist in the same district in
which the anthropologist was working, but their impact was not con-
stantly before him. The few who did study urban life—and such studies
mostly date from very recent years—found that African areas of the
town were set apart physically, socially, and politically from areas
inhabited by the ruling peoples. The local political system of the
native authority differed in kind as well as in membership from the
administrative system of the district office or the national political
system. The anthropologist who worked in the rural areas could go
for weeks and sometimes months without seeing an official from the
wider political system, although he might hear of official actions that
impinged on the local people. He would see material goods brought
into the countryside and used there, and he would hear of the sale of
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cash crops and of men going to work for cash wages, but many of the
economic transactions he observed took place in a local exchange sys-
tem governed by other principles than market exchange. Some of the
children might be in school, but before World War II most of them
were educated at home by parents and guardians preparing them for
the same way of life they themselves knew. As late as the 1950’s it was
entirely possible for anthropologists to work in areas with no nearby
schools and where it was difficult to find anyone with more than a bare
minimum of literacy.
In the late 1940’s, when I first worked in the southern province of
Zambia, then the colonial territory of Northern Rhodesia, most of the
people I knew were mainly concerned with village life. For many the
political horizon stopped at the district level, and the district com-
missioner was regarded as wielding independent power. The provincial
commissioner and the territorial governor were distant figures in
whom the local residents had little interest. The legislative council of
the territory meant little or nothing. Settlers, traders, missionaries, and
administrative and technical officers w'ere occasionally seen, but usually
only when one visited a township, farm, mission, or administrative
station. Such people were discussed more than seen, for a constant
theme of conversation was the differences between Europeans and
Africans.
Village people saw Europeans as foreigners with their own manners
and customs. They distinguished between their own institutions and
those of the foreigners, and even when they attempted to model them-
selves on the foreigners they did not regard the new way of life as
representing their own custom. Insofar as I learned to see through
local eyes, their attitudes certainly influenced me. I suspect most other
anthropologists who worked during these decades were similarly in-
fluenced.
We accepted the local view all the more easily because for many
reasons it was convenient to compartmentalize our thinking and to
attempt to isolate a tribal or local system from a wider system for the
purposes of analysis. Even though social anthropologists sought to
deal with contemporary life and with social change, our analytical
models at this period were such that we were happiest when we could
create a working description that included only sets of relationships
that could be observed by the investigator. Given the difficulties of
transportation and of following sets of transactions over any wide area,
we sought the most convenient cutoff points, which left us with the
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local scene as an independent world of events related only vaguely to
external happenings.
Whether we intended it or not, this method of working led to an
archaizing of our descriptions, for the organic model we were trying
to preserve was our model of the tribe as a culture-bearing natural
unit. This tribe had a past, and we paid disproportionate attention to
the more immediate past in reconstructing what we thought of as the
traditional culture, not always realizing that to claim something as
traditional was sometimes the only way to legitimating innovation. We
emphasized old customs or older types of institutions that we regarded
as characteristic of the tribe and gave only a very summary attention
to the new schools, the developing group of clerks, technicians, and
teachers, the discontent of the young, and the creation of new forms of
association. All these might be recognized as present, but they were not
part of the “tribal” picture. If they entered into our description, they
did not form part of our analysis of the ongoing system of institutions.
In many parts of Africa tribal society, if it ever existed, has long
been a thing of the past. Today almost everywhere the more natural
unit for observation, and certainly the one that most easily reflects the
rapidity of change, is the territorial one. Teachers, traders, clerks, and
local government officials transfer from one part of the country to an-
other; men seek economic advantage where they can. Today it would
be more realistic to concentrate on the heterogeneity of the actual local
scene rather than to attempt to reconstruct the assumed homogeneity
of the past. Of course, if we are to do this we will have to develop
new methods that can deal with heterogeneity and rapid change.
Such a shift will guide us away from some of the errors involved in the
old forms of research based on the assumption that the tribe existed
historically over a long period of time.
Our adoption of the tribe as a natural unit also had other implica-
tions. Unconsciously we were all Darwinians, for we wrote as though
acceptable change took place only through the slow accumulation of
small variations. Only then could the natural system absorb change
and continue as an integrated system. Violent change or violent con-
frontations were seen as harmful or dangerous. Indeed, attempting to
describe too faithfully the various rapid changes that might be occur-
ring put in jeopardy our theoretical model. Changes as rapid as those
we might encounter could not be related to one another in an inte-
grated system; perhaps we were no longer studying an integrated
system. The result of such speculation was to challenge the validity of
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our local study. The only possible escape from the impasse was to
disregard as much as possible the impingement of the outside on the
local scene, to allow only that much to be reflected in our descriptions
as permitted us to continue with the assumption that we were studying
a society with an organized way of life in which the various actions of
its members were somehow harmonized.
The overemphasis on the past and on “native culture,” as opposed
to the growth within local society, was also conditioned by the anthro-
pologist’s audience. He was certainly not writing for the local people,
though he might claim to be writing for their children and their
children’s children. But he was much more conscious of his immediate
audience, composed of other anthropologists and various Europeans
with interest in Africa—administrators, technicians, missionaries,
traders, and settlers. In writing for such an audience there were certain
things the anthropologist could assume his readers knew. They knew
about schools, stores, prices, the color bar, the colonial system, and
the organization of technical and administrative services. Thus, much
detail important for an understanding of the contemporary scene
could be mentioned briefly, for the readers wanted material unfamiliar
to them described and explained. Inevitably the anthropologist wrote of
customs as though they were strange and stressed the exotic, not
necessarily because he himself found them strange by the time he wrote
his report but because he was trying to explain local institutions to
foreigners. If an African belonging to the local society had written an
account of the same scene for his own people he would have written
in different terms. He could have assumed their knowledge of such
things as the kinship institutions, the marriage rules, the meaning
behind religious rituals. On the other hand, he might have dwelt at
length on such matters as the administrative organization, the school
system, and the peculiarities of the trading stores.
Both accounts would have been equally true, though neither would
have been complete. But the fact remains that for thoughtful African
observers anthropological accounts usually appear either as distorted
or as pretentious discussions of the commonplace.
Today our audience is much more varied. It still includes anthro-
pologists and a variety of Europeans and Americans concerned with
Africa. But today we are increasingly aware of African colleagues and
the educated men and women of Africa who are deciding if we have
anything to offer them. In a period of rapid change in which each
country is developing along its own lines as it is freed from the uni-
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formity imposed by the colonial system, it is no longer possible to
assume that our audience either from outside Africa or inside the
continent is familiar with the general framework of national political,
legal, and economic institutions within which a particular local area
operates. Of necessity we will have to pay greater attention to national
institutions than we have in the past. At the same time, learning to
write for this new audience may compel us to a new rigor in presenta-
tion. In deciding what to write about we can no longer ask ourselves
the easy question—what is familiar and what is unfamiliar? We will
have to ask ourselves the much more demanding question—what
features must be included if we are to describe this system adequately,
or what variables must be included if this hypothesis is to be tested?
In this, of course, we also meet the drive from within anthropology
for a more rigorous sense of problem.
For anthropologists who expect to judge and use earlier accounts of
an area there is an implicit warning in what has just been said. They
can expect to understand the implications of the earlier research only
if they know what the writers assumed their readers to already know.
Emphasis on the tribe as the natural social unit and on the un-
known rather than the familiar had advantages during the colonial
period that were more or less consciously recognized by those con-
ducting the research but that do not apply in contemporary Africa.
Both emphases permitted the fieldworker to avoid violent collision
with the local power structure. The tribal political system was pre-
vented from having any direct influence on the national political
scene. It was permitted to deal only with local issues and local events,
and this under the guidance of district officers or magistrates who
came from outside the tribe. The anthropologist might be suspected
by administrators and settlers as a possible troublemaker whose actions
questioned the validity of the color bar and the existing distribution of
wealth and privilege. He was almost certainly an irritant, with his
claims to superior understanding of the local people and their aspira-
tions based on the fact that he lived among them. But so long as he
made no attempt to comment on the administration and did not
publicly challenge the existing structure of relationships in too blatant
a fashion, he could usually work without much interference. As long as
his writing dealt with the remnants of the pre-European political
structure or with the religious or social life of the local people it was
not considered dangerous, although it might be dismissed as irrelevant
to practical problems. Administrators, settlers, and missionaries had
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little reason to feel threatened by the anthropologist’s work because it
did not deal with their own customs and policies.
It was fair enough, perhaps, to ignore the kinship system of settler
and administrator, but in ignoring the local administration and its
involvement with a larger system of power relationships, the anthro-
pologist was working in a political vacuum. This he realized, but it
was a compromise required of him if he were to continue to carry out
his research within Africa. Attempts to widen the scope of investigation
and include the local political officer and his staff ended in disaster.
Attempts to include local settlers as objects of research might meet
with outright refusal of cooperation.
This limited scope may have mattered little for some of the prob-
lems anthropologists were investigating before the late 1950’s. Indeed,
it may have been an advantage since it permitted the fieldworker to
concentrate on a manageable field of observation. I suspect, however,
that the limitation contributed to the continued use of the organic
model of society, with its emphasis on harmonious functioning of
institutions for the maintenance of society. Already this was preventing
advances into research on more complex social systems and was
limiting the examination of the problems of maintenance, as well as of
problems of change. It led to an expectation of stability and continuity
and to a failure to perceive the actual forces at work. We were, in fact,
examining dependent systems as though they were independent sys-
tems. In analyzing a political system, we did not deal with that portion
of the system that controlled the use of force save in the most casual
fashion. We consequently played down the degree to which men
manipulate events and seek their own interests. We paid little atten-
tion to the clash of irreconcilable differences. The functional model
led us to emphasize sets of ideal relationships or immutable custom
rather than the degree to which men manipulate their fellows to attain
their ends. Such conflict as we reported was usually repetitive con-
flict seen as absorbed by the system or as working to maintain it. Our
descriptive statements might contain information on the discontents of
people and the breakdown of this or that accommodation, but our
analytical models stressed the continuation of relationships and the
maintenance of the existing system. The radical changes that have
taken place in Africa within the last ten years have helped to dis-
credit the old theories of the bases for social systems. Only now are we
beginning to develop the tools for a study of conflict that allow us to
deal with rapid change. Indeed, the shift from a study of equilibrium
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to the study of conflict is one of the significant developments within
anthropology in the last decade and a half.
It is uncertain that this new development will help us very much in
the immediate future in making ourselves acceptable as students of
Africa. Central governments and national political parties today domi-
nate the local scene both in towns and in rural areas as they never did
in earlier years. Local and national political leaders are interchange-
able; they belong to the same universe, as they did not in the past.
Local and national elites share in the same social and economic in-
stitutions in a way new to Africa and to the anthropologist attempting
to describe and analyze the processes of contemporary African life.
There are no sealing-off points at the moment to remove the local from
the national scene either for the purpose of constructing convenient
analytical models or for the purpose of producing descriptions of polit-
ical and social processes that can be regarded as innocuous by those
in power. What the anthropologist is describing as true only of the
most remote rural area may affect the position of a national leader.
Earlier, local European settlers and administrators had the political
power to prevent themselves from being subject to study by a foreign
observer; today African leaders have stepped into the positions of
power and they can prevent studies that include them as part of the
scene. Although Africans objected to the type of study that emphasized
the harmony of life and the continuity of relationships insofar as this
seemed to imply a continuance of colonial society, today they may
object even more to the examination of situations wherein men come
into conflict and the way in which men seek to manipulate one an-
other.
The new theoretical interests of anthropology, therefore, are not
always such as bring them willing acceptance on the part of those who
have power. What else have they to offer? Foreign anthropologists
working in Africa have lost advantages that formerly accrued to them
because they were foreigners of the same type as those who composed
the ruling group. Once they could serve as interpreters and inter-
mediaries between the local peoples, with whom they lived, and the
foreign administration and foreign institutions, which the people saw
as threatening. Frequently the anthropologist won a welcome because
with his entree to the society of those who held power he could be
used by the local people to their own ends. For this, if no other reason,
it was wise to court him and to assist him in his research. An anthro-
pologist in these circumstances might be seen as someone who could
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become at least a partial confidant of those in many ranks of local
society. Today this is no longer true. The people of the local area
usually have more access than does the anthropologist to administrative
and political circles in which decisions are made. They have no need
of the anthropologist in the role of intermediary.
In the new Africa the anthropologist will probably be welcome only
if he can find a new role for himself and a new set of research problems.
He will no doubt have to accept that he is no longer committed to the
holistic approach to culture and society, which has long been regarded
as the hallmark of his profession. He may retain the fundamental
conviction that actions can best be understood in context, but he can-
not expect to know the total context. Probably the approach was never
realistic; today it is inappropriate. The stage on which people move
is too large; their contacts extend over too wide an area; they are aware
of themselves in a new fashion as citizens not only of a new country
but also of a new earth. When in 1965 I visited the villages where I
had lived in the 1940’s, I found their people visiting here and there
throughout Zambia, at school in Europe and America, attending con-
ferences in other parts of Africa and in Australia. Where I once found
none who had gone beyond the primary school, there are now uni-
versity graduates. Where the political horizon was once the district, it
is now the country of Zambia and the United Nations. Already they
are finding their own voices and are writing their own books in which
they speak for themselves about their lives, their culture, their society.
They no longer feel the need for a foreign interpreter.
Probably the same changes have taken place over much of Africa.
The people who are aware of themselves as never before have no wish
to be studied as objects, though they may still welcome the outsider who
is prepared to respect their ways. The anthropologist can no longer
expect to become the expert on a people, the unique exponent of their
way of life. He now shares the stage with many other interpreters, some
of whom are permanent members of the cast of the drama he watches.
It is no longer enough to describe the strange, to analyze the un-
familiar. We must say something significant in local terms if we are to
be welcome. On the other hand, the anthropologist can find new ad-
vantage in this change. He no longer needs to feel that he alone is
responsible for the collection and presentation of data. As his work
has been made more difficult in one direction, so it has been eased in
others. Increasingly he can rely on colleagues in the area who have
collected much of the relevant detail that formerly he had to record
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himself. Perhaps the anthropologist today has a greater chance to
speculate, to explore a range of problems, because there are others who
can provide data and check his results. If he will accept the new era,
he can speak with more assurance of his intellectual findings because
he no longer must cite himself as the sole authority. Increasingly we
work among people with a known history, with a file of records, with
a written literature. Increasingly they are able to comment on our
results.
To sum up the changes which a changing Africa is forcing upon
anthropological research: We can no longer consider ourselves as stu-
dents of primitive peoples or of tribal culture. We cannot study people
as people, for they see this as turning them into objects of research.
We are increasingly dealing with contemporaries who are able and
only too willing to criticize our work. But a genuine concern for com-
parative religion, law, economics, kinship, and other social phenomena
will still give us entree to the society of people who, like us, are con-
cerned with the diversity of the human record and seek to understand
it.
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The British and the
Ethiopian Railway
bj Harold G. Marcus
After the Fashoda crisis, when France decided that “schemes of terri-
torial conquest should be abandoned . . . and attention should center
on the realization of the economic possibilities of the territories al-
ready in French hands, she found the way to economic predominance
in Ethiopia already open. A French company held a concession to
build a railway from Jibuti to Addis Ababa. French officials thought
that, should this railway be successful, “the commerce of Harrar and
Abyssinia would very naturally use the railway from Jibuti, thus
making Jibuti vital to the Ethiopian economy. Commercial predomi-
nance was bound to bring with it a measure of political control.
Britain’s need to protect the Nile affluents meant that she could not
allow any potentially dangerous European power to gain influence at
Menilek’s court. Sir John Lane Harrington, Great Britain’s first am-
1. J. B. Christopher, “Ethiopia, the Jibuti Railway and the Powers, 1899-1906”
(Ph.D. diss.. Harvard University, 1942), p. 52.
2. Silvain Vigneras, Notice sur la Cote Frangaise des Somalis (Paris: Imprimerie
Paul Dupont, 1900), p. 78.
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bassador in Ethiopia, strenuously opposed the attempt to make
Ethiopia a French preserve. He favored an open door policy, which he
regarded as compatible “with the maintenance of the territorial integ-
rity of Abyssinia which the British Government was anxious to see
preserved.”^
The Railway Concession of 1894
The long and complex story of the Ethiopian railway began in
1897. Alfred Ilg, who later became Menilek’s chief foreign adviser,
constructed a model railway to show Menilek, then King of Shoa,
what modern transportation could mean for the future of Ethiopia.
Remembering that the British had built a small railway for moving
troops into Ethiopia at the time of the Mak’dala expedition, Menilek
felt that he should not build anything so strategically dangerous;
moreover, he believed that the Emperor Yohannes would never ap-
prove such a project. When Menilek became King of Kings in 1889,
however, Ilg again suggested that the possibility of a railroad be
studied, and on 11 February 1893 Menilek issued a decree allowing Ilg
to do so.
Ilg chose Jibuti as the coastal terminus for the proposed railway and
then sent Leon Chefneux—a friend of Ilg’s in Ethiopia, where he was
variously a merchant, a trader in guns and munitions, French consular
officer, Ethiopian consular officer in Europe, and adviser to Menilek—
to Europe to investigate the cost of materials and possible sources of
capital and to find a contractor for the job. Chefneux returned in late
1893; he reported that the projected plans for the railway were feasible
and that funds for the venture would be available in France.
On 9 March 1894, Menilek granted Ilg a concession that allowed
him to form a company to build a railroad.^ Though the concession
stated that the line was to be built in three sections—the first from
Jibuti to Rarer, the second from Rarer to Int’otto (Addis Ababa), and
the third from Int’otto to Kafa and the White Nile—it only dealt with
the line from Jibuti to Rarer. The validity of the concession ex-
tended from the date of signature until ninety-nine years after “the day
3. T. Lennox Gilmour, Abyssinia: The Ethiopian Railway and the Powers
(London: Allston Rivers, 1906), p. 11.
4. Conrad Keller, Alfred Ilg, Sein Leben und Seine Werke (Frauenfeld and Leip-
zig: Verlag von Hiiber und Co,, 1918), pp. 131-34.
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when the construction is finished and operation begins.” The con-
cession further stipulated that no other railroad company would ‘‘be
authorised to construct concurrent lines, from either the shores of the
Indian Ocean, or the Red Sea to Ethiopia, or from Ethiopia to the
White Nile.” However, if construction of the railway did not begin
within four years of the date of signature, the concession would be
nullified.® Upon the concession’s expiration, the railway’s equipment
and fixed installations were to become ‘‘the property of the Govern-
ment of Ethiopia without indemnity.” To aid it in meeting its ex-
penditures, the company was allowed to collect a ten-percent duty on
all merchandise ‘‘coming or going” on any usable portion of the rail-
road, and the emperor undertook to order that all goods leaving
Jibuti ‘‘ought henceforth to be transported by the railway,” with the
proviso that troops or war materials of the Ethiopian government
would be carried at low cost in times of peace and free of charge in
times of war.®
On 12 January 1896, the Paris firm of Duparchy and Vigouroux
signed the contract to build the railroad line.^ But in order to start
construction at Jibuti, the concessionaires needed the French govern-
ment’s permission. Since the outcome of the Italo-Ethiopian war was
then not yet certain, the French government, though it aided Menilek
with arms and ammunition, did not wish to provoke Italy further by
authorizing the construction of a strategic railway through French
territory. Moreover, an Italian victory would have doomed the Addis
Ababa-Jibuti railway project, since the Italians could then be expected
to insist that any railroad to Addis Ababa start in Eritrea. In light of
these considerations, the French government withheld its permission
to build a railway until shortly after the Battle of Adwa.® A formal
convention giving the Imperial Railway Company of Ethiopia the
right to lay a railway to Rarer over French Somali territory, to build
the necessary appurtenances in Jibuti, and to collect in Jibuti the
5. A supplemental statement of 5 November 1896 gave the company an additional
three years within which to start construction. F.O. 403/334, Law Officers of the
Crown to Foreign Office, 16 February 1903.
6. Governo Italiano, Ministero degli Afferi Esteri, Trattati (Rome, 1906), I, 415;
and F.O. 403/299, 1900.
7. Gouvernement de France, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, La Concession du Chemin
de Per Franco-Ethiopien (Paris: Librairie Generate de Droit et de Jurisprudence,
1924), p. 1.
8. Angoulvant and Vigneras, Djibouti, Mer Rouge, Abyssinie (Paris: Librairie
Africaine et Coloniale, 1902), p. 334; F.O. 403/275, Letter of Mr. Guiyesse, 27
April 1896.
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ten percent duty stipulated in the Concession in 1894 was not signed
until 12 March 1897.^
British Financial Involvements
The Railway Company estimated that the 300 kilometers of the
Jibuti-Harer section of the line would cost about 30 million francs.
They “knew from the first that construction of the railway would be
expensive [but] they casually assumed that they could procure with
ease the large sums required. By mid-June 1897, the Railway Com-
pany had gathered 4 million francs by subscription, 1 million of which
was paid in.^^ Among the subscribers to this first bond issue was a
British firm, the New Africa Company, Ltd.^^ Most of the big firms in
France, however, did not invest as much as the Railway Company had
hoped they would; they regarded the railway as a political instrument
rather than a commercial undertaking, and they felt that they could
not count upon the backing of the French government, whose attitude
in regard to the project was unknown to them.^^ Thereupon, the Rail-
way Company decided to create 85,000 obligations worth 500 francs
each. Of the 76,500 obligations immediately issued, the concessionaires
bought 56,700 for only 250 francs each. They succeeded in selling
about 2,000 more, and the remainder was given to Duparchy and
Vigouroux as an advance for their work. Thus, of the 38 million
francs that could have been realized from the obligations issued, only
15 million were actually obtained. Even with the 4 million it received
from the first bond issue, the Railway Company was still about 10
million short of the 30 million francs it needed. In December 1897 it
finally obtained a loan for the balance in France.
New financial difficulties arose in 1899. This time the Railway
Company was unable to raise a loan in France and it turned to British
investors for help.^^ On 29 June 1900 the chairman of the New Africa
Company intimated in a public speech that for commercial reasons his
9. Carlo Rosetti, Storia Diplomatica deWEtiopia (durante il Regno di Menelik H)
(Turin: Societa Tipografica Editrice Nazionale, 1910), pp. 139-40.
10. Christopher, Ethiopia, p. 26.
11. Angoulvant and Vigneras, Djibouti, pp. 333-39.
12. Christopher, Ethiopia, p. 37.
13. Ibid., p. 46.
14. F.O. 403/322, memo, of Sanderson, 28 June 1902.
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firm might aid the Imperial Railway Company of Ethiopiad^ and in
August the New Africa Company agreed to lend the Railway Company
2 million francs at six percent interest. In the following year Oceana,
Ltd., and the New Egyptian Company also invested heavily in the
railway.!® In July 1901 the three British companies together with a few
French investors pooled their interests and formed the International
Ethiopian Railway Trust and Construction Company, Ltd.,!"^ which
immediately assumed control of the Imperial Railway Company. The
trust took four of the eight company directorships. It also acquired
options on 30,000 company bonds, or 15,000 shares. The company
agreed not to issue any further obligations or shares without first
obtaining the trust’s agreement, and the trust held the contract for
constructing the railroad line from the 225!*' to the 245^^ kilometer. In
addition, the trust obtained from the company exclusive rights for
constructing any of its future lines in Ethiopia.!® Thus, by the middle
of 1901 the Railway Company, though French in name, was largely
controlled by British capital. This fact caused concern in French
colonial circles, who immediately began a vigorous campaign to secure
the French government’s intervention in the building of the railroad,!®
and the Trust Company reacted by seeking the British government’s
protection.
Fears of French Domination
The Trust Company knew that the British government had evinced
concern as early as 1898 over the possibility that French government
involvement in the railway would result in French political and
economic predominance in Ethiopia. At that time Sadler, the consul
in the British Somaliland Protectorate, had written to Creagh, the
15. Gilmour, Abyssinia, p. 18,
16. The New Africa Company, Oceana, Ltd., and the New Egyptian Company,
each organized to make overseas investments, held each other’s shares and had inter-
connecting directorships. Together they held interests in the Transvaal, South
Africa, Mozambique, Congo, Egypt, and Sudan. See Woolf, Empire and Commerce
in Africa (London: Labour Research Department and George Allen Unwin, n.d.),
p. 206.
17. Rosetti, Storia Diplomatica, p. 141.
18. F.O. 1/41, memo, by Lansdowne to Salisbury, 26 June 1901.
19. Gilmour, Abyssinia, pp. 20-21.
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resident in Aden, warning him of the possible consequences of the
railway for the Somaliland Protectorate:
I do not think it is too much to say that, if the line is completed and no
counteracting steps are taken by our Government the trade of southern
Abyssinia and the Galla country [to] Zeyla will be doomed . .
.
[and]
we should in fact lose the very means [customs duties] upon which we
rely to develop the Protectorate and make it a paying concern.20
And Harrington, the British ambassador to Ethiopia, warned London
that the railway would enable France “to lay hands on Harrar and the
surrounding country should a favourable occasion occur.” He also in-
formed London that a British “group” was willing to underwrite a
railroad from Zeila to the trunkline below Harer. He thought that
both Ras Makonnen, Manilek’s viceroy in Harraghi Province, and the
emperor would prefer a line with branches to both the English and the
French seaboards, “as thereby they would feel themselves more inde-
pendent of one or another power”; and the “group,” he reported, be-
lieved that a connection between Harer and the English seaboard
would “improve the prospects of the Railway Company in all re-
spects.”2 i
The Foreign Office wrote to Sadler about the suggested Harer-
Zeila line to be built under British government guarantee.22 The
British government, though unwilling to take any concrete official
action, was ready to “view with approval arrangements to facilitate a
line from Berbera to Zeyla and Harrar.’’^^ Sadler, however, felt that
a British railway to Zeila, though politically expedient, could not be
justified commercially. “It has . .
.
yet to be shown,” he wrote, “that
a railway would result in a large increase of trade to the Protectorate
. .
.
[since] trade would naturally follow the best route and find its
exit at Jibuti.” If the railroad could have its one terminus at Berbera,
instead of at Jibuti, it might succeed, but he did not “think that the
French would . . . readily acquiesce in a measure that would spell
ruin to their Colony unless they are prepared to abandon it, of which I
20. F.O. 403/284, Sadler to Creagh, 4 June 1898.
21. F.O. 403/275, memo, by Harrington, n.d.
22. F.O. 403/275, Foreign Office to Sadler, 14 October 1898. In this letter the name
of Alfred Ochs, general manager of the New Africa Company, was mentioned. In
December, Ochs wrote to the Foreign Office (F.O. 403/275, A.L. Ochs to Foreign
Office, 3 December 1898). From this correspondence it is fairly clear that Harring-
ton’s “group” was made up of agents of the New Africa Company.
23. F.O. 403/275, Salisbury to Cromer, 19 December 1898.
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see no present indication. ”24 Harrington agreed that there was no
room for two lines, and he suggested that the best method for England
to ensure against French predominance in Ethiopia would be to take
over the French railway.^s
Harrington had already written in November 1898 that “the more I
see of this country the more convinced I am that it is to our interest to
pay a considerable sum for Railway communications with Harrar, or
to prevent France alone having it . “26 To him the whole issue was
simply a “question of rendering British influence paramount in Abys-
sinia or not, [and] the chances of our making our influence paramount
are at the present moment most favourable. ”27 British capital was al-
ready deeply involved in the railway, and Harrington felt that the
most obvious step would be for the British government to back a
British financial group in taking over control of the existing railway.28
By this time Harrington was gaining some support in his growing
concern over the railroad. Lord Cromer, while believing that “Harring-
ton overstates the case,” wrote that he “would much rather the French
should not occupy the predominant position in Abyssinia, which the
construction of the railway will probably give them. They are sure to
cause us trouble of one sort or another.”26 When Harrington warned
Menilek that the railroad concession was a monopoly which “had
placed practically the whole future commercial development of his
country in the hands of the French,” Menilek replied that the con-
cession did not interfere with British interests, since “he had only
written in the Concession that no other railway would be permitted
‘near’ the French railway, and that he had never intended a monop-
oly.”3^ Harrington then asked London for a legal interpretation, and
in August the Law Officers of the Crown reported their
opinion that the effect of the Concession granted to M. Ilg is to debar the
Emperor from granting any Concession for the construction of a railway
in Abyssinia which would be a competing line with that authorised by
M. Ilg’s Concession. The question whether any proposed railway would
so compete would be a question of fact, but it would appear clear that
24. F.O. 403/298, Sadler to Salisbury, 29 March 1899.
25. F.O. 1/36, Harrington to Rodd, 22 April 1899.
26. F.O. 403/275, memo, by Harrington, 7 November 1898.
27. F.O. 403/284, memo, by Harrington, n.d.
28. F.O. 403/298, Harrington to Cromer, 14 April 1900.
29. F.O. 403/298, Cromer to Foreign Office, 15 May 1900.
30. F.O. 403/299, Harrington to Salisbury, May 30, 1900.
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any line running from the coast of British Somaliland to Harrar would
be both “competing” and “near.”3i
This statement persuaded the British government that a railroad
line from Rarer to the British coast was out of the question from a
legal as well as from an economic standpoint. It also aroused Menilek’s
fear of France, whose friendly motives he had not previously sus-
pected.32 turned to the British in hope that they would find a way
of circumventing the concession. The British Trust Company, too,
solicited the support of its government in its effort to keep control of
the Railway Company out of the hands of the French government.
The Convention of 1902
Meanwhile, the Comitd de I’Afrique Fran^aise, which “considered
British designs on the railway part of a gigantic plot to expel the
French from East Africa and install British hegemony over Ethiopia,”^^
was making some headway in its campaign to secure the support of
the republic in ridding the railway of British interventionists. To gain
the support of the comite in the forthcoming general elections, the
Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry agreed to give financial aid to the Railway
Company,34 which by the end of 1901 had run out of funds with only
220 kilometers of rail completed.^® On 6 February 1902, the French
government and the Railway Company signed a convention that had
the effect of making a private enterprise, as one writer put it, “the
official protege of one state, operating in another equally sovereign
state, but without the consent of the second party.”^®
The convention provided for the transfer of the title to the rail-
way concession from Alfred Ilg to the Railway Company. It also
stipulated that the company should have its permanent headquarters
in Paris and be governed by French law. Henceforth, the company
could assume no obligations without the approval of the French
ministers of colonies and finance. The directors of the company had to
be French and their appointments subject to approval by the ministers
of colonies and foreign affairs, who could, if they deemed this to be in
31. F.O. 403/299, Law Officers of the Crown to Foreign Office, 31 August 1900.
32. F.O. 403/312, Harrington to Lansdowne, 12 January 1901.
33. Christopher, Ethiopia, p. 73.
34. Gilmour, Abyssinia, p. 21.
35. Gouvernement de France, La Concession, p. 1.
36. Christopher, Ethiopia, p. 140.
37The British and the Ethiopian Railway
the public interest, replace them at any time. The company could not
change any of its statutes without the permission of these two ministers,
nor could it cede or lease any of its property without their approval
and the advice of the minister of finance. The convention granted the
company a fifty-year annual subvention of 500,000 francs and the right
to charge whatever rates the company found necessary to make a profit
and repay its debts, as long as these rates were not so high as to drive
trade away from Jibuti. The company was required, however, to share
its profits with the government of French Somaliland. These provisions
were to be in force for ninety-nine years from the time the railroad
was completed to Addis Ababa; thereafter the rights of the conces-
sionaires to the line between Jibuti and Dirre Dawa were to be turned
over to the government of the French Somaliland Protectorate, which
was also given the right to buy the concession and the part of the line be-
tween Jibuti and Awash anytime after 1 January 1920. Only in the
last of its eighteen articles did the convention make any reference to
Ethiopian sovereign rights: it simply noted there that any of the stipu-
lations regarding the Ethiopian sections of the railroad would require
the approval of the Ethiopian government.^"^
Since the convention made it virtually certain that France would
eventually control the railway not only within its own Somaliland
territory but also within Ethiopia, the British government reacted
negatively and instructed Harrington to bring the terms of the con-
vention to Menilek’s attention.^* Harrington told the emperor that
it was now acknowledged by everyone official and private that the object
of the railway was political and not commercial . .
.
[and] that this con-
vention was an usurpation of his Sovereign rights, and showed a great
want of respect for him on the part of the nation who had always posed
as the great friend of Menelek.
He then suggested the possibility of neutralizing the “political effect
of the French line by a competing line which Menelek could build to
the British frontier.” The concession’s restriction against competing
commercial railroads might be evaded, he added, if the additional line
were built by the Ethiopian government, and he advised Menilek to
seek a loan for such a project from the British government. On Meni-
lek’s request, Harrington promised to draft a telegram to London
requesting such assistance.
37. Governo Italiano, Trattati, p. 673 ff.
38. F.O. 403/322, Lansdowne to Harrington, 18 March 1902.
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The French minister resident in Addis Ababa, M. Lagarde, did not
immediately send Menilek a copy of the convention. Harrington took
advantage of the delay by securing a second audience with the king to
explain the exact terms in his own way. Menilek was dismayed. If the
French expected to control the railway as far as Awash, he said, “they
might as well tell me to prepare for war at once.” He could see that the
final article, requiring his agreement for the Ethiopian part of the
line, was merely intended “to smooth it all over.” For, if the French
had really wanted his agreement, they would have shown him the
convention beforehand. He could not help wondering why France,
who had always proclaimed her friendship for him, had acted so
“arbitrarily.”
Harrington replied:
If you believe friendships exist between Governments, you are very much
mistaken. Friendship between Governments depends on community of
interests and ... no Government will make a considerable sacrifice for
another unless it is to their interest to do so.
He told Menilek then that the British government feared that the
railway as a political instrument in the hands of the French would
become
a danger to his independence which it was to our interest to maintain.
. . . The present situation unless neutralized or averted in some way or
other, was to my mind the beginning of the end . . . the day of spheres
of influence in Abyssinia was approaching . .
.
[and] if nothing was done
by him to counterbalance the situation . . . [which] French Government
control would create, then I should fail in my duty did I not do the ut-
most to urge my Government to come to terms with France, as regards
spheres of influence before the railway could make her position stronger
than our’s or Italy’s.
He went on to point out that if Great Britain helped him in this issue,
she “did so because it was to [her] interest to do so, and not out of
friendship or philanthropy.”
Menilek urged Harrington not to send the telegram he had drafted
earlier but instead to sound out unofficially the London government s
views on the railroad problem. Harrington informed London that
Menilek promised in return
that he would sign no agreement about the railway with Lagarde with-
out giving me beforehand a copy of any proposed arrangement, and the
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necessary time to submit the same for any remarks or suggestions that my
government might wish to make. Consequently time has been gained and
we have what at present looks like a very fair chance of neutralising the
French railway if we want to and we play our cards carefully.39
Since Menilek wanted London’s advice on what action to take,
Harrington wondered
whether, should he act on that advice, [Great Britain] will be prepared to
support him. Further, he asks, whether, should he give a partial consent
to the Convention, His Majesty’s Government would lend him money for
the construction of a line from Harrar to our frontier, and themselves
construct a line from Berbera to join his, at the same time guaranteeing
him possession of Harrar against the French.
Harrington recommended that the British guarantee £2,000 to cover
the interest on the capital required to build the line from Berbera to
the Ethiopian frontier. He also suggested that they lend Menilek the
capital to build a line from Harer to the proposed British railway. “It
is hardly likely,” he added, “that a better opportunity for establishing
our influence will occur than is offered by the present situation.”^^
It is well to note at this point that several French authors have
claimed that Menilek’s hostility to the railway convention was due to
Harrington’s activities and his dislike of the French.^^ Other writers
believe, however, that the French had only themselves to blame for
underestimating Menilek’s intelligence.^^ gg tj^^t as it may, the Lon-
don government decided to move cautiously. The Foreign Office took
the position “that King Menelek’s proposals are of a nature which
require careful examination before they can be entertained. They
would involve us in heavy expenditure and in far-reaching responsi-
bilities.”^^ Harrington, who had found an ally in Captain Ciccodicola,
the Italian minister resident, in trying to induce Menilek to continue
to withhold recognition of the 1902 Convention, to withdraw the
original railway concession, and “to give French influence a set back,”
complained to Ciccodicola that His Majesty’s Government would
probably not build a railway line, “as apparently both he [Ciccodicola]
and I attached much more importance to the political importance of
39. The preceding questions are based on F.O. 1 /40, Harrington to Boyle, 5 April
1902.
40. F.O. 403/322, Harrington telegram in Cromer to Lansdowne, 12 April 1902.
41. Notably Pierre-Alype, L’Empire des Negus (Paris; Librarie Plon, 1925), p. 107.
42. Keller, Ilg, p. 152; Gilmour, Abyssinia, pp. 30-31.
43. F.O. 403/322, Lansdowne to Cromer, 14 April 1902.
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the French railway than those who were not personally acquainted
with the political situation actually existent here.”^^
Harrington continued to press his point of view on London. He
wrote:
the question, in my opinion, is largely one of political finance, and unless
we are prepared to run the risk of seeing the French in the near future
paramount politically in Abyssinia, eventually Mistress of Harrar and
southern Abyssinia, and in a position to divert trade from the Berbera
hinterland, then it is obligatory on us to ascertain what the cost of neu-
tralising such a situation would be.'*^
He sent Lord Lansdowne a letter he had received from Swayne, the
consul in Berbera, who wrote:
Looking far ahead I cannot but feel that after all our sacrifices in South
Africa and Uganda, and the Soudan, it would be fatal to the general
African interests if we allow a hostile power (France is always hostile
when we are in trouble) to get a preponderating influence in Abyssinia,
and at a time when we were involved in trouble in the Soudan, she
might and would use her influence to make Abyssinia actively hostile to
us in the Nile Basin.^6
Lord Cromer supported Harrington’s views on the British inaction
concerning the railway. He feared that the French would try to extend
the railway to the Upper Nile and was concerned that the Somali pro-
tectorate would suffer a considerable loss of revenue if there were no
connecting line to Harer.^^
Nonetheless, the British government continued in its reluctance to
build a railway from Berbera to Addis Harer (Dirre Dawa). They felt
it would be too expensive an undertaking, besides being of dubious
legality.^® Moreover, they apparently were not at all certain that it was
desirable to encourage Menilek to cancel the railway concession, since
they would then be practically obliged to take over the construction
of the line from Harer to Addis Ababa^^ and would also risk antago-
nizing France at a time when the two powers were moving toward the
44. F.O. 1/40, Harrington to Boule, 3 May 1902.
45. F.O. 403/323, memo, by Harrington, n.d.
46. F.O. 403/323, Swayne to Harrington, 7 May 1902.
47. F.O. 403/323, Cromer to Lansdowne, 17 October 1902.
48. F.O. 403/323, Law Officers of the Crown to Lansdowne, 17 November 1902;
F.O. 403/334, Law Officers of the Crown to Foreign Office, 23 February 1903.
49. F.O. 403/323, Lansdowne to Cromer, 24 November 1902; F.O. 1/43, Sanderson
to Cromer (initialed by Lansdowne), 17 March 1903.
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entente cordiale.^^ Great Britain’s ultimate object in Ethiopia con-
tinued to be the safeguarding of vital British interests in the Nile
Valley and, therefore, to ensure that Menilek and Ethiopia not fall
under French hegemony. These aims could be achieved by sustaining
Menilek in his defiance of the 1902 Convention, thus blocking further
construction of the French railway until such time as France agreed to
guarantee the interests of the other European powers in Ethiopia.
Harrington was therefore instructed “to dissuade King Menelek
from signing the French Convention, pointing out to His Majesty the
very serious effect that will be produced by his doing so.’’®^ The in-
structions added, however, that Harrington should not “put too much
stress on the assistance we can render as regards railways . .
.
[since]
the issues are scarcely of sufficient gravity to warrant expenditure of
millions.’’®^ Harrington wrote to Lord Cromer that he would, as the
London government had directed, continue working for the neutrali-
zation of the French railway. He added that if he had appeared “too
eager,” it was because he had to deal with the railway issue from the
local and not from the imperial point of view.®^
Menilek now tried to force the British government into an active
commitment regarding the railway by sending a personal telegram:
As I have been advised by His Majesty’s Government not to accept the
proposed French Government Convention, I am ready, provided that His
Majesty’s Government agree to support me in the question to make no ar-
rangement with the French Government in connection with the Railway
question without the advice of and except in agreement with, His
Majesty’s Government.
Although the British government had already rejected a similar pro-
posal a year earlier, Harrington again supported Menilek, because
he believed that the emperor would “make undesirable terms with the
French Government unless he receives assurances of support from His
Majesty’s Government. The British, however, again rejected the
idea, this time because
50. A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1954, 1957), pp. 412-13.
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55. F.O. 403/334, Harrington to Cromer, 10 April 1903.
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it is almost certain that the French Government would claim the right of
holding direct discussions with the Emperor Menelek on the subject of
the Railway Convention, and would maintain that they cannot admit
the right of any other Power, which has only indirect and secondary in-
terests. to intervene in the matter.^s
In June 1903, the emperor in a last attempt to gain British aid sent
Harrington a letter summarizing his views on the railway. He ex-
plained that
originally the Emperor gave the Concession to a private business on the
understanding that no government should take part in the enterprise.
... His Majesty, the Emperor, is opposed to the Erench government par-
ticipating in the enterprise because he does not wish to give preferential
treatment to one power at the expense of others.
. . . French control of
the railway
. . . will necessarily give them an exclusive advantage in the
trade of all the eastern parts of Ethiopia. His Majesty does not like this to
happen. His Majesty believes that such control of the railway by a single
power is a direct threat to the independence of his empire . .
.
[and] a
breach of good faith on the part of the original concessionaires. . . .
The Emperor does not want the French to enjoy much more influence in
his empire than the other powers.
He then again suggested that the British should build a railway from
Berbera to the Abyssinian border and that he in turn would construct
the line from there to Harer. “There is only one problem here: it is
a financial one. It can, however, be solved by the British Government
itself.”®^
When this letter received no more response from the British govern-
ment than his previous ones had, Menilek proceeded to take his own
steps to block further railway construction by the French. He had
already shown his displeasure with the Railway Company by refusing
to attend the inauguration of the first section of the line, 310 kilometers
between Jibuti and Addis Harer, which was completed in December
1902.®® He then damaged the company’s borrowing power by with-
drawing its privilege of collecting a ten percent levy on merchandise
in transit, because “he had originally granted the privilege to a private
company and not to a foreign government.’’®^ He also withdrew his
56. F.O. 403/334, Lansdowne to Cromer, 23 April 1903.
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agreement to channel all goods requiring transport between Jibuti and
Addis Rarer toward the railway, thus causing the railway’s traffic to
drop to such a low level that the company’s receipts could not cover
current expenses and pay the interest on bonds. Finally, the emperor
refused to sanction the construction of the second section of the rail-
way line, from Addis Rarer to Addis Ababa, and the company was
forced to stand by idly eating up its capital.
Pressures for Internationalization of the Railway
The Railway Company had procured 11,300,000 francs from an
insurance company that had bought up the subvention of 500,000
francs a year granted in the 1902 Convention. Three million of this
was used to pay back the English lenders, who continued, however,
to hold the bonds they had bought. The remainder was used to finish
the first section of the line. Because of Menilek’s continuing refusal
to agree to the convention the company could not procure additional
funds in Paris, and so from 1902 on it suffered an annual deficit of
more than 1 million francs.®^
The plight of the Railway Company brought the Trust Company
once again into the picture. The Trust Company helped the Railway
Company to meet interest commitments with several large loans®^ and
it sought in other ways to harmonize English and French interests
in the area. The Ochs brothers felt that many influential circles in
France wanted to come to an agreement with Britain on outstanding
Franco-British problems in Ethiopia, and they told the British govern-
ment to rely on the Trust Company’s influence to induce the admin-
istration of the railway to come to a suitable arrangement.®^ Alfred
Ochs was certain that the French government could also be brought to
terms “if Menelek refuses to allow them to continue their line, which,
if he is sure of support, he will do, [and then] they [the French gov-
ernment] will accept the situation without any real fuss.’’®®
The British government instructed Clerk, their charge d’affaires
60. Sylvia Pankhurst, “The Franco-Ethiopian Railway and Its History,” Ethiopia
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in Addis Ababa, to start negotiations for the establishment of a con-
nection between the Ethiopian railway and a proposed British line
from Berbera to the British Somaliland border. The British had
shown earlier that it really had no intention of building this link.
Menilek knew this, but he apparently fell in with the British maneu-
ver so that he could tell the French “that he has been advised by
[the British] to withhold his consent from any proposals to which he
is not pledged under the existing contract, pending the result of this
negotiation.”®® Possibly he also still hoped to involve the British in
the building of the rail connection, since Harrington was again press-
ing London “for ... a pledge of our support to Menelek and a
pledge to commence construction of a competing scheme.”®^
The government in London was beginning to be annoyed with
Harrington’s continued opposition to its policy on the railway issue,
particularly while the Anglo-French entente was being negotiated.
Cromer warned Harrington on 28 November 1903 not to exceed his
instructions. In reply Harrington hinted that he was willing to take
the risk. In another letter Cromer pointed out to Harrington that,
while it sought to prevent French predominance in Ethiopia, Great
Britain was not willing to go to war with France to achieve that ob-
jective.
Cromer thought that the solution to the railway problem lay in
an agreement between France and Great Britain.®^ Lord Lansdowne
went a little farther:
In Lord Lansdowne’s opinion [it would] be better that the line should be
an international undertaking or at all events that England, France, and
Italy should all have a share in the direction and management rather
than it should be under Anglo-French control.®^
Explaining this suggestion. Lord Cromer wrote to Sanderson that
what is meant by internationalisation . .
.
[is] I think ... an equal con-
trol by all the three powers interested over the railway throughout its
course, and perfect equality of commercial treatment in respect to all
goods landed at Jibuti for transit."^®
The Trust Company apparently convinced the British government
66. F.O. 403/334, Lansdowne to Cromer, 13 November 1903.
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that France would ultimately consent to the internationalization of
the railway. In early February, Albert Ochs, general manager of the
Trust Company, told Cromer that the colonialist group in the French
Assembly would accept an Anglo-French arrangement on the rail-
way.^i Later, in a memorandum sent to the British government to
explain what terms the French colonialist group would accept, Ochs
said that “the Company would become international; it would be
administered by Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Italians in equal num-
ber. The President would be French.'’^^ jn early March he informed
the British that the Colonialist party in the French Assembly saw the
hopelessness of obtaining from the French government enough capital
to complete the present railway, “and they are therefore ready to give
their support to any reasonable proposal for giving the Company an
international character and thus distributing the burden. Further
evidence of an apparent French volte-face on the subject of the railway
appeared when Deloncle, one of the leaders of the Colonialist party
in the Assembly, came to the British Embassy and stated that he was
“well aware" that Britain would continue to block a railway “under
exclusively French auspices," and “to avoid this . . . the bulk of the
Colonial Party desire to come to terms with England, and if need be,
with Italy also, with a view to internationalizing the railway."^^ In
1904, however, during preliminary talks with the British about the
Tripartite Agreement, the Erench did not mention the possibility of
internationalization'^^ and, contrary to the statements of Trust Com-
pany officials, never seem to have seriously considered such a move.
Deloncle’s statement was apparently no more than a reflection of the
impatience of the colonialist group in the assembly. The French
government clung to the idea of a “French" railway with great deter-
mination and rapidly convinced Lord Lansdowne that they would
never give up their proprietary rights over the railway.
On March 25 Menilek and Chefneux signed an agreement to extend
the railway to Addis Ababa. Clerk immediately went to Menilek and
“complained of the breach of faith to Harrington and myself."'^®
Menilek replied that Chefneux “had suddenly offered to accept any
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conditions His Majesty wished to impose, and that it therefore seemed
to be a good opportunity for a favourable settlement of the whole
railway question.” He added, “by the preamble all previous Conces-
sions and Agreements had been cancelled.” Clerk was openly skeptical
and asked to see the agreement. He found that
the actual meaning was that the Agreement about the section from Kaffa
to the White Nile (a matter of complete indifference at the present mo-
ment) only was cancelled.
. . . All reference to the existing railway was
left out, and His Majesty thereby tacitly assented to the Convention be-
tween the Railway Company and the French Government of the 6th
February, 1902.
After he explained the deception to Menilek, he recommended that
the emperor recall the document before it was signed by Ilg, the third
contracting party, and that he should “make it quite clear that he
would acknowledge no Agreement or Concession unless his own in-
tentions were therein expressed in language of whose meaning there
could be no doubt.”
Clerk suggested three possible explanations for Menilek’s ill-con-
ceived and precipitous behavior: first, “His Majesty . . . has an un-
shaken confidence in his own astuteness as a maker of Treaties and
Conventions, and will not believe that any one can get the better of
him in such matters”; second, “His Majesty is apt to get wearied of
questions which he is constantly being urged to settle, and is some-
times inclined to finish them off at any cost, in the hope he will
thereby be troubled no more”; third,
M. Chefneux . .
.
[probably] confessed to the Emperor that the greater
part of the indemnity paid after Adowa by the Italians to His Majesty,
and by him entrusted to M. Chefneux, had been invested in the Railway
[Company]; if the extension was not granted, the Railway Company
would go bankrupt and His Majesty would lose all his money. This rea-
son, if true, would be quite sufficient to account for the action of His
Majesty, to whom a threatened loss of actual cash appeals with especial
force.
At the end of March Menilek’s secretary called at the British Lega-
tion to tell Clerk that the emperor had retrieved the agreement from
77. The two previous paragraphs except for specific references have been drawn
from F.O. 402/346, Clerk to Lansdowne, 2 April 1904. See also F.O. 403/346,
agreement signed by Menilek and Chefneux, 25 March 1904, and the amended
agreement, 27 March 1904.
The British and the Ethiopian Railway 47
Chefneux and that he desired Clerk’s suggestions for possible amend-
ments. Clerk’s suggestions were incorporated into a revised draft
under whose terms
all monopoly is done away with, no interference on the part of any Gov-
ernment will be admitted without Menelek’s consent, and equal treat-
ment on the railway will be granted to all nations. This solution of the
question, though not the best, should insure, at least, the independence of
Abyssinia, if His Majesty is firm in resisting French pressure.’^®
The British charge d’affaires thus blocked Chefneux, who, however,
refused to accept the amended agreement. In August Lagarde ex-
plained to Menilek the importance of a letter authorizing the construc-
tion of the second section of the railway. He pointed out that the
company’s troubles would lead to bankruptcy if Menilek did not pro-
vide some assurance that the company would be allowed to continue
the work, and he told the emperor that such a letter “would have no
effect on the negotiations now in progress in Europe.’’ Lagarde re-
ceived the letter he wanted on 8 August. When Harrington saw a copy
on 26 August, he told Menilek
that the wording of the letter, doubtless unintentionally, ignored the fact
that the railway question was now being discussed at home, and tended
therefore to complicate matters very considerably, unless His Majesty
made it quite clear that, of course, his consent to the continuation of the
railway was conditional on the agreement of the three powers . . .
thereto.
Menilek thereupon wrote another letter to Lagarde stating that his
commitment in the letter required the consent of Italy and Great
Britain. Lagarde refused to receive this letter, but Menilek was satis-
fied that he had seen its contents.
Harrington was quite upset about Lagarde’s action, since Lagarde
had promised to do nothing regarding the railway until a conclusion
had been reached in Europe, “an undertaking which I reciprocated
and observed.’’ Since the French had already “trapped” Menilek twice,
Harrington requested and received from him a letter granting the
British government the right to construct a line from Berbera, through
Ethiopia, to the Sudan.
This letter not only renders the intrigues of my French colleague or of
78. F.O. 403/346, telegram by Clerk in Cromer to Lansdowne, 1 April 1904.
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any one else here comparatively harmless, but should also enable your
Lordship to insure France coming to reasonable terms on the question of
internationalisation, as the existence of a British line from Berbera to
Harrar, even if continued no further, would suffice to wreck the French
railway.80
Lord Lansdowne then asked Gambon, the French ambassador in
London, to request his government to restrain Lagarde from further
separate negotiations with Menilek about the railway while the general
talks between England, France, and Italy were in progress.®^
The Ethiopian State Bank and the Railway
In his next attempt to find some way out of the railway stalemate
and to provide himself with greater bargaining power in relation to
France, Menilek informed Harrington that he would be willing to
grant a British firm a fifty-year concession for a state bank with exclu-
sive privileges. Cromer was delighted with this idea, which would
provide Great Britain with some control over Ethiopia’s economic life
and might provide Menilek with enough capital to build the second
part of the railway. He immediately telegraphed Harrington that the
Bank of Egypt would send an agent duly authorized to study and
negotiate the details of the question to Addis Ababa.®^
On 10 March 1905 Menilek signed the concession for the bank.®^
The charter gave the bank a capital of £500,000 and stipulated that
the head office was to be in Addis Ababa. The bank was incorporated
for fifty years. It was to be the only bank in Ethiopia, had the sole
right to issue bank notes, and had to be consulted whenever the gov-
ernment undertook to mint coins. All Ethiopian government funds
had to be deposited in the bank, and the bank was to be given
preference for all government loans. The charter further stipulated
that after expenses had been paid, ten percent of the profit should be
placed in reserve and a seven percent dividend paid to shareholders.
Of the remainder Menilek would get twenty percent and the bank
80. F.O. 403/346, Harrington to Lansdowne, 31 August 1904; Menilek to Lagarde,
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could use the rest as it saw fit.®^ Even though several nationalities were
represented on the board of the bank and stock had to be sold on the
open market, the number of Englishmen in the administration was
sufficiently large to give Britain control. Harrington wrote to Cromer:
I sincerely trust that there may be no hitch in the formation of this bank,
as I am firmly convinced that it will be of inestimable value to the devel-
opment of Abyssinia, and the fact that it is under English direction is an
asset of great value in the political situation here.*?
MacGillivray, whom the National Bank of Egypt had sent to make
the survey of Ethiopia's banking needs, had reported that the proposed
bank would act essentially as a ministry of finance, even though during
its first few years of existence it would do little more than cover its
expenses. He also saw that the second section of the railway could be
built with the funds Menilek had, in his treasury reserve along with
a loan from the bank.®® Apparently MacGillivray made Menilek aware
of this fact, or else the emperor had foreseen the possibility of using
the bank’s resources as a threat to obtain concessions from the French.
On 1 April he asked Harrington to
tell your government that after the experience I have had of French
policy in my country, I fail to see the value to me of any Agreement
whereby the French Government have control of a railway to my capital,
and that, failing internationalization of the railway in my territory, I
shall myself undertake the construction of the line.®^
On April 11 he called the ministers of France, Italy, England, and
Russia and a number of Ethiopian dignitaries to a meeting. He told
them:
for three years now work [on the railway] has ceased and you know the
reasons; time passes in sterile discussions. ... It is with great regret that
I see the months and years slip away without our friends being able to
come to an accord on this question. ... It is to put an end to this
state of affairs that I called you here today. I come to ask you to in-
form your governments [of] the decision that I desire to take relative to
this question of the railway. ... I would be happy to see the guaranteed
construction of the railway as soon as possible by an agreement between
the several powers giving to each of them the necessary guarantees. Up to
85. F.O. 401/8, The Bank Charter, 11 March 1905.
86. F.O. 401/8, memo, by Sir Palmer, 20 April 1905.
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now, I have received no proposition on your part. If I receive no proposi-
tion from your Governments, nor any plan reconciling your ... in-
terests, which puts an end to this conflict, I would see it necessary, to
assure the construction of the railway to undertake the construction my-
self, without asking nor accepting agreement from any part.
In reply to Menilek’s statement, Harrington said that the best way
to solve the problem would be to allow all interested nations to share
in the capital required for the construction of the railway. Lagarde re-
mained silent, and Menilek berated him and his government for sign-
ing the 1902 Convention, which had brought on the railway impasse
and endangered his sovereignty. The Italian representative stated
that his government favored the internationalization of the railway,
while the Russian minister, who supported Lagarde, merely said that
he would make Menilek’s intentions known to his government.^
The Tripartite Treaty
Despite Harrington’s statement at the meeting, the British govern-
ment did not want to see Menilek take over the railway. By this time
safeguards for British interests in the Nile Valley had been gained
from France and Italy, and Britain no longer cared who controlled
the railway so long as there was no discrimination on the line.^^ When
MacGillivray left Egypt to become director of the new bank, Harring-
ton was instructed “to prevent his doing any thing by which Menelek
might be encouraged to reject the proposals which the British, French,
and Italian governments have laid before him,’’®^ ^^d in February
1906, when some of the local bank directors tried to take over the rail-
way, the British made every effort to block their action.^^ They were
convinced that Menilek’s speech on the railway and the bank’s actions
that followed were the direct result of MacGillivray’s influence, and
in March 1906 Lord Cromer wrote to Grey “that the inevitable recall
of Mr. MacGillivray is necessary.’’^^ But he stayed, because Harrington
felt that “to recall him would be a fatal mistake, as the Emperor would
90. Gouvernement de France, La Concession, pp. 3-6.
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thus be convinced that the bank is a political institution, as he hears
on all sides.”®^ Cromer, still concerned
that the Emperor Menelek . .
.
[would] take the railway in hand himself
• •
•
[suggested] that it might be well for Sir John Harrington to receive
. . . instructions to use all his influence with the Emperor to dissuade
His Majesty from taking any definite action on his own account until the
termination of the political negotiations now in progress.
He added that the governor of the Bank of Egypt should send similar
instructions to MacGillivray.^®
In late June Menilek suddenly interrupted an audience with Har-
rington to announce that the time limit for a railway settlement had
passed and that he would now build the railway himself. Harrington
was able to persuade him to wait a few more days and wrote to Grey
that unless some agreement was arrived at soon, he would not be able
to restrain Menilek.^^
The Tripartite Treaty, reconciling the differences of England,
France, and Italy, was initialed on 4 July 1906,^® making it unneces-
sary for Menilek to take over construction of the railway. The treaty
recognized the right of a French company to continue the railway
from Dirre Dawa, on condition that the railway practice no discrimi-
nation “in . . . matters of trade and transit.” Great Britain, Italy, and
Ethiopia were each granted the right to have one of their nationals
on the board of the French company, and France was given the same
right on any future British or Italian railways that might be built in
Ethiopia. The treaty did not reconcile Menilek’s differences with the
French, making further negotiations between Ethiopia and France
necessary. But it satisfied Great Britain’s political aims in the area.
95. F.O. 401/9, Harrington to Cromer, 23 March 1906.
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Isike, Ntemi of Unyanyembe
bj Norman R, Bennett
By the middle of the nineteenth century the African and Arab trading
network reaching from the East African coast to Lake Tanganyika and
beyond was able to supply the markets of Zanzibar and the coast with
the staples of the interior trade, ivory and slaves. Among the many
African peoples participating in this commercial system as inde-
pendent traders and as porters in Arab-led caravans were the Nyam-
wezi of what is now called central Tanzania. Their importance derived
from the strategic position of their homeland, which dominated the
central portion of the trade route. By the 1820’s the Arabs had felt the
need of a center among the Nyamwezi, and after some years they
decided to establish it in the Unyanyembe chiefdom.
A biographical sketch of Isike, ruler of Unyanyembe from about
1877 to 1893, is presented here, based on German, British, French,
and Belgian private and governmental sources, both published and
unpublished. Some oral information is included in these sources, but
most of it is not the product of modern methods of collecting oral data.
Thus, despite the large body of historical material on the central
Tanzanian region for the middle and later periods of the nineteenth
century, any biographical effort must suffer from the lack of African
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sources so vital for giving perspective to European-derived informa-
tion. On the other hand, African and other researchers now engaged in
the collecting of oral data do not always have available to them the
full range of written sources. Where possible, a useful collaboration
can result from the two methods of research. A recent example of this
is a study by an East African scholar of another nineteenth-century
Nyamwezi leader, Mirambo, which incorporates earlier written efforts
along with new insights derived from interviews.
^
The Emergence of Isike
The ruler of the Nyamwezi chiefdom of Unyanyembe, located near
present-day Tabora, was inextricably tied into the Arab trading struc-
ture of eastern Africa. His state had become the principal base for
Arab settlement of the interior, and a working relationship be-
tween Arab and African was necessary to keep commerce flowing.
But the relationship was unstable as tensions arose between Nyamwezi
rulers and Arab traders over the distribution of the profits of trade
and over the extent of Arab power and influence within the Nyamwezi
chiefdom. Thus, to understand and depict the life of Isike, one must
be aware of the competition for power among Nyamwezi claimants
for the chiefdomship, the impact of the Arabs on these quarrels, and
the relationship of the later German rulers to the two groups.
The system of succession to the office of chief, or ntemi, among the
Nyamwezi invited rivalry among many possible successors and often
led to civil strife.^ In Unyanyembe, the Arab presence further con-
tributed to the instability. Prior to the death of ntemi Fundikira I in
1858 or 1859,'^ an agreement was apparently reached between the
1. See J. B. Kabeya, Ntemi Mirambo (Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Kampala: East
African Literature Bureau, 1966).
2. R. G. Abrahams, “Succession to the Chiefship in Northern Unyamwezi,” in
Succession to High Office, ed. Jack Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1966), pp. 127-41, examines this with specific reference to some of the Kamba
chiefdoms of Unyamwezi. There is also a valuable general discussion in Audrey I.
Richards, “African Kings and Their Royal Relatives,” Journal of the Anthropologi-
cal Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 91 (1961): 135-50.
3. Speke to Rigby, 10 March 1861, in General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave
Trade, ed. Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1935), p. 238;
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of the Royal Geographical Society 29 (1859): 204; James Augustus Grant, A Walk
Across Africa (London and Edinburgh, 1864), p. 52.
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Arabs and the Nyamwezi setting the terms for cooperation in trade:
the Arabs were exempted from paying taxes on merchandise brought
into Unyanyembe, while the Nyamwezi reaped the material benefits
of the Arabs settling in their territory rather than in that of some
rival Nyamwezi state.^ Fundikira was succeeded by Mnywa Sere. With
the aid of Muhammed bin Juma, an Arab who had married one of
Fundikira’s daughters, Mnywa Sere defeated the bid of another claim-
ant, Mkasiwa. Once in power, however, Mnywa Sere attempted to
gain an increased share of the profits of the trade flowing through
Unyanyembe. His exactions were borne for a time, but when he
moved against the family of Muhammed bin Juma, the Arabs joined
together to drive Mnywa Sere out of the chiefdom.®
Mkasiwa then became ntemi with the support of the Arabs. He was
generally considered a weak man and an Arab puppet.® There can be
little doubt that he badly needed Arab support. Mnywa Sere actively
opposed him until his death in 1865; two other Nyamwezi leaders,
Mirambo and Nyungu-ya-Mawe, seriously threatened Unyanyembe in
the 1870’s.^ When Mkasiwa died in 1876, he was succeeded by his son
Isike. No less than his father, Isike needed Arab support to maintain
himself in the face of Mirambo’s and Nyungu’s opposition.®
Without adequate African sources, and these are lacking, a wholly
satisfactory description of Isike is difficult to gather. He may have had
some knowledge of the world outside of Unyamwezi. There is record
of a visit to Zanzibar in 1865 by two sons of Mkasiwa; only one,
Swetu, is named, but perhaps the other was Isike.® European char-
acterizations of Isike abound. They portray him as an Arab puppet
4. Alison Smith, “The Southern Section of the Interior, 1840-84,” in History of
East Africa, eds, Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1963), vol. 1, p. 279. See also Burgess’s letter of 11 September 1839, in The
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(as his father had been), a drunkard, and a generally worthless char-
acter in his early years, who later on became a fierce and resolute
enemy of the Arabs and an even more determined foe of the new
German rulers of East Africa. His early subservience to the Arabs
was probably due to expediency: when he no longer felt the need for
Arab support he quickly changed his attitude.^®
The circumstances of life at Isike’s center, his ikulu, made it rela-
tively easy for him to maintain his position toward the Arabs, who
lived in their own centers in Unyanyembe apart from the Nyamwezi.
Isike did not generally leave his ikulu;'^^ unlike Mirambo, Nyungu,
and Mtinginya of Usongo, he was not a renowned leader of warriors.
Apart from having to meet specific Arab demands, he remained su-
preme in his own sphere as the ruler of his people. At the same time he
profited from the Arab presence through trade revenues and the gen-
eral prosperity of his state.^^ His early subservience to the Arabs is
best explained as an adaptation to the realities of Arab power, since
an alliance between the Arabs and his rivals would have presented an
irresistible threat to his position in Unyanyembe.^^
Early Relations with Arabs
When Isike took office in 1877, the official head of the Arab com-
munity was Said bin Salim, who had served as governor for about fif-
10. For some characterizations of Isike, see Jerome Becker, La Troisieme Expedi-
tion Beige (Brussels, n.d.), pp. 91, 152, 284; Adolph Burdo, Les Beiges dans VAfrique
Centrale. De Zanzibar au Lac Tanganika (Brussels, 1886), p. 51; A VAssaut des
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11. Wilhelm Blohm, Die Nyamwezi: Land und Wirtschaft (Hamburg, 1931), p.
175; idem.. Die Nyamwezi: Gesellschaft und Weltbild (Hamburg, 1933), p. 68. For
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Political Organization of Unyamwezi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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13. Burdo, Les Beiges, pp. 302, 305.
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teen years.^^ Said bin Salim owed his position more to the powerful
Indian customs master of Zanzibar than to that island’s ruler, Bar-
ghash bin Said,i® had no real power to intervene in the affairs of
Unyanyembed^ Eventually inter-Arab rivalry in Unyanyembe led to
the deposition of Said bin Salim. He was accused by his rivals of
cooperating with Mirambo during the Arab-Mirambo hostilities of the
early 1870’s.i® Expelled by Isike, he went over to Mirambo, who
gave him shelter.^o
Isike acted at the instigation of Abdallah bin Nasibu, a very popular
member of the Unyanyembe Arab community. Abdallah bin Nasibu
was a successful trader and raider known for his generosity in the
distribution of booty won in battle.^i With the elimination of Said
bin Salim he became the uncontested leader of the Arabs of Unyan-
yembe, making Isike’s apparent subservience to him all the more
necessary as Mirambo, Nyungu, and other Nyamwezi rivals all re-
mained active in their opposition to the ntemi of Unyanyembe.22
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In 1881 a French trader, E. Sergere, established a trading center in
Unyanyembe with the approval of Sultan Barghash. The center was
designed to supply goods to passing caravans and to allow Sergere to
purchase ivory for export to Zanzibar. Sergere not only thus challenged
Arab control of the local ivory market but also roused the ire of Isike.
He sent, or had plans to send, gunpowder to Mirambo. He also became
close to Swetu, Isike’s brother, thus stimulating the latent dynastic
fears of the Nyamwezi ruler—there were rumors circulating at the time
that Swetu, with Sergere’s aid, would poison Isike. The result was that
Abdallah bin Nasibu and other Arabs made every effort to stop all in-
dividuals from trading with the Frenchman and that Isike followed
with threats that caused Sergere to flee Unyanyembe. Both the
Arabs and Isike had thus good reasons for expelling the trader, but
contemporary reporters, convinced of the dominant influence of the
Arabs, believed that Isike had been forced to act by Abdallah bin
Nasibu’s assertions of a plot among Sergere, Swetu, and Mirambo to
murder Isike and divide Unyanyembe. Abdallah bin Nasibu did in-
deed bring forward the idea of a plot, but the implication that Isike
was simply following orders is unlikely. There was an element of plaus-
ibility in such a plot given the political conditions of Unyanyembe,
especially since it was known that Sergere had made overtures to trade
with Mirambo. Self-interest made Isike’s action necessary, and there
was little need of any pressure from the Arabs.
The aftermath of the Sergere affair seriously affected Isike's future.
On his return to Zanzibar, Sergere protested against his treatment in
Unyanyembe to both the French consul and Sultan Barghash. The
end result was that the Sultan recalled Abdallah bin Nasibu from
Unyanyembe during the latter part of 1881. It remains unclear why
the Arab leader obeyed the Sultan’s order in view of the Sultan’s
limited authority in the interior. There is also doubt as to Barghash’s
reasons for issuing the recall, though it appears that Abdallah bin
Nasibu was heavily in debt to Indian merchants in Zanzibar and that
he was connected wth an Arab faction hostile to the Sultan. In any
case, the Arab leader returned to Zanzibar, where he was imprisoned
and where he later died, allegedly from poison administered on
Barghash’s orders. Abdallah bin Nasibu’s brother, Shaykh bin Nasibu,
23. Copplestone’s journal, entries of 18, 19, 20, and 28 March 1881, G3. A6/01,
CMS; Stokes to Wigram, 14 June 1881, CMS; Kirk to F.O., May 5, 1881, Q-25, ZA;
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carried on as head of the Arab community in Unyanyembe during his
brother’s absence, but he too died in 1882, allegedly from poison ad-
ministered by an agent of Barghash.^^
The Unyanyembe community of Arabs never fully recovered from
the loss of the Nasibu brothers. No replacement was sent from Zanzi-
bar to succeed Abdallah bin Nasibu. Factional quarrels kept the
remaining resident Arabs divided, and Unyanyembe became known
as “a veritable hot bed of intrigue. Reports began to circulate that
the Unyanyembe Arabs would throw their support to Mirambo instead
of Isike because of fears that without Abdallah bin Nasibu’s leader-
ship Mirambo would soon defeat the Unyanyembe ntemi . The only
reported efforts to bring the Arabs of Unyanyembe under some form of
control from Zanzibar were the offer of a governorship to Tippu Tip
and later to his brother Muhammed bin Masud by Sultan Barghash.
Either appointment could have posed a serious threat to Isike, since
Nyaso, one of the Nyamwezi rivals for the rule of Unyanyembe, had
been the wife of Tippu Tip’s father, Muhammed bin Juma. Isike con-
sidered the threat serious enough to ask the White Fathers in Unyan-
yembe to aid him in gaining French protection. But neither Tippu
Tip nor Muhammed bin Masud ever came to Unyanyembe as gov-
ernor, and Isike soon dropped his quest for outside aid.^^
In these circumstances, had the European characterizations of
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in A VAssaut, pp. 334-335; Paul Reichard, “Die Unruhen in Unjanjembe,” Deutsche
Kolonialzeitung, 5 (1892): 103; Blanc’s letter of 8 June 1882, with addenda of
25 June, Bulletin des Missions d’Afrique (d’Alger) (1882-1886), p. 27; Copplestone
to Lang, 17 January 1883, G3. A6/01, CMS; Becker, La Vie en Afrique, vol. 2, p.
448; Last to Wigram, 5 March 1879, C. A6/014, CMS; Mackay to Wigram, 2
November 1879, C. A6/016, CMS. See also Paul Reichard, Dr. Emin Pascha (Leipzig,
1891), p. 76.
25. Barghash once said that he did not send a new representative because he
feared “misrepresentation” in the interior. Holmwood to F.O., 10 July 1887,
E-99, ZA.
26. For example, Hore to L.M.S., 11 February 1887, LMS; Stokes to Kirk, 11
February 1887, E-97, ZA.
27. Mackay to Kirk, 24 August 1886, in Holmwood to F.O., 18 October 1886,
F.O. 84/1775, PRO.
28. Hauttecoeur’s letter of 2 March 1884, in Bulletin des Missions d’Afrique
{d’Alger) (1883-1886), p. 215.
29. Ibid.; Faure’s letter of 16 May 1883, ibid., pp. 115-117; Maisha ya Tippu
Tip, pp. 139, 141; Becker, La Vie en Afrique, vol. 2, p. 448. There are some later
references to one of the influential Arabs of Unyanyembe, Zid bin Juma, serving as
governor, but he does not seem to have been appointed or recognized by the ruler
of Zanzibar. See Kirk to F.O., 3 June 1886, E-93, ZA; Michahelles to Macdonald, 20
September 1887, E-98, ZA.
60 Norman R. Bennett
Isike been accurate, he no doubt would have soon lost control of the
situation and been driven from power. But Isike reacted to the new
challenges so successfully as to make himself the undisputed ruler of
Unyanyembe and at the same time extend his influence over many of
the neighboring Nyamwezi states. The death of Isike’s most important
opponents, Mirambo and Nyungu, in 1884 helped to improve Isike’s
position considerably. There are conflicting reports concerning the
cause of Mirambo’s death. An African source claims that Isike had
him poisoned, while contemporary European witnesses assert that
Mirambo died a natural death. Whatever the cause, Mirambo’s state
went into decline after his death. As for Nyungu’s death, his state
survived his loss, but his successors posed no important challenge to
the Unyanyembe ntemi.^^
Relations with Europeans
Secure in his own state, Isike now had to deal with the ever-in-
creasing numbers of Europeans arriving in central Tanzania. Roman
Catholic White Fathers had been active in Unyanyembe since 1881;
their main concern was an orphanage for African boys, not local
proselytizing. Isike tolerated their presence at first, extracting frequent
gifts from them—too frequent in their view—but otherwise leaving
them alone.^i But if Europeans could engage in missionary activities in
relative security, they could not seek ivory with equal ease. The Ger-
man firm of H. A. Meyer, a major exporter of East Africa ivory, sent
agents to Unyanyembe beginning in 1884. They met with hostility not
only from members of the Arab community but also from Isike, who
had by then become the dominant trader of Unyanyembe—he even
sent his own caravans to the coast. The Germans were nevertheless
allowed to settle in Unyanyembe after completion of various payments
to Isike and to the then leading Arab, Zid bin Juma. Their trading
efforts were, however, frustrated, and one German merchant was
30, Shorter, “Nyungu-ya-Mawe,” pp. 256-258; Norman R, Bennett, Studies in
East African History (Boston: Boston University Press, 1963), p. 29. The statement
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murdered by an Arab, Muhammed bin Kasum. Isike’s role in the
murder is unclear, but he did share in the booty taken from the
dead German’s stores. All this passed without serious repercussions
since the real authority of the German colonial establishment in East
Africa did not yet reach beyond the coastal regions.
A new figure appeared at this point on Unyanyembe’s political
scene. Isike, while retaining his traditional role at his court, delegated
authority to deal with outsiders to a man from the coast. Fundi Sugu,
who had the experience required by the intricacies of commerce that
Isike lacked. Fundi Sugu kept the Arabs under control. He made them
pay heavily for the recruiting of porters, and he imposed several indi-
rect taxes on them. The Arabs had no choice but to submit, since
without Nyamwezi cooperation all trade was bound to stop; they knew
that Isike could, for example, dispatch raiders to destroy the caravan
of any recalcitrant Arab trader. Isike demonstrated his power in 1887
when he detained all ivory caravans for the coast for about three
months. As a consequence of this and similar acts, some Arab traders
left Unyanyembe, though their number was not significant enough to
reduce the importance of the local Arab community.
The German colonial establishment in East Africa eventually
reached Unyanyembe, the focal point of the interior trade routes.
German mismanagement provoked the coastal populations into an
armed uprising during 1888-90, and the conflict had its repercussions
in the interior. Isike, however, kept aloof from matters which, after
all, did not directly affect Unyanyembe. London Missionary Society
agents at nearby Urambo were told by some Arabs that it would be
dangerous for them to visit Unyanyembe,^^ but it is not certain
whether such danger really existed, as Isike had earlier informed
British visitors that he wanted good relations with their country.^^ It
is true that the White Fathers, however, did not fare too well. The
Catholic order, which had decided to evacuate Unyanyembe in 1889,
experienced considerable difficulties in doing this. Their reason for
32. Ibid.; Raffray to M.A.E., 17 November 1886, ibid.; Heudebert, Vers les Grands
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departure was Isike’s continued demands upon the mission, but it does
not appear that any special effort was made to force the missionaries
to leave or to threaten their lives when they decided to leave.^® The
incident nevertheless embittered the White Fathers and added to the
impression of German officials that Isike was a determined enemy of
their colonial policies.
The government of German East Africa established a presence in
Unyanyembe in a manner destined to create a highly unstable situa-
tion. Hermann von Wissmann, the German commander, had originally
opposed occupation of Isike’s center until sufficient German forces
would become available to ensure obedience to government policy—
a
wise decision, since Isike reportedly had well over 1,000 firearms for his
followers. Wissmann contented himself with sending a Muslim agent,
Ismail Bilach, to Unyanyembe in 1890. Bilach succeeded in persuading
the Arabs, still smarting under Isike’s authority and also cognizant of
German victories on the coast, to hoist the German flag, but Isike
promptly made them lower it. Meanwhile, the well-know Emin Pasha,
who had entered German service to lead an expedition to the Lake
Victoria region, violated his instructions and proceeded to Unyan-
yembe. Emin did this largely on the advice of the equally well-known
Carl Peters, who was then returning from his abortive Emin Pasha
rescue mission and thought it dangerous for the German administra-
tion to leave the important Nyamwezi trade center in hostile hands.
The Arab residents, already influenced by Wissmann’s agent, quickly
came to terms. Isike proved more difficult, but he finally decided it
best not to expose his forces to an attack by Emin’s well-equipped ex-
pedition and to conclude an agreement with the Germans. Eor their
part, the Germans still feared an attack even after the agreement in
view of Arab-reported rumors of an Isike-Angoni plot against them. All
passed peacefully, however. How well founded the charges of a plot
were remains unclear; they may have been the product of an Arab
attempt to embroil Emin and Isike in a quarrel that would punish
Isike for his acts against the local Arab community.^"^
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It is hard to assess precisely Isike’s role from that time on. He stayed
secluded in his court and dealt with Germans and other outsiders
through intermediaries, who were not always trustworthy agents and
may at times have misrepresented his wishes. One indication that
Isike’s real policy was a passive one designed to ride out potential
dangers is seen in his contacting the White Fathers returning with the
Germans in an attempt to persuade them that the Unyanyembe Arabs
and not he were to blame for their earlier withdrawal and to assure
them that none of their abandoned property had been harmed.^®
In any case, Isike remained quiet. The German authorities on the
East African coast initially censured Emin Pasha for his actions in
Unyanyembe. They informed him that he had exceeded his orders and
that there were no German forces available to provide an adequate gar-
rison to ensure fulfillment of his treaty arrangements with Isike and the
Arabs.®® But the step had been taken, and the German government
was committed to action, though Wissmann’s original fears of a pre-
cipitate German occupation by a garrison unable to carry out govern-
ment policy were eventually to be proved all too correct. A German
officer. Lieutenant Sigl, with only about seventy African troops, many
of them poorly trained, occupied Isike’s center in Eebruary 1891. Sigl
was content to follow his instructions: as long as outward forms of
submission were given to German authority, he was not to interfere in
local problems. Sigl had a useful ally in the German-appointed head
of the Arab community, Sef bin Said, who gave unreserved support to
the new European administration. Though unhappy with his pre-
carious position and at what he considered lack of support from his
superiors,^^ Sigl managed to keep Unyanyembe peaceful. Isike acted
similarly, but his dissatisfaction with the Germans appeared in a
letter sent to the British in Zanzibar asking British protection for his
state.^2 To him an absent imperial power apparently looked better
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than a present one. The British, of course, took no notice of such a
request from a German subject.
The Germans continued to show their disinclination to strengthen
their tenuous control of Unyanyembe. The Hehe victory at Lugalo
over a German expedition in August 189T^ diverted the limited
German manpower to more immediately pressing requirements.^^
When Sigl was replaced by Dr. Schwesinger as local commander in
March 1892, the new officer brought an equally small garrison. His
instructions were to concentrate on diplomacy to keep order and to
avoid hostilities.^^ Isike left the Germans alone, however, and he even
sent them gifts.^®
The Fall of Isike
But a peace based upon mutual tolerance between often aggressive
German officers and an equally determined African ruler could not
last. The arrival of large troop contingents belonging to the German
Anti-Slavery Society heralded new difficulties. Their destination was
Lake Victoria, but they made it a practice to stop in Unyanyembe. In
April 1892, the leader of such a group. Lieutenant Hermann, precip-
itated a crisis. Some of his African troops quarreled with the in-
habitants of a village controlled by a son of Isike. The responsibility
for the episode was unclear, but Hermann accepted the version of his
men and stormed the village. Unyanyembe was immediately filled
with rumors. Some of them led to the belief that Isike, who had had
no part in the original quarrel, would begin war. In the confusion,
Africans in the service of the Arabs, who had aided the Germans,
attacked a party of Isike’s men sent under cover of a white flag to
present the Nyamwezi ruler’s version of the episode.^®
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16 April 1892, LMS.
48. Schweinitz, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika, p. 62.
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A major crisis was nevertheless averted. Isike refrained from making
any hostile moves. Some of the Arabs of Unyanyembe who wished to
avoid hostilities came forward as intermediaries in negotiations be-
tween the Germans and Isike. The Germans, who had decided Isike
was to blame for the affair, wanted the Nyamwezi chief to come to
their station and pay an indemnity. Isike did not appear, but his men
brought an indemnity, which the Germans accepted. It was learned
later that the Arabs had paid the indemnity, possibly without Isike’s
knowledge; no one knew what the Arabs had told him of the course
of the negotiations. Hermann’s forces then left Schwesinger in his
weak position in Unyanyembe and proceeded on to Lake Victoria.
Isike now had reason to believe that the Germans were hostile to his
continued rule of Unyanyembe. He stopped sending gifts to the
German authorities and began to build up his forces. German efforts
to placate him, as, for example, when they persuaded a recalcitrant
Nyamwezi chief to pay Isike tribute, had no effect.
Hostilities began in June 1892. Isike had closed the Unyanyembe
market to Europeans, and there were reports that Isike had asked
other Nyamwezi leaders to join him in an attack on Europeans as
soon as the remaining Anti-Slavery Society forces left. Schwesinger
decided to mount, with some Arab support, a surprise attack against
Isike’s capital, but the attack was checked. Isike’s position was weak-
ened, but his fortress remained intact.®^
Nevertheless, the Germans continued to maintain the offensive.
They raided Isike’s allies successfully, inducing many of his Nyamwezi
enemies to come over to them. The Nyamwezi of Urambo, Mirambo’s
former center, were one such group. An increasing number of dissatis-
fied Nyamwezi gave their support to Isike’s rival, Nyaso, whom the
Germans now recognized as ntemi of Unyanyembe. By August 1892
Isike held only his ikulu, and the Germans prepared for another as-
sault. The German attack, with considerable Nyamwezi and Angoni
support, did much damage to Isike’s fortress—Isike himself was
wounded—but the fortress was not taken. The Arabs, some of whom
49. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
50. Ibid., pp. 64-65; “Vorgange in Tabora,” Deutsches Kolonialblatt 3 (1892):
444-46; “Bericht des Dr. Schwesinger, betr. des Vorgehen gegen den Sultan Sikki
(Tabora),” ibid., pp. 608-609; “Die Kampfe bei Tabora. Bericht des Herrn Josef
Rindermann,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 5 (1892): 126-127; Kapitan Spring, Selb-
sterlebtes in Ostafrika (Dresden-Leipzig, n.d.), pp. 70-75. Not all the Arabs sup-
ported the Germans. See Karl Hespers, ed., P. Schynse’s letzte Reisen-Briefe und
Tagebuchbldtter (Koln, 1892), p. 6, for information on the Arab factions.
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always supported Isike and whose trade was suffering from these
hostilities, tried to arrange peace, but Isike, as before, did not appear
for any negotiations. Since the Germans had failed to take his ikulu,
he no doubt considered himself the winner.^i Another German attack
in September proved equally fruitless.^^
By this time, however, Isike had suffered enough to seek an arrange-
ment with the Germans. On October 30, 1892, the Nyamwezi ruler
formally accepted German protection, agreed to leave decisions re-
garding peace and war in German hands, promised to end his raiding
and to punish those of his subjects who continued, agreed to aid the
Germans in keeping trade flowing, and promised not to exact any
duties upon that trade.^^ The agreement was clearly intended to pro-
vide no more than a temporary halt to hostilities. The Germans had
already extended their support to Isike’s rival, Nyaso, and had even
proclaimed her ruler of Unyanyembe. An increasing number of
Nyamwezi leaders, anticipating Isike’s final defeat, rallied around
Nyaso.®^ Isike became upset; in November he asked for Nyaso’s sur-
render, though, of course, he met with no response.
A strong German force arrived in December under the command of
the able Tom von Prince. He reported that Isike was in contact with
another enemy of German rule, Mkwawa of the Hehe, and that
further negotiations would serve no useful purpose. In January 1893 a
combined German-Arab-African force successfully attacked Isike’s
stronghold. Isike attempted to blow up the powder magazine, and
himself, in the last stages of the attack, but he survived the explosion.
His mangled but still living remains were hanged from a tree by the
victors.56
51. Schweinitz, Deutsch-Ost-Afrika, pp. 65-88, 184; Spring, Ostafrika, pp. 77-96;
“Tagebuch des Leutnant Meyer aus Tabora,” Deutsche Kolonialzeitung 5 (1892):
154-55; “Bericht des Leutnants Meyer,” ibid., pp. 155-56.
52. “Bericht des Lieutenants Prince uber die Niederwerfung and Vernichtung des
Hauptlings Sike von Tabora,” Deutsches Kolonialblatt 4 (1893): 199; Long’s journal,
entries of 30 August-19 September 1892, Le Mouvement Antiesclavagiste 5 (1892-
93): 148-151.
53. “Ein Vertrag mit dem Sultan Sike von Unyanyembe,” Deutsches Kolonialblatt
4 (1893): 20.
54. “Fortsetzung des Tagebuches des Leutnant Meyer von 15. Juli,” Deutsche
Kolonialzeitung 5 (1892): 177; Spring, Ostafrika, pp. 67, 89.
55. “Bericht des Lieutenants Prince,” p. 199.
56. Ibid., pp. 200-204; “Bericht des Lieutenants Prince iiber den Riickmarsch der
Tabora-Expedition vom 5. Februar bis 18. April, d. Js.,” Deutsches Kolonialblatt 4
(1893): 267. Tom v. Prince, Gegen Araber und Wahehe (Berlin, 1914), pp. 187 ff.;
Rodd to Rosebery, 15 May 1895, F.O. 107/4, PRO; Redmayne, “Mkwawa,” p. 421;
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With the demise of Isike, Unyanyembe lost its independence. It
was not to be expected, of course, that Isike could, any more than
any other African leader, defeat overwhelmingly superior European
military forces, though he fought to the last to uphold the dignity
of his traditional office. But before he was forced into a hopeless
military confrontation with the Germans, Isike’s long career showed
him to be a most adroit and dynamic political figure. He steadily
progressed from an early position of weakness in the face of the Arabs
until he became the dominant force in Unyanyembe. He sought as
far as possible to avoid armed conflicts and preferred diplomacy to
achieve his aims. For many years he thus managed to frustrate Arab
and European attempts to control his state for their own purposes and
at the same time to keep many potential African rivals from allying
themselves with outsiders to drive him from power.
Shorter, “Nyungu-ya-Mawe,” p. 257. Nyaso was installed as ruler of Unyanyembe
after Isike’s defeat. See Prince’s letter of 28 January 1893 in Deutsche Kolonial-
zeitung 61 (1893): 65.
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Goree and the Cape Verde Rivers
by George E. Brooks, Jr.
Few contemporary maps of West Africa show the island of Goree. Yet,
for four centuries this tiny speck of volcanic rock and sand, measuring
only half a mile in length and a few hundred yards in width, was
strategically the most important trading center between the Senegal
and Sierra Leone rivers. Goree’s participation in the slave trade of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is well known, even exaggerated,
but its importance in the legitimate trade of the nineteenth century and
its role as the springboard for French commercial and political expan-
sion on the Windward Coast have never received the attention they de-
serve. The islanders—Africans, mulattoes, and Europeans—served as
catalysts in a process of economic, social, and political change that
revolutionized the lives of the African populations inhabiting the coast
between Senegal and Sierra Leone. An attempt will be made here to
shed some light on the economic relations between Goree and the
rivers south of Cape Verde, which nineteenth-century French traders
called Rivieres du Sud and English traders of that period referred to
as Northern Rivers.
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Goree's Geographical Advantages
Initially, the importance of these rivers derived from their serving
as ports of entry for commerce with the Futa Jalon. Around the
middle of the nineteenth century many of the areas along these rivers
became important centers of peanut cultivation. Traders from Goree
and Saint-Louis, as well as from Marseille and Bordeaux, followed the
expansion of peanut cultivation southward along the coast; the eco-
nomic and political influence they gradually acquired at the expense of
their British and Sierra Leonean rivals generally determined the areas
of France's territorial annexation in the 1870’s and 1880’s. Goree
derived its maritime and commercial importance from its salubrity,
its dominant position on the roadstead formed by the cradling arm
of the Cape Verde Peninsula, and the natural protection an island
offered European traders and their goods.
Goree served the interests of several European nations, Portugal,
Holland, France, and Britain. It provided them with a fortress, a
point of rendezvous for shipping, and an entrepot for commerce along
the coast between the Cape Verde Peninsula and the Gambia River.
Vessels from Europe bartered their goods with local traders or rode
safely at anchor while their boats and the cutters and schooners from
the island visited the seasonal bazaars along the Petite-Cote, at places
such as Rufisque, Joal, and Portugal and in the Gambia.
By the close of the eighteenth century a natural symbiosis had
evolved between the island’s inhabitants and the Lebous, who oc-
cupied the Cape Verde Peninsula. The thousand-odd Goreens came
to depend on the mainlanders for water, fresh meat, vegetables, fruits,
firewood, and construction materials. In turn, the Lebous, who in the
1790’s had revolted against the overlordship of the darnel (king) of
Cayor, the Wolof state which dominated their hinterland, came to
depend on the Goreens for military supplies and millet brought in
from the Petite-Cote. There was some friction resulting from numerous
exactions imposed by the Lebous on the Goreens until 1830, when the
French commandant of the island succeeded in putting an end to
them. The Lebous also used to pillage shipwrecks. Like many others
in West Africa, the inhabitants of the mainland opposite Goree sub-
scribed to the notion that while the sea might belong to white men,
the land belonged to Africans, and shipwrecks were windfalls to which
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they were entitled. The pillaging of shipwrecks continued until 1857,
when the French occupied the Cape Verde Peninsula.
^
British dominance of the trade along the Gambia considerably re-
stricted Goree’s commercial potential. Britain did not allow French
and Goreen traders to travel farther upstream than their post at
Albreda, some twenty miles above the Gambia’s mouth. Goreen
mulattoes often took advantage of family connections and business
alliances with “Portuguese” mulatto traders operating the length of
the river to circumvent British restrictions; even so, they were only
able to bring small lots of slaves, gold dust, ivory, gum, and wax over-
land to the Petite-Cote.
Socioeconomic Factors
At the close of the eighteenth century, according to an estimate by
Goldberry, Goree had a population of about 2,000. The population
was made up of 166 mulatto and free African property holders, 522
free Africans without property, 1,044 captifs de case (domestic slaves),
about 200 slaves held for trade, and about 80 European officers,
soldiers, and employees of the Senegal Company.^ This was already a
rather sizable population for an island of such small dimensions,
especially if one considers that one-third of the space was taken up by
the castel, the fortified volcanic ramparts at the southern end of the
island. The castel was reserved for military functions, though it also
served as the home of Mam Koumba Castel, Goree’s resident genie
and protectoress. Yet during the nineteenth century the population
grew even more. A census taken in 1842 recorded 4,983 inhabitants:
1,070 mulattos and free Africans, 3,713 captifs de case, 152 temporary
workers, and 48 Europeans.^ Three years later the total population
topped 5,000, and in 1848 it reached 5,370—about seven times the
island’s present population.^ Several large trading firms—Malfilatre,
Gaspard Deves, Maurel et Prom, Maurel Freres, and others—had their
1. Claude Faure, Histoire de la presqu'ile du Cap Vert et des origines de Dakar
(Paris, 1914), pp. 53 ff. See also Armand-Pierre Angrand, Les Lebous de la
presqu’ile du Cap Vert (Dakar, 1946?), pp. 50-53; 69 ff,
2. S. M. X. Goldberry, Fragments d’un voyage en Afrique, fait pendant les annees
1785, 1786 et 1787 (Paris, 1802), vol. 1, pp. 60-61.
3. Faure, Origines de Dakar, p. 109.
4. Pierre Cariou, “Promenade a Goree,’’ unpublished manuscript, p. 30.
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main office or a branch office in Goree. Some firms had agents, often
mulattoes from Goree and Saint-Louis, scattered along the coast to the
south as far as Sierra Leone. With the elimination of restrictions on
foreigners trading in Senegal in the 1850’s, merchant consuls from a
number of countries also established themselves on the island.
The mulattoes formed the most important social group in Goree.
They owned many of the island’s vessels and small craft, as well as the
captifs de case who manned them. In 1778 one of them was named
mayor. Many of the rich mulatto traders and owners of some of the
finest residences on the island were women, the redoubtable signares.
As the wives and mistresses of the resident French traders and officers
of the garrison, they lost few opportunities to further their own in-
terests and those of their families.
In 1816-17, when the British traders and military who had occupied
Senegal during the Napoleonic Wars removed to the Gambia in
anticipation of the restitution of the colony to France, a number of
signares from the island and some from Saint-Louis went along with
the British. Through their commercial role, which was facilitated by
their family and business connections in Goree and Saint-Louis,^ the
signares made an important contribution to the founding of Bathurst,
which soon became Goree’s rival as an entrepot for the trade of the
Petite-Cote and the rivers.
The French reoccupation of Goree in 1817 found the island’s popu-
lation declining and the remaining traders impoverished and dispir-
ited. Their most lucrative commerce, the slave trade, had ended,
the Gambia was closed to them, and they were hard pressed to compete
with their Gambian rivals in the Petite-Cote. To add to their hard-
ships, France imposed the Exclusif, a set of mercantile regulations
reserving Senegal’s commerce solely to French vessels and merchants
—this at the very time when France’s war-depleted merchant marine
was incapable of adequately provisioning her far-flung possessions.
Deprived of essential trade goods, Goreen coastal traders resorted to
smuggling; they obtained trade goods surreptitiously in the Gambia
and in clandestine rendezvous with American vessels trading along
the coast. Alarmed at the plight of the islanders and increasingly re-
sentful of British encroachments on the Petite-Cote, French administra-
tors in Senegal addressed their superiors in France with eloquent pleas
for changes in the oppressive mercantile regulations. The result was
5. See Florence K. Omolara Mahoney, “Government and Opinion in the Gambia
1816-1901” (Ph.D. diss.. University of London, 1963).
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the Decision Royale of 1822, which made Goree an entrepot for cer-
tain non-European products, particularly American tobacco and rum.
With ample supplies again at their disposal, Goreen traders quickly
regained their previous position in the Petite-Cote and even put traders
in the Gambia on the defensive by smuggling large quantities of rum
and tobacco into their area. The resident traders in the Gambia ap-
pealed to the British commander to take measures against the Goreen
intruders, but under existing Anglo-French treaties, French and
Goreen vessels could not be denied access to Albreda, and the presence
of numerous “relatives” of the Goreens in Bathurst and upriver made
smuggling impossible to prevent. Eventually the British Navigation
Acts were set aside, so that American vessels could trade at Bathurst
as well as at Goree. But since Goree’s customs duties were substantially
lower than those of the Gambia, it paid French and Goreen traders to
continue smuggling large quantities of goods into the Gambia. This
they often did with the connivance of British businessmen who had
established factories close to the French trading post at Albreda.®
Goreen trade with the Casamance River area on a sustained basis
dates back to 1828, when a trading post was founded in the river’s
mouth, on Mosquito Island. French authorities actively encouraged
Senegalese coastal traders to enter the river and challenge the Portu-
guese, who until then had considered the Casamance their exclusive
trading area. In order to give greater thrust to the Goreen’s rather
timid ventures, the Compagnie de Galam was recognized in 1836 as the
Compagnie de Galam et de Casamance, and some of its resources were
directed to establishing the new commerce on a permanent basis. In
1838 a trading post with a small garrison of soldiers was established at
Sedhiou, about 100 miles upstream. Sedhiou lay on a caravan route
connecting the Futa Jalon and the upper Gambia; by establishing a post
there the French were able to siphon off much of the commerce that
previously had passed downriver to Ziguinchor, the principal Portu-
guese center in the Casamance. The Portuguese tried to deter the
French in their purpose with diplomatic protests and by harassing
Senegalese traders; after these efforts failed, Portuguese businessmen in
the area reconciled themselves to the new situation and entered into
profitable commercial relations with French and Goreen traders. British
6. George E. Brooks, Jr., “American Trade as a Factor in West African History
in the Nineteenth Century: Senegal and the Gambia, 1815-1835,’’ Boston University
Papers on Africa, vol. 4.
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and Gambian interests also entered the area and set up factories near
the Sedhiou post."^
The Peanut Revolution
The period 1835-45 marked the initial stage of the economic revolu-
tion in the Senegambia engendered by the cultivation of peanuts for
export. In the 1840’s, possibly earlier, peanuts were cultivated along
the rivers south of the Gambia. During the 1850’s and 1860’s peanut
cultivation spread to areas south of the Nunez. The first commercial
shipment from the Gambia took place in 1834 on the initiative of
Forster and Smith, the most enterprising British firm to trade with
West Africa during the first half of the nineteenth century.® Once the
industrial uses of peanut oil, especially in the manufacture of soap and
candles, came to be appreciated in the Western world, peanut exports
from the Gambia rose dramatically: 213 baskets in 1834, 47 tons in
1835, 129 tons in 1836, and 671 in 1837. By the 1840’s, annual exports
were counted in thousands of tons.®
Though samples of peanuts and peanut oil were first sent to France
in the 1830’s, substantial exports from Senegal date from the early
1840’s.i® Still, the Senegalese crop was too small to meet French de-
mands and French merchants bought increasingly larger quantities of
Gambian nuts. By the 1850’s virtually the entire Gambian crop was
shipped to France and in French bottoms, to avoid surtaxes levied on
foreign vessels unloading in French ports. Economically, the Gambia
became something of a French colony, with the French hourdeau
(eight bushels) recognized as a standard measure and the five-franc
piece as legal tender.
7. Georges Hardy, La mise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 a 1854 (Paris, 1921),
pp. 297-9.
8. R. Montgomery Martin, “Possessions in Africa and Austral-Asia,” History of the
British Colonies (London, 1835), 4: 560. One hundred baskets of peanuts worth a
half dollar per basket were exported in 1830, presumably an experimental ship-
ment. Captain Belcher, “Extracts from Observations on Various Points of the West
Coast of Africa,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, vol. 2 (1831), p. 297.
9. J. M. Gray, A History of the Gambia (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 379-80.
10. E. Bouet-Willaumez, Commerce et traite des noirs aux cotes occidentales
d’Afrique (Paris, 1848), p. 52. Jaubert, a French trader established on Goree, sent
a sample of peanut oil to Marseille in 1833, but there was no immediate follow-up.
Paul Masson, Marseille et la colonisation frangaise (Marseille, 1906), p. 470. There is
conflicting evidence about the date of the first shipment and by whom.
11. Gray, Gambia, p. 384. Bernard Schnapper, La politique et le commerce
frangais dans le Golfe de Guinee de 1838 a 1871 (Mouton: Paris, 1961), pp. 229-31.
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Peanut oil was sought in France not only because of its industrial
uses but also as a consumer item, since French housewives found pea-
nut oil an inexpensive substitute for olive oil in cooking. To meet
this demand for vegetable oils, French businessmen found it advan-
tageous to exploit their long-standing commercial ties with the
Senegambia and concentrated on peanut imports from the dry savanna
areas of West Africa, while British businessmen relied mainly on
palm oil imported from the forest regions of the Leeward, or Guinea,
Coast. This early differentiation of areas of economic interest had a
striking influence on the patterns of colonial acquisition in the latter
half of the nineteenth century.
The peanut commerce of the 1840’s reinforced an earlier phase of
Goreen expansion southward to the rivers providing access to the
trade of the Futa Jalon, principally the Nunez and the Pongo. The
movement of Senegalese coastal traders to the south of the Gambia
River has yet to be fully charted. The evidence examined to date is
still too inconclusive to determine whether the movement was the re-
sult of a steady progression of trading down the coast or a striking
out for the Nunez and the Pongo, bypassing what is now Portuguese
Guinea. The second alternative is suggested by the fact that the Nunez
area was commercially attractive, while the attempt to trade in terri-
tories under Portuguese influence always met with difficulties.
The Portuguese, Cape Verdian, and indigenous mulatto {filhos da
terra) traders who frequented the area from the Casamance to the Rio
Cacine jealously guarded their prerogatives of exclusive commerce
along the two principal rivers, the Cacheu and Grande, at the cost of
considerable conflict with the African peoples residing there. Although
a few Goreen traders, and perhaps some from Saint-Louis and the
Gambia, dealt with the Portuguese entrepots at Cacheu and Bissau,
as well as with those in the Cape Verde Islands, even before 1820,
there does not seem to have been any significant amount of commerce
until the 1840’s and 1850’s, when legitimate trade began replacing the
slave trade.
The first peanut exports from Bissau were recorded in 1846, prob-
ably a later date than in the Nunez River area to the south. Legiti-
mate commerce with Portuguese Guinea thereafter expanded rapidly,
12. A. Teixeira Da Mota, Guine Portuguesa (Lisboa, 1954), vol. 2, p. 31, and Da
Mota and Joao Barreto, Hisldria da Guine 1418-1918 (Lisboa, 1938), are the most
useful sources for the history of Portuguese Guinea in the nineteenth century.
However, neither provides a satisfactory treatment of commerce.
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and foreign traders flocked in. Reportedly, thirty or more sloops and
schooners from Goree and the Gambia were trading with Cacheu and
Bissau in the early 1850’s, each making two or three voyages every
year.^^ In 1855 a French naval officer reported that half of Bissau’s
foreign trade was controlled by French and Goreen traders, with most
of the rest being in the hands of Englishmen and Americans.^^ A
decade later a French merchant residing at Bissau described it as one
of the most important commercial centers between Saint-Louis and
Sierra Leone. He reported that French and Goreen traders accounted
for two-thirds of the commerce in peanuts from Bissau and the Rio
Grande.
The slave trade long continued in the Nunez and Pongo areas,
particularly in the latter. Only gradually, perhaps beginning in the
1830’s, was legitimate trade disassociated from it. Of the two rivers, the
Nunez was commercially the more important, and vessels from both
Goree and Saint-Louis were trading there by the 1830’s.^® The prin-
cipal factories were at the head of navigation, forty-odd serpentine
miles from the river’s mouth. Here Fulbe and Mandingo traders
from the neighboring highlands of the Futa Jalon came to barter gold
(worked into rings), ivory, and hides for salt, guns, powder, cloth,
tobacco, and other European and American goods brought by English-
men, Sierra Leoneans, Goreens, Frenchmen, Americans, and others.
The slave and legitimate trades existed in a sort of symbiotic rela-
tionship, each sustaining the other. The caravans were composed of
both free men and slaves, and some slaves were sold in the Nunez or,
more often, in the Pongo area. Similarly, merchandise brought there by
legitimate traders and bartered for hides, coffee, etc., was subsequently
used to purchase slaves in the interior. The principal middlemen in
13. Francisco Travassos Valdez, Six Years of a Traveller's Life in Western Africa
(London, 1861), vol. 1, p. 260. Travassos Valdez visited Portuguese Guinea in 1852.
14. Extrait du rapport du commandant du brick le Victor, December 19, 1855,
Goree et dependances XIII, la. Archives Nationales, Section d’Outre-Mer (Paris).
15. Rapport de Adolphe Demay, August 1864, Folder J-e-24, 2F3, Archives, former
French West Africa (Dakar). Hereafter cited as A.A.O.F.
16. The progression of traders from Goree and Saint-Louis has yet to be worked
out. A French naval officer visiting the Nunez area in 1837 mentions several traders
from Saint-Louis (the brothers D’Erneville, Rene Valentin), one Goreen (Robert
Heddle), and one Frenchman (M. La Porte). Heddle was described as “settled” in
the Nunez area. Lt. Guerret to commander of la Triomphate, April 16, 1837, 7 G6,
A.A.O.F.
17. The region at the head of navigation was termed Kakundy, reputedly from a
sacred grove of Pullman, or “Cotton,” trees found there. Extract from the Journal
of Dr. D. G. Miller, Surgeon of H.M.S. Aetna (1831), 7 G6, A.A.O.F.
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the exchanges were mulatto families indigenous to the rivers, de-
scendants of European slavers and female relatives of their “landlords,”
the African chiefs who controlled commerce. The long-established
families, the Proctors and Skeltons on the Nunez, the Lightbourns,
Curtises, and Fabers on the Pongo, wielded enormous influence. Their
commercial ties and family relationships with European and mulatto
traders extended from Saint-Louis to Freetown.
Trade in the rivers was generally confined to the dry season from
December to April, when the paths were open and goods could be
safely transported. The customary method of trade was for the seasonal
visitors to pay stipulated customs to the chiefs, after which they ad-
vanced goods to the resident middlemen who promised returns later
in the trading season. “Advances” were disliked by the visiting traders,
but giving credit was unavoidable, for few of the resident middlemen
had sufficient capital to operate without it. The creditor lived in con-
stant fear that trade stoppage, warfare, the death of the resident
trader, or his cupidity might prevent completion of the bargain. There
was no recourse to legal means or to European men-of-war, for until
the 1850’s naval vessels infrequently visited the rivers, even in the dry
season, knowing from experience the dangers to their crews.
The lucrative caravan commerce in the Nunez area was frequently
interrupted by disputes between the Nalou and Landouman peoples
who lived upstream and the alimami who ruled the Fulbe state in the
Futa Jalon and held an insecure suzerainty over them. The alimami’
s
demands for tribute or for redress of grievances involving Fulbe
traders sometimes halted trade for months, though the resident mulatto
and European traders did their best to mediate for the benefit of all
concerned. The halting of trade, for whatever reason, was an endless
source of frustration for the seasonal visitors, venturing hundreds or
thousands of miles as they did only to find that their hopes for the
season had miscarried.^^
Senegalese and French traders steadily grew in number and influence
18, The author and his wife are compiling file cards on African, European, and
mulatto traders who lived on the Windward Coast from Senegal to Sierra Leone
c. 1780-c. 1860. Preliminary findings show a remarkable number of family links.
19. Andre Arcin, Histoire de la Guinee franfaise (Paris, 1911); A. Demougeot,
“Histoire du Nunez,” Bulletin, Comite d’Etudes Historique et Scientifiques de
I’Afrique Occidentale Eran^aise, Vol. 21 (1938); Christopher Fyfe, A History of
Sierra Leone (Longmans: London, 1962), passim. See also Norman R. Bennett and
George E. Brooks, eds.. New England Merchants in Africa; A History Through
Documents, 1802 to 1865 (Boston: Boston University Press, 1965), pp. 283-339.
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in the two riverine areas, and gradually they began to replace the Sierra
Leonean and British traders who had preceded them. In the 1840’s
some became more or less permanent residents. One of the first to do
so was Auguste Santon, a Frenchman who established a plantation at
Katekouma (Bel-Air) and raised peanuts and coffee. By the 1840’s
mulattoes from Senegal were joined by Moslem Wolof traders, notably
Ishmael Tai, who became one of the more important traders in the
Nunez area.
In the 1840’s and 1850’s agricultural exports—coffee and indigo, as
well as peanuts—greatly increased the value of Nunez trade. Peanut
exports were soon worth several times the value of caravan commerce.
Existing import regulations on coffee in France and Britain militated
against the introduction of Nunez coffee, since it was not produced
within the boundaries of a recognized colony and was therefore subject
to high tariffs. The French Minister of Marine suggested in 1840
that Nunez coffee be shipped overland to the Casamance, from where it
might be imported as “colonial produce,’’ but the suggestion was not
followed up. Finally, in 1846 a French trader in the Nunez area was
designated to provide certificates of origin for coffee grown there, and
thereafter it was exported to France via Goree as originating from a
French establishment.
Competition and conflicts of interest increasingly disturbed the
Nunez trade in the 1850’s and 1860’s. Trade, politics, warfare, and
treaty-making became more and more complicated with so many con-
flicting interests involved: those of the Landouman and Nalou chiefs,
the alimami of Futa Jalon, the old resident families, the seasonal resi-
dents, and European warships come to intervene on behalf of their
nationals. The events of those years are so far only imperfectly de-
scribed by historians. 21
Goree was not only the springboard for French commercial thrusts
southward—which included after 1843 trading posts on the Ivory
Coast and in Gabon—but also served as the principal base for the
French naval squadron in West Africa. In 1845 the senior naval officer
in West Africa was named inspecteur general des comptoirs, with
headquarters at Goree. From 1855 to 1859 Goree was separated from
Senegal and made the headquarters of a new colony, Goree et depen-
20. Demougeot, “Nunez,” pp. 206-7; Hardy, Mise en valeur, pp. 306-8. See also
Fyfe, Sierra Leone, pp. 226-27.
21. Arcin and Demougeot so far provide the fullest coverage, but they use a
limited selection of sources and omit or misconstrue certain aspects.
79Goree and the Cape Verde Rivers
dances, which included all French possessions and interests as far
south as Gabon. 22 In 1859 Goree was reattached to Senegal but con-
tinued in its role as the main naval base for France's West African
squadron. The island’s prosperity continued undiminished, as a
number of residences and public buildings still in existence attest.
In 1857 an Anglo-French convention arranged for the exchange of
the French post at Albreda in the Gambia for British trading rights
at Portendic in Mauritania. The political settlement, however, had
little influence on trading patterns: the Gambia’s peanuts continued
to be shipped to French markets. The governor of the Gambia, Colonel
D’Arcy, wrote in May 1860 that “the fact is isolated in colonial history,
but, while I write, I count thirty tricolours, six stars and stripes and but
one union jack flying in the port of Bathurst. French interests in-
deed dominated the commerce of the coast from Senegal to Sierra
Leone. On virtually the same date that Colonel D’Arcy deplored the
state of affairs in the Gambia, Governor Faidherbe of Senegal exul-
tantly reported his findings after a tour of the coast:
One fact is immediately apparent. It is that French commerce is entirely
predominant in this part of Africa; even at the Portuguese establishments
and the English establishments in the Gambia the French flag is almost
the only one seen. The same statement may be made for as far as Sierra
Leone.24
Faidherbe’s successor, Pinet-Laprade, fostered an activist expansion
policy. In 1865 and 1866 treaties of protection were signed with a
number of African rulers in the Nunez, Pongo, and Mellacourie
areas, and French authority was asserted by the construction of military
posts. The formal annexation of territory and concomitant Anglo-
French competition and negotiation over demarcations dragged on for
several decades. It was a classic instance of the flag following trade:
where Goreen and French traders had pioneered and successfully
established close commercial and political ties with African rulers,
there the tricolore was implanted from the 1860’s onward.
22. Schnapper, La politique, ably relates Goree’s role to the larger picture of
French expansion in West Africa. See also Schnapper, “La fin du regime de
I’exclusif: le commerce etranger dans les possessions” (Paris); Francois Zuccarelli,
“L’Entrepot fictif de Goree entre 1822 et 1852,” ibid.
23. Gray, Gambia, p. 384.
24. Voyage de Gouverneur Faidherbe a la Cote Occidental d’Afrique, June 1860,
1G26, A.A.O.F.
25. John D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London: Mac-
millan, 1963).
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French commerce and influence on the Windward Coast had been
destroyed during the Napoleonic Wars; renewed and spearheaded by
the traders of Goree, within a half century it dominated the 500 miles
of coastline between Senegal and Sierra Leone. Goree, its historical
function seemingly now served, became absorbed by the rising seat of
empire to which it had given birth. Goree’s rivals are no better served
by history: Bathurst presides over a commercial cul-de-sac; so too does
Freetown, lacking a hinterland for its magnificent harbor. All three
entrepots live in the past, in the reflected glories of what was—or might
have been.
Rebels and Rebellions in
Angola, 1672-1892
bj Douglas L. Wheeler
The history of Portuguese Africa seems to be little more than a
solemn parade of petty trading and bush warfare. Page and Oliver
convey such an impression in referring to old Angola and Mozambique
as “ill-defined trading preserves.’’^ So also does Duffy in summing up
the first three centuries of Angola’s history as “a chronology of small
wars, expeditions to the interior, and of a dedicated commerce in
black humanity. ”2 But first impressions can be deceptive. Progress is
now being made in original research in Portuguese archives and
libraries, and one may confidently predict that the history of Angola
will eventually reveal useful parallels with other African territories
and help to illuminate current developments.^
1. J. D. Fage and R. Oliver, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore: Penguin,
1962), p. 181.
2. James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1962), p. 47.
3. Since 1966 several detailed, valuable historical studies on Portuguese Africa
have appeared: R. J. Hammond, Portugal and Africa 1813-1910 (Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford University Press, 1966); David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola
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There is a marvelous unity about the history of Angola. Many re-
cent events look like replicas of the past, particularly when it comes
to rebels and rebellions. The struggle for paramountcy of European
settler interests against Africans or against faraway Lisbon has been
going on since the sixteenth century. The African desire for indepen-
dence from Portuguese rule was never entirely suppressed even in the
territory known as the kingdom of silence. Events in 1672, 1790 and
1860 have their echoes in the insurgency of 1961 in northern Angola.
It is a political wonder of the modern world that Angola is still a
Portuguese territory.
Some rebellions are lost to African history, forever obscured by
artifice or by accident, like
Some village-Hampden, that with dauntless breast
The little tyrant of his fields withstood, . . .
Some village Cromwell, guiltless of his country’s blood.^
Still, the reports of Portuguese officials in Angola contain much
material on local rebellions. The picture they often paint is one of
woe and helplessness. About 1790, for example, a Brazilian-born
soldier and historian with extensive personal experience in Angola
commented:
In no other part of the Portuguese world is the militia more necessary
than in Angola. . . . No other continent will be more subject to revolu-
tions, uprisings, murders by the natives and robberies on the roads. None
more liable to the disobediences of National Chiefs who, shackled to the
chain of vassalage,^ make their lot even sadder and more afflicted [by
revolting].
This passage from Elias Silva Correia’s Historia de Angola reflects
the precarious nature of Portuguese power in eighteenth-century
Angola. The most important African rebellion of the eighteenth
century occurred when the chief, or king, of Mossul, in northwest
Angola, reacted to Portuguese attempts to monopolize trade in his
area and invaded Portuguese-controlled territory. African forces
reached to within a few miles of Luanda, the capital of Angola, killing
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Eric Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for
Africa 1875-1891 (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1967).
4. Thomas Gray, “Elegy Written in a Country Church Yard” (1750).
5. “Vassalage” was the Portuguese term for the quasi-feudal arrangement in
Angola where the Portuguese supported certain chiefs in return for their support
in trade, war, and slaving.
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European settlers and Africans alike, capturing Portuguese slaves,
and selling them to French and British traders at the port of Ambriz,
outside of Portuguese control. The governor reported to Lisbon that
this was the most serious invasion the Portuguese had had to face in
Africa since 1641, when a Dutch expedition captured Luanda.
The Mossul rebellion of 1790-91 established a pattern that con-
tinued into the twentieth century. The country to the north of Luanda
up to the Congo River contained many pockets of active resistance to
Portuguese rule. Unhealthy climate, broken and hilly terrain, and
scanty European settlement made it difficult to administer the Congo
district and Dembos. The Portuguese did not control that coast until
after the 1880’s. The names of rebel nests in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries have been reproduced on combat reports since March
1961. For example, the town of Nambuangongo, one of the first areas
to be hit by insurgency in 1961, was the most persistent obstacle to
Portuguese trade and communications with the interior before parti-
tion and the so-called pacification campaigns of 1890-1920.
Major African Rebellions
Since the seventeenth century Portuguese interests in Angola gradu-
ally shifted from the Kongo Kingdom in the north to southern regions.
Originally, the Portuguese founded a trading empire supported by a
military caste of Europeans and their African auxiliaries and min-
istered to by Jesuits and Capuchins. Their small numbers and the
commercial nature of their interests impelled the Portuguese to work
out a system of “vassalage” among friendly African sobas (chiefs) . The
frontier of Angola was marked by the limits of sovereignty of “vassal
chiefs”; beyond the frontier were the non-vassals, often called gentio,
literally “heathen.” This crude political arrangement was fed largely
by a continuing slave trade and concomitant activities, and it did not
alter very much over three centuries. As long as the number of Portu-
guese was small and as long as African sobas were willing to trade and
contribute porters and levies of warriors in exchange for Portuguese
gifts and privileges, there seemed to be no reason for changing this
arrangement.
Luanda was founded as a settlement in 1576, and it soon became the
major port of a trading empire that lived on the export of African
slaves to the Americas and of wax and ivory to Europe and Brazil.
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Within a century the Portuguese had conquered the three major
African kingdoms north of the Kwanza River: Kongo, Ndongo, and
Matamba. Some African kings contributed men to the Portuguese
army, and these groups made up the famous guerra preta (“black
war”), an auxiliary corps that was sometimes used as a reserve of
irregulars to snuff out African rebellions. Just as often, however, its
members fomented petty warfare, rapine, and unrest without Portu-
guese prompting. In his Historia Geral das Guerras Angolanas, the
Portuguese chronicler-settler-soldier Antonio de Oliveira Cadornega
tells us that the Angolan history of his day was mainly a history of
“civil war” among thousands of Africans presided over by handfuls of
Portuguese.
A considerable mulatto (called mestizo or pardo) class grew up in
Angola. By the end of the eighteenth century and in the early nine-
teenth mulattoes were perhaps more numerous in Angola than at any
other time in history. The ratio of mulattoes to Portuguese was then
about 5 to 1, whereas today that ratio is about 1 to 3. Though there
were numerous African rebellions against Portuguese rule earlier, the
first important insurrection in the seventeenth century was one led by
mestigos in the Portuguese service. It reportedly occurred around 1672
or 1673 in the fortress town of Massangano.
There is some controversy as to whether such an uprising did take
place. Ralph Delgado, a distinguished Portuguese historian, claims
that he could not find any documents mentioning the revolt and that
other historians may have mistaken a local European revolt for a
mestigo insurrection at Massangano. He could not see why mestigos
would revolt, as they enjoyed privileges denied to Africans.® But the
mestigos appear to have been the most discontented class in Angolan
history. And all major chronicles and histories of the pre-twentieth-
century period, including the one by the usually reliable Silva Correia
(whom Delgado does not cite), describe the Massangano insurrection as
one led by mestigos.
Apparently, then, the mestigo rebels laid siege to the fort, gathered
African forces, and pledged themselves to kill as many whites as they
could and drive the remainder into the sea. Though the revolt did not
succeed—for it was quickly suppressed by the captain-general of
Angola—the Massangano rebels had some reasons for believing that it
might. Shortly before, in 1670, the Portuguese army had sustained a
severe defeat in the Kongo Kingdom, and much of northern Angola
6. Ralph Delgado, Hisloria de Angola, vol. 3, pp. 384-87.
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was up in arms. The prevailing atmosphere was one of upheaval, and,
as Livingstone noted later while traveling through northern Angola
in 1855, a small success of an African rebel force could easily trigger a
general revolt in the country."^
To what causes may we attribute this and other African rebellions?
The works of Silva Correia paint a picture of poverty, sloth, misery,
and desperation in old Angola. A writer for a Lisbon newspaper
claimed in 1864 that Portuguese officialdom was largely responsible
for destroying the goodwill created among Africans by the few mission-
aries who had dared enter the Angolan interior before 1900. He ac-
cused Portuguese judges, officers, district officials, and tax collectors of
behaving like “little tyrants” and thus provoking Africans into open
rebellion.
8
Another major cause for widespread violence in Angola during the
nineteenth century was the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
Traffic-minded sohas near the coast and as far east as Lunda were
baffled by the news that the Europeans had decided to abolish the
slave trade. A number of chiefs openly opposed abolition, and some of
them showed their resentment by attacking Portuguese settlements in
the 1830’s.
Some Portuguese statesmen—such as, for example, the liberal patriot
Marquis Sa da Bandeira—feared the loss of African territories through
interference by foreign powers as well as African uprisings, and they
tried to enter into secret treaties with their ancient ally Britain to
guarantee the territorial integrity of Angola and Mozambique. It is
not clear whether such treaties were actually concluded, but as the
text of a treaty proposed in 1838 shows, Portuguese anxieties were real
enough. The draft treaty of 1838 asked Britain for an
explicit guarantee of the above Dominions [Angola and Mozambique]
for the Crown of Portugal against any uprising, which could occur in
those Provinces, as well as against any attempts by foreign powers to try
to foment rebellion, or to try to possess these Dominions.^
It should be added, however, that later in the nineteenth century, on
the basis of more subtle arrangements, Britain did help Portugal to
7. David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (New
York, 1858), p. 483.
8. Jornal do Commercio, March 1864.
9. Documentos Officiaes Relativos a Negociacao do Tractado entre Portugal e a
Gram Bretanha Para a Suppressdo do Trafico da Escravatura (Lisbon, 1839), Doc.
no. 5, p. 29.
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foil the aggressive designs of Germany and Cecil Rhodes against
Portuguese possessions in Africa.
After the slave trade was doomed, Africa-related unrest subsided.
Later, however, Portuguese tax policy spawned another wave of re-
bellions. In 1841 the Dembos people revolted under the leadership
of an educated prince, Dom Aleixo (Alexus), brother of King Henry
II of Kongo. Captured by the Portuguese, Alexus was incarcerated in
a Luanda fortress from 1841 to 1856. The Portuguese did not dare to
execute the prince, fearing the reaction of various African groups.
Instead, they imprisoned him and every month paraded him in a
Portuguese general’s uniform to a reception at the governor’s palace
in a mock ceremony designed to impress the African population.
Georg Tams, a German traveler, visited Alexus in prison and was told
by him in good Portuguese that:
The Queen of Portugal [Maria II (1834-53)] was not his rightful Queen—
that she had no direct right to rule his country—because this prerogative
belonged only to him and his brother, the King of Congo. . . . His im-
prisonment had been arbitrary, since he had committed no crime.
Prince Alexus, who died shortly after his release from prison, was a
member of the Agua Rosada e Sardonia, an African dynasty that
dominated the throne of Kongo since the early eighteenth century.
To the Kongo kings, the Portuguese rulers at Luanda were in a sense
patrons, as the dynasty depended upon Portuguese support to main-
tain its power at Sao Salvador, the capital. A few of them were edu-
cated in Luanda, and some went to study in Lisbon. Many of them
laid claim to the throne of Kongo and were inclined to rebel against
the Portuguese if the latter supported their rivals. The Portuguese
became involved in a similar succession crisis in the Congo District
from 1955 to 1957, an affair that had serious political consequences
and contributed to the founding of an African nationalist party.
Another noteworthy African rebel was the assimilado Prince Nicolas
of Kongo, a son of King Henry II of Kongo. Born about 1830,
Nicolas received a Portuguese education and held minor posts in the
Portuguese civil service in Angola. Although he planned to enter the
clergy, he became involved in 1859 in a dispute over the succession
10. Georg Tams, Visita as Possessoes Portuguezas Na Costa Occidental d’Africa
(Oporto, 1850), vol. 2, pp. 17-19.
11. Assimilado, “an assimilated one,” was an African with the education and
culture of a Portuguese. In the 1920’s the term took on a legal meaning, referring
to Africans who had the rights of the Portuguese.
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to the Kongo throneA^ This happened in a period of expanding
Portuguese influence in the Kongo Kingdom. Nicolas wrote a letter
to a Lisbon newspaper in which he accused the Portuguese of having
taken advantage of the Kongo king’s (and his advisers’) ignorance of
Portuguese to place him in a position of subordination to Portugal.
Nicolas claimed that his knowledge of Portuguese enabled him to act
as protector of Kongo sovereignty. Before he could carry out a plan to
escape from Angola and board an English vessel, he was murdered by
a group of Africans who mistook him for a tool of the Portuguese
and a traitor to the cause of the independent tribes. But Nicolas had
dreamed of a Congo separate from the colony of Angola. Both he and
his relative Alexus, obscure figures as they were, had sought to voice
African aspirations.
By the middle of the nineteenth century conditions in Angola
deteriorated even further. Editorials in Lisbon newspapers spoke in
1860 of the possibility, after numerous African rebellions, of Portugal
losing her African territories. The chief cause of renewed unrest was
a government plan aimed at territorial expansion, an increase in trade,
the abolition of forced labor, and increased African taxation to make
up for the loss of revenue that had resulted from the abolition of the
slave trade. The Portuguese sent expeditions into the northern terri-
tory, built new garrisons, mined copper, and attempted to keep the
roads open. Because of African hostility, the deadly climate, and poor
resources, attempts to carry out the plan were eventually abandoned.
The Portuguese authorities tended to blame the unrest on foreign,
especially British, interference. British merchants on the Congo coast
did indeed sell arms and powder to Africans, but so did Portuguese
traders. Still, the British acted as water-borne despots along the Ango-
lan coasts and thus alienated the Portuguese. And the memory of the
prominent role that Britain had played in the emancipation of Brazil
from Portuguese rule certainly intensified Portugal’s suspicions of
British intentions regarding its African dominions.
Attempts to increase taxes caused the Dembos to rise once again
in 1872-73. Lisbon again dispatched an army expedition, which did
not succeed, however, in suppressing the revolt. Full Portuguese con-
trol was not established in Dembos territory until World War I,
when an expedition finally conquered the region. Other rebellions
broke out in several Angolan regions around 1890. The plateau saw
12. See Douglas L. Wheeler, “Nineteenth-Century African Protest in Angola:
Prince Nicolas of Kongo (1830P-1860),” African Historical Studies 1 (1968): 40-59.
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a series of military campaigns for another generation, with sporadic
local revolts still erupting in the 1920’s and even later. Portuguese
occupation and colonization continued to be limited to the coastal
hinterlands around the major towns of Luanda, Benguela, and Mo-
^amedes. Even after the last tribal resistance was said to have been
crushed, despite the confidence of the twentieth-century governments,
the extent of effective Portuguese control of the country thus remained
an open question.
European Unrest in Old Angola
European society in Angola has been noticeably short on both
quantity and quality. The original conquistador, Paulo Dias de
Novais, who founded Luanda, was forced to recruit for his Angolan
expedition by scouring the jails of Lisbon. Between 1575 and the
1920’s at least half and often the majority of the Europeans in the
colony was made up of criminals, felons, or political
prisoners transported from Portugal for punishment. Much of the
Portuguese part of the army consisted of deserters, and until the
twentieth century the colonial service was largely staffed by second-
raters, trimmers, and disappointed individuals.
Until the early nineteenth century the African territories were
subordinated to the economic interests of Portuguese America. Brazil
was the heart of the Portuguese empire. Angola, the “Black Mother”
of Brazil, provided slaves to American plantations in exchange for
various goods. Angola became largely dependent upon Brazil for
various food staples, building materials, and capital. This was true
even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. Thus, Brazil cast
a shadow on Angola long after it had ceased to be a part of the
Portuguese empire in 1822. When they talked about ways of improv-
ing conditions in Angola, Lisbon reformers often showed that they
were thinking in terms of their Brazilian experience. Indeed, many of
them hoped that Angola would become “a new Brazil” for Portugal.
Perhaps the earliest important European revolt occurred in 1694,
when infantry in Luanda, led by Brazilian-born Portuguese—or “sons
13. See Douglas L. Wheeler, “Portuguese Expansion in Angola since 1836: A Re-
Examination,’’ Central Africa Historical Association, Local Series Pamphlet, no. 20
(1967).
14. Degredado means “one who is exiled.’’
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of Brazil,” as they were called—revolted against the captain general.
This barracks coup was crushed by the government, but it set a pattern
of settler hostility to Lisbon rule. As Boxer has observed, Portuguese
pay in the tropics was bad, late, or never; health conditions were
wretched; and the leadership of the colony was not well prepared to
cope with problems. There was not much incentive for enlightened
rule in a colony of transported criminals.
In the eighteenth century the draconian punishments meted out by
governors who tried to rule with an iron hand provoked several con-
vict revolts. In 1878 Governor Vasco Guedes spoke out sharply against
the Portuguese policy of convict transportation to Angola and as-
serted his belief that a great “moral deficit” was piling up in the
country.15
Few Portuguese settled permanently in Angola during the first
three centuries. The European population did not exceed 9,000 until
after 1900. In 1778 a reliable estimate gave a population of 1,700
Europeans. A century later there were about 3,000 Portuguese. Coloni-
zation schemes in the 1880’s caused an increase in the European popu-
lation, but the most significant increases came only after World War
II.
The most notable European separatist movements came in the nine-
teenth century. Brazil declared its independence in September 1822.
Within a few months Brazilians in Angola combined with dissident
Angolans to form a Brazilian Confederation in order to maintain
lucrative economic ties with Brazil and exclude monopolistic Portugal.
Portuguese forces in Luanda prevented the success of this separatist
plot. In the south coast town of Benguela, always a locale of autono-
mist ideas, a separatist junta survived a short while, only to fall to the
Portuguese forces in 1823.
Brazilians were involved in other such plots in Angola in the
following decades. Political changes in Portugal also influenced Euro-
pean movements in Angola. A Portuguese colonialist wrote in 1830
that “when the Metropolis suffers, then the colonies must also suffer;
and the evils that afflict the colonies must affect the Metropolis.
In the political activities surrounding the coming of a constitutional
monarchy to Portugal absolutists opposed liberal constitutionalists.
The heated struggle was echoed in Africa as political exiles of all
15. Francisco Castelbranco, Histdria de Angola (Luanda, 1932), p. 244,
16, J, A, Das Neves, Consideracoes Politicas e Commerciaes sobre os Descobri-
mentos e Possessoes Portuguezas na Africa (Lisbon, 1830), pp, 349-50,
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stripes were shipped out to Angola. In the 1830’s and 1840’s Portu-
guese governors had to adopt severely repressive measures to put down
a number of revolts in Luanda and Benguela.
Discontent among Europeans brewed anew after 1854 when the
first of the Portuguese emancipation laws leading toward an abolition
of slavery was passed. Many settlers and plantation owners, some of
them Brazilian, threatened to rebel against measures designed to bring
about a gradual emancipation. About 1860, coincident with the Prince
Nicolas affair, a European independence movement blossomed in
Luanda. We have a brief account of it by a contemporary writer,
Alfredo de Sarmento:
At that time in Luanda, some utopian ideas of independence fermented
so that some radical natives tried to liberate the mother country, as they
called it, from Portuguese rule. They talked of a Republic, preferring
Brazilian nationality, and there were even those who thought of making a
present of the beloved country to the republic of the United States of
America. 17
The Portuguese government could not afford to compensate slave-
owners for losses incurred in the transition from an economy based
on slave labor to one based on free labor. Though liberal reforms
were conceived in Lisbon, they were rarely implemented in Africa.
Settlers like the sertanejo,^^ who traded and traveled in central Angola,
dared statesmen to come to Angola to apply their principles. The ex-
ample of Brazil—where slavery was not abolished, because of violent
opposition, until 1888—of course had an impact on Angola. Angolan
settlers felt that 1878 as the legal year for emancipation was an un-
reasonable deadline. Slavery and forced labor persisted there long
after that year. Domestic slavery was not eliminated in some areas of
interior Angola until 1 924-25, while various forms of forced labor
apparently continued until 1961.
The slavery issue became confounded with political ideologies. In
Europe the Portuguese monarchy was assailed by republican agitators
until it finally fell in October 1910. Republican exiles, considered sub-
versive in Lisbon, were shipped to Angola and Mozambique. These
men established political circles in Angola, enjoyed relative freedom of
movement, and published newspapers in which they attacked the gov-
17. Alfredo de Sarmento, Os Sertoes d’Africa (Lisbon, 1880), p. 67.
18. Sertanejo was a “person of the backlands”; it came to mean a European
trader-settler in plateau Angola in the nineteenth century.
19. Robert Davezies, Les Angolais (Paris: Minuit, 1965), p. 239.
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ernment and urged Angolan autonomy. One such newspaper was the
short-lived Luanda weekly O Cruzeiro do Sul {Southern Cross), which
began its publication in 1873.
The prevailing atmosphere in Angola, however, was extremely
conservative. Autocratic tendencies prevailed over republicanism and
utopian reformism. Few governors in the nineteenth century or later
could resist muzzling the press when the criticism became too effective
or too heated. The military nature of the Lisbon-appointed administra-
tion (most of the governors were soldiers or sailors) discouraged free-
dom of the press. Even in Lisbon freedom of the press was ephemeral.
Nevertheless, the short-lived settler newspapers and not a few African
newspapers in the 1880-1930 era served a useful purpose in Angola.
Some of the ideas they expressed on agriculture, investment, finance,
and colonization later came to be recognized as having some value.
Lisbon’s army expeditions to Angola could serve two purposes: to
crush African rebellions and to keep unruly settlers in line. Those
perennial “enemies wdthin and without’’ seemed to be everywhere.
Editorials in O Cruzeiro do Sul argued that political freedom should
not vary with geographical latitude. But the authorities had their own
view of what could be permitted in an era when it was uncertain
whether or not Portugal had the strength to remain in Angola. Under
the constitution, Angola could elect deputies to represent the colony
in the national parliament in Lisbon. Elections for these deputies
during the nineteenth century were little less corrupt than elections in
Portugal, the difference being that in Angola the mass blocs of votes
bought were among tribal Africans and not among Portuguese. Given
the chaotic nature of European society in old Angola, the civil rights
enjoyed in Europe could be periodically eliminated to suit the author-
ities. Censorship and military force were the means used to keep
“order.’’2o
A noteworthy separatist movement among Europeans in Angola
came into being during the early 1890’s. As before, crises in Brazil and
Portugal inspired the movement, fn 1888 republicanism won a tri-
umph in Brazil, as the emperor went into exile in Europe and the
country w'as declared a republic. Republicanism in Portugal and
Angola was thereby encouraged, fn addition, a crisis broke out in
Portugal when the government, after being humiliated at the Berlin
Conference (1884-85), yielded to a British ultimatum in a dispute
20. The most complete history- of Angolan journalism is in Julio de Castro Lopo,
Jornalismo de Angola (Luanda, 1964).
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over Nyasaland (now Malawi) in early 1890. The Portuguese monarchy
tottered and ministries fell. The Republican party of Portugal, which
had been gaining strength since the 1870’s, took full advantage of the
government’s embarrassments and portrayed the Portuguese retreat
before the British ultimatum in the Nyasaland affair as a betrayal of
national interests and a signal of the end of the monarchy. As one
fanatic Republican wrote of the day Portugal was forced to accept the
British ultimatum: “This day was worth centuries. Portugal was
at that time in serious financial difficulties: European creditors were
pressuring her, and the colonies were treated as footballs by competing
political and economic interests. It was in this climate that republican
exiles in Angola renewed their agitation for autonomy.
The movement in Angola reached its zenith in 1891-92. The
American consul in Luanda, Heli Chatelain, left a detailed account
of it in his official reports to the State Department . 22 Convinced that
the Portuguese empire was about to collapse and favoring American
imperial expansion in Africa, Chatelain went so far as to suggest to
the State Department that the American government purchase the
Cape Verde and Azdres islands, as well as Cabinda (an Angolan
enclave north of the Congo River). He was in close contact with the
exiled revolutionaries from Lisbon, who believed that a Republican
government in Lisbon would not oppose the idea of Angolan inde-
pendence. So influenced was Chatelain by their views that in 1891 he
confidently predicted in a report that Portugal would not be afraid
of Angolan independence as long as “the Portuguese element remains
paramount.’’
Chatelain was, of course, mistaken. He overlooked Portuguese re-
silience in Africa. Outward signs of weakness were deceptive; to Portu-
gal colonialism was an integral part of any national policy of home
revival, and vested European interests in Angola tied to Lisbon inter-
ests acted as the final arbiters of Angola’s fate. Only a handful of
Europeans, often quarreling among themselves, favored annexation
by or association with the United States in 1892; the majority re-
mained in the Portuguese tradition. The Portuguese government was
bound to prevail in these circumstances and to tighten its control of
Angola, though only to a degree, after a short period of confusdo?^
21. Bazi'lio Telles, Do Ultimatum ao 31 de Janeiro (Oporto, 1905), p. 1.
22. Despatches from United States Consuls in St. Paul de Loanda, T-430, Roll 5,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
23. Confusdo, which literally means “tumult, chaos, pandemonium,” was used in
1961-66 to describe the time of troubles in Angola.
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As the result of a series of treaties between 1885 and 1926 the bounda-
ries of Angola were delimited and Angola was legally made a Portu-
guese territory. But these acts never enabled the Portuguese to exercise
full and effective control over the area, as unrest continued among
Africans and Europeans.
In sum, though often isolated, veiled, and even obscured from out-
side view, Angola experienced many outside influences over the cen-
turies. Dissatisfaction with various aspects of Portuguese rule is not a
twentieth-century phenomenon. Angolan society has proven responsive
to Brazilian influences, ambitions of educated Africans, foreign sug-
gestions, Western political ideals, and, of course, Portuguese politics
and culture. Relations between Angola and Portugal have never been
easy. Indeed, Portugal’s presence in Angola has been in jeopardy more
often than present patriots in Lisbon would like to recall.
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The Separatist Challenge to
White Domination
in South Africa
bj Newell M. Stultz
This essay examines the activities of two organizations in South Africa,
the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and the Transkei
National Independence Party (TNIP), and the effectiveness of the
challenge that these two organizations have presented to white domi-
nation in that country. Though different in many respects, both of
them advocate what for the sake of brevity will be referred to here as
“separatism.”
The essence of separatism is the belief that the 12.5 million or so
Africans and the approximately 3.5 million whites of the Republic of
South Africa—or, at any rate, a sizable majority of both groups—
should be territorially separated from each other through the creation
of two or more politically autonomous, if not independent, states.
Separatists reject as undesirable not only the present domination over
Africans by a white minority but also the prospect of future domi-
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nation over whites by an African majority. The second of these al-
ternatives, they are convinced, would be the inevitable end result of a
policy that accorded, however gradually, political equality to all per-
sons in South Africa irrespective of race.
How realization of their goal would affect other ethnic groups is a
question to which separatists have no clear and uniform answer.
Although there are 2 million Coloreds (persons of mixed blood) and
half a million Asians in the republic, no important voices have been
heard calling for the establishment of separate Colored or Asian
“homelands.” The truth is that most separatists are not particularly
interested in the fate of the Colored and Asian communities; the only
problem of real concern to them is that of relations between whites
and Africans, the solution to which they see in the creation of some
sort of a new political environment in South Africa that would in
effect result in alien status for non-Africans in African-inhabited ter-
ritories and in alien status for non-whites in white-controlled areas.
Such a solution, if adopted, need not affect the present subordinate
position of Coloreds and Asians in relation to whites, and few
separatists, apparently, expect that it will, though some of them have
expressed the hope that once a substantial degree of separation be-
tween whites and Africans has been attained discrimination against all
non-whites might be significantly lessened.
Even in this imprecise form, the idea of an equitable partition of
the republic along racial lines exercises a strong hold on many minds
in South Africa. But this does not mean that the South African white
community can be expected to surrender overnight all the political
privileges and material comforts it has enjoyed for so many years by
virtue of its ability to discriminate against other races. To believe
otherwise would be to overrate the force of a mere idea. Separatism
calls for changes so drastic in the white South African structure of
social values that they could not be brought about without first over-
coming the powerful forces of tradition, self-interest, fear, and
prejudice that operate to preserve the status quo.
If it is to have any chance of succeeding at all, separatism must meet
two requirements. First, it must be promoted through an organized
effort. It is for this reason that the activities of SABRA and TNIP, the
only organizations thus far formed in South Africa to advance the
separatist cause, have been singled out here for scrutiny. Second, a
separatist organization must be able to function without the support,
direct or indirect, of the South African government. This point is
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crucially important. Though the South African government professes
to favor racial separation, it remains committed to the preservation of
existing laws and institutions. Sooner or later, therefore, any organi-
zation that genuinely wishes to promote separatism is bound to find
that the basic interests of the South African government, official
policy declarations notwithstanding, do not coincide with its own.
Historical Antecedents
The idea of separatism is not new. It appeared very early in the
history of South Africa. At the end of the so-called Hottentot War
(1658-60), Jan van Riebeeck delimited the newly founded Cape
Colony’s boundary, a line running from the mouth of the Salt River
to the mountain slopes behind Wynberg, and directed that Europeans
and Hottentots stay on its opposite sides. ^ Disregarding it, a group of
Dutch farmers soon thereafter pushed eastward. In 1750 they reached
the Keiskamma River; there they clashed with the Xhosa, who in the
meantime had been moving with their herds southward in search of
fresh grazing lands. Again the Cape government vainly tried to keep
whites and blacks apart by demarcating a border. In 1743 it fixed the
border at the Great Brak River, but in 1770 it had to shift it east-
ward to the Gamtoos River and in 1775 still farther east to the Fish
River. By 1866 European control extended over all the tribes living
south and west of the Kei River, in the area now called the Ciskei.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Cape govern-
ment, having abandoned the last vestige of hope of maintaining a
political boundary between whites and Africans, proceeded to annex
the 16,000 square miles of tribal lands between the Kei River and the
Natal border. This area is now known as the Transkei. It was reserved
for African occupation, but white magistrates supported by police
forces were sent in to administer it. The same procedure was applied
to all other tribal lands that were later brought within the confines
of the present South African Republic.
In 1910 the Union of South Africa was formed as a self-governing
member of the British Commonwealth. Three years later tribal terri-
tories were formally organized as Native Reserves under a new Land
Act. The previous practice of restricting occupancy to Africans was
reaffirmed. Government purchase of additional land was declared to
1. Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London: Longmans, 1962).
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be the only legal method of increasing the size of the reserves, which
represented then—as they still do—about 13 percent of South Africa’s
total area. Inside the reserves African communal ownership was recog-
nized as the sole form of land ownership; outside, Africans were for-
bidden to acquire land not already owned by other Africans.
The Land Act of 1913 thus established the principle of territorial
segregation of Africans, though only in regard to land ownership.
Subsequently, the distinction between principle and fact was blurred
by the attempts of a succession of white political leaders throughout
modern South African history to win support for the thesis that the
Native Reserves were the only “national homes” of Africans and on
that basis to justify their exclusion from ordinary citizenship rights in
so-called “white South Africa.” The thesis was so used, for example,
by the Nationalist party during its successful 1948 electoral campaign.
Since the reserves, the Nationalist party stated in its program, were
“the true fatherland of the Native,” he should be regarded “as a
‘visitor’ who can never be entitled to any political or equal social rights
with Europeans in European areas. ’’^
A century earlier most Africans did indeed live in geographically
separate and self-contained communities that could be easily distin-
guished from those of South African whites. Racial discrimination
existed even then, but it affected an insignificant number of Africans
who for one reason or another had left the tribal lands. By 1911,
however, half a million Africans, or 12 percent of the country’s
African population, were living in cities and accounted for about
one-third of the total urban population. A census taken in 1960
showed that only about one-third of the total number of Africans
inhabited the reserves and that nearly half of those outside lived in
urban areas. This trend has continued, to the point where Africans
now outnumber whites in the cities. The thesis that Africans con-
stitute geographically separate communities in South Africa can thus
find some support in the principle laid down in the Land Act of 1913
but not in the known facts concerning the present racial distribution
of the country’s population and the historical trends that led to it.
The principal reason for the steady exodus of Africans from the
reserves is the extreme poverty of these areas. The sole economic
activity of any importance there is subsistence farming, which is
inefficient and incapable of supporting a growing population. Many
Africans are therefore forced to seek wage employment, but few jobs
2. “The National Party’s Colour Policy,’’ 1948.
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are to be had in the reserves. Of the nearly 1.5 million Africans living
in the Transkei in 1962, for example, only 21,000, according to official
statistics, worked for wages; another 145,000 migrated to other areas,
seeking employment wherever they could find it—in mines, on white
farms, or in industries.^
The basic reality is that today most of South Africa’s Africans, and
nearly all Coloreds and Asians, live outside the native reserves. They
are in continuous daily contact with whites under a social system gov-
erned by the principle of white supremacy and sustained by an ever-
more unreal belief that Africans have no permanent interests outside
the reserves. But there is no escape from the fact that the reserves, bar-
ring a radical and extremely costly transformation of their economies,
cannot support more than a small fraction of the African population.
The Rise and Decline of SABRA
The origins of SABRA can be traced to some of the economic and
social trends that emerged during World War II. The war accelerated
industrial development in South Africa, and this in turn provided a
major stimulus for increased African migration into urban areas.
Since municipal authorities could not, because of wartime restrictions,
take adequate measures to accommodate the heavy flow of in-migrants,
the material and social welfare of urban Africans deteriorated
markedly. White public opinion became disturbed not only about
some of the immediate social effects—such as, for example, a rising
level of “native crime’’—but also about the long-term implications of
the new racial situation in the cities. Should Africans, many whites
wondered, be treated as permanent city residents? If so, could equal
rights be denied to them? If not, what was to be their future?
The white segment of South Africa’s population became so restive
over this problem in the immediate postwar years as to impel both
major political parties, the United party and the Nationalist party,
to search for a solution. Prime Minister Smuts tried to curb the Afri-
can influx into the cities, but he was unable to build a consensus
within his United party for a comprehensive racial policy and in
1946 he turned the matter over to a special commission of inquiry.
The following year the Nationalist party appointed a commission of
3. House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), May 28, 1963, col. 6772; March 18,
1963, col. 2962.
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its own and asked it to provide guidelines for a “native policy.” The
commission drew up a report which laid the basis for the apartheid
(separate development) program of the alliance between the Reunited
National and the Afrikaner parties that won the general election in
1948.4
The quest for a solution to the racial problem engaged not only the
efforts of government experts and party politicians but also those of
intellectuals. At a Rotary Club luncheon held in 1947 at Paarl, in the
Western Cape Province, Professor N. J. J. Olivier of the University of
Stellenbosch delivered a momentous address in which he expatiated on
the idea of racial separation with justice for all groups. Though the
idea was not new (Professor Hoernle had explored it eighteen years
earlier, in a public lecture at the University of Cape Town^), Olivier’s
Paarl address received nationwide publicity and aroused so much
interest in Afrikaner circles that a group of Afrikaner academicians,
mostly from the University of Stellenbosch, met soon thereafter in
Johannesburg to consider the forming of an organization for the
study of racial affairs. The outcome of the meeting was the creation of
SABRA.6
This decision was reached in spite of the fact that there already
existed in South Africa an organization, the South African Institute of
Race Relations, with a record of experience in the field of racial
studies going as far back as 1929. The group that met in Johannes-
burg wanted to set up a separate body because, for one thing, it ob-
jected to the dominant role of English-speaking South Africans in the
institute’s affairs; and, for another, it felt that the institute’s more-or-
less liberal views did not reflect the sentiments of most Afrikaners, in-
deed of most whites, in South Africa.
SABRA held its first formal meeting on September 23, 1948, at Cape
Town. Several prominent Afrikaners, including three future Cabinet
ministers, joined it on that occasion. Another who was allowed to join
was Colonel Stallard, leader of the right-wing English Dominion party.
His admission was essentially intended as a gesture to show that
SABRA did not wish to be a purely Afrikaner organization. Yet this is
4. Verslag van die Kleurvraagstuk-Kommissie van die Herenigde Party, 1948.
5. See R. F. A. Hoernle, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1945), pp. 168-78.
6. E. S. Munger, “Suid-Afrikaase Bure Vir Rasse-Aangeleenthede [South African
Bureau of Racial Affairs]: An Intimate Account of SABRA’s Origins, Leadership,
Organization and Views, and Its Interaction with Afrikanerdom’s Church, Press,
Party and Public,” American Universities Field Staff Newsletter, AFRICA ESM-6-’56.
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precisely the image SABRA has earned for itself, partly because its
initial funds came from the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultur-Vereenig-
ing, an Afrikaner cultural group; partly also because its membership
since its inception has been predominantly Afrikaner; and, finally, be-
cause its conduct never gave cause to doubt its allegiance to the
principles and institutions of Afrikaner nationalism.
During the first decade of its existence SABRA grew rapidly in
strength. By 1956 it claimed an individual membership of more than
3,000 and the affiliation of some 230 municipalities, churches, and
cultural groups. This rapid growth enabled SABRA to finance all its
activities—including the organization of annual conferences, the cir-
culation of a bimonthly newsletter, and the publication of a bilingual
quarterly, the Journal of Race Affairs—out of members’ subscriptions
and private gifts. At no time did it either solicit or receive financial
contributions from the government, the Nationalist party, or the uni-
versities.
The lack of a financial connection, however, did not prevent SABRA
from becoming closely identified with the University of Stellenbosch
during the 1950’s. Several factors contributed to this result. One was
that SABRA maintained its main office there until 1964. Another was
the university’s heavy representation in SABRA at the policy-making
level. Though SABRA is formally governed by a council elected by
the membership at large, the council’s only substantive function is to
elect a fifty-four member executive committee; the latter appoints a
sixteen-man dagbestuur, or “day committee,’’ which in practice makes
most of the organization’s policy decisions. In 1956, twelve members of
the dagbestuur belonged to the Stellenbosch faculty. But the most
important factor was the role of Professor Olivier, of Paarl-address
fame. As national vice-chairman, a post he filled until 1961, he con-
tributed more than any other single person to the building up of
SABRA and was widely regarded during the 1950’s as its leading
spokesman.
The formulation of SABRA’s separatist philosophy owed much to
his views. Agreement on it was reached within the organization as
early as 1952, and apparently with little debate. Its main features were
spelled out in a thirty-five page pamphlet issued in the same year
under the title Integration or Separate Development? Both the prevail-
ing policy of white discrimination against Africans and the alternative of
providing equal treatment for the two races within a common political
framework were found wanting: the former because it was oppressive
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and bound to fail in the long run, the latter because it implied the
eventual disappearance of the white community as a distinctive entity
in South Africa. The only sensible course for the country, the pam-
phlet claimed, was to aim at “the free and separate development of the
two racial groups.” The services of African workers would continue
to be assured to the white community through a system of migrant
labor, since territorial separation was not meant to deny Africans
access to the “European territory,” only to prevent them from ac-
quiring permanent interests there. Effective separation demanded,
however, that the white community assume the burdensome costs of
financing the economic development of African territories. To SABRA,
as we shall see later, this point was of decisive importance. As for the
political consequences of territorial separation, the pamphlet did not
venture beyond the view that African territories were likely to remain
subject to white control “for a long time,” apart from an obscure
reference to the eventual emergence of independent “Bantu states.”
The translation of this philosophy into an effective action program
depended in the main for its success on the state of SABRA’s relations
with the ruling Nationalist party. At first these relations were ex-
tremely cordial; later, however, largely because of differences of opin-
ion over the recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission, which
the government had appointed in 1951 to look into measures for the
socioeconomic development of Bantu areas, they became acutely
strained.
The Tomlinson Commission was unable to complete its investiga-
tions and present its findings before 1956. Until then the racial policy
advocated by the government in parliamentary debates found con-
stant SABRA support. The Nationalist party had every reason to be
pleased: its apartheid doctrine lacked intellectual respectability and
SABRA’s carefully articulated arguments provided at least a veneer
of it. The Nationalist party felt so warmly disposed toward SABRA
in those years that it came to look upon it as some sort of informal
adjunct to the state machinery it controlled.
SABRA, of course, looked forward to the publication of the Tomlin-
son Commission’s report with keen anticipation, since the commission
was expected to recommend measures for the economic development
of African areas, measures considered by SABRA as essential to the ful-
7. The idea that urban Africans should be considered temporary migrants was not
new. A similar view had been put forward by the Transvaal Local Government
Commission, the so-called Stallard Commission, as early as 1922.
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fillment of its separatist aspirations. When the report finally appeared,
SABRA, obviously impressed, decided to promote a general public
discussion of it by sponsoring a Volkskongres (People’s Congress) at
Bloemfontein. The Volkskongres convened in June 1956, but the
event was marred by the publication shortly before it took place of a
white paper outlining the government’s reaction to the commission’s
report. The government, the white paper indicated in broad language,
basically sympathized with the commission’s reasoning; nevertheless,
and this was the main point, it could not go along with a proposal ask-
ing it to spend within ten years the equivalent of nearly $300 million
on the African reserves.® An effort was made at the Volkskongres to
maintain complete silence about this unexpected development. None
of the formal papers read on that occasion mentioned it. It proved
impossible, however, to prevent some of the participants from using
the opportunity afforded by floor discussion of the various papers to
voice their irritation at the government’s reaction.^ This was the first
public indication that a rift was beginning to form between SABRA
and the Nationalist party.
In the two years that followed the rift widened considerably. In
1958 SABRA held its annual conference at Stellenbosch in an atmo-
sphere that reflected a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with the
government’s stand on the racial question. According to one observer,
the director of the University of Natal’s Institute for Social Research,
Dr. J. F. Holleman, most of the participants appeared to be convinced
that the difference that had emerged earlier between the Tomlinson
Commission’s recommendations and the government’s apartheid pol-
icy, far from being resolved, was actually growing sharper; that, mean-
while, the racial situation in South Africa was rapidly deteriorating;
and that consequently not much time was left in which to find a
suitable remedy.
A
motion was presented asking the executive com-
mittee to organize a joint meeting with a number of prominent
Africans. Its supporters argued that such a meeting might produce
plans for separate development acceptable to both whites and Afri-
cans. The motion passed by an overwhelming margin. The Nationalist
government, obviously stung, reacted swiftly. Shortly after the con-
ference ended, a Cabinet minister publicly denounced “parlour in-
8. White Paper, F-’56.
9. M. Horrell, comp., A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1955-1956
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, n.d.), p. 152.
10. Ibid., 1957-1958, pp. 15-16.
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tellectuals, who venture to question the Nationalist policies. The
minister of native affairs, Dr. Verwoerd, resigned his membership in
SABRA—an event that took on added significance with his elevation
to the prime ministership four months later.
Despite the huge vote in support of it, the proposal to convene a
joint conference never went beyond a preliminary stage in which a
group of SABRA representatives headed by Professor Olivier met in-
formally with African spokesmen. The South African press reported in
early 1959 that Prime Minister Verwoerd had stubbornly insisted in
several heated discussions with SABRA leaders that only government
officials could properly enter into formal consultations with African
leaders. Pressure to call off the proposed conference was also exerted
within the ranks of SABRA. Reports circulated in late 1958 and
early 1959 that several members, most of them from the Transvaal,
had accused the Stellenbosch-dominated leadership of trying to em-
barrass the government through a public display of SABRA opposi-
tion to official policy. It may not be amiss to point out here that Dr.
Verwoerd from 1958 to the time of his death was the leader of the
Nationalist party in the Transvaal. Apparently the Stellenbosch group
managed at that time to restore harmony within the organization, but
only by agreeing to some sort of a compromise that resulted in the
indefinite postponement of the proposed SABRA-African meeting.
Yet these efforts to find an accommodation between the Stellenbosch
intellectuals and Dr. Verwoerd’s Nationalist party were bound to fail
ultimately, since they left a fundamental question unanswered. The
question, simply stated, was whether SABRA was to be allowed to be
anything but a subservient tool of government policy.
The answer came in 1961. A study group headed by Professor Olivier
prepared a report on the future of the Coloreds, in the expectation
that the report would serve as the main theme of SABRA’s twelfth
annual conference. The subject had a special appeal to Professor Olivier
and the men around him, all of whom were Cape Nationalists; for
the Coloreds form, in the main, a community of the Western Cape
Province. There was a strong chance, however, that a conference
centered on the Colored question would offend the Nationalist party,
which clearly did not welcome efforts to draw public attention to a
major flaw in the official ideology of apartheid. The party was all
too conscious of the fact that by invoking, as it had so often done.
1. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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cultural and territorial differences as the basis of its doctrine of sepa-
rate development, the doctrine could be made to apply to the Africans,
but not to the Coloreds, who lacked a sufficiently differentiated culture
or a territory of their own even remotely comparable to the African
reserves.
How provocative the study group’s report actually was it is impos-
sible to say for certain, for the report was never made public. The
executive committee at any rate evinced sufficient alarm over it to rule
against its disclosure and in favor of a new and much more innocuous
conference theme—“Relations between English- and Afrikaans-speak-
ing South Africans.’’ As a result the conference, which had been
scheduled for April, was postponed until September. But that was not
all. For a point had been reached where it was felt that the basic issue
that had agitated SABRA since 1956—whether the organization was
meant to operate as an independent body of scholars or, in Dr. Holle-
man’s words, “within the prescribed limits of the unitary concept of
Afrikaner Nationalism’’—could no longer be sidestepped. On the
second day of the conference the executive committee met again, in
private session, to tackle the issue. It is not known precisely what
went on at that meeting, but, significantly, during the open balloting
that followed for membership in the executive committee. Professor
Olivier was heavily defeated in his bid for reelection, and his place
as vice-chairman was taken by the director of the government-spon-
sored Africa Institute of Pretoria, Professor P. F. D. Weiss; whereupon
Professor Olivier’s disheartened supporters withdrew their own nomi-
nations.
One year later at Pretoria, the site of SABRA’s thirteenth annual
conference, the effects of these changes in leadership could already be
felt. The theme of the conference—the coming of “self-government’’
to the Transkei—though timely, having been chosen in the wake of
an announcement by Prime Minister Verwoerd that some sort of
autonomy would be granted to the Transkei in 1963, attracted a
relatively small audience. The papers presented at the conference’s
various sessions dealt mostly with such bland topics as the adminis-
trative history of the Transkei. A single attempt by an individual at
one session to raise a controversial issue was neatly sidetracked by a
motion to adjourn the session for “tea-time.” The uneventful confer-
ence dragged on until, as a final gesture, the participants were asked to
12. J. F, Holleman, “Sabra 1961: The Great Purge,” mimeographed (Durban:
Institute for Social Research, University of Natal, 1962).
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approve a motion of confidence in the government’s policy—which
they did, without debate and by a unanimous voted^
In 1964 Professor Weiss became chairman of SABRA, and its main
office was moved from Stellenbosch to Pretoria. These were not
important events, except symbolically: they represented the final steps
in the process of liquidating the old organization and what it had
stood for. SABRA became a propaganda instrument of the govern-
ment, though hardly a useful one. Its earlier posture as an authentic
champion of separatism had enabled it to wield a certain amount of
intellectual and moral authority; this posture it could not credibly
maintain once it forfeited its independence, and in consequence it lost
nearly all influence on the South African scene.
Matanzima and the TNIP
Though an advocate of separatism, the Transkei National Indepen-
dence party (TNIP) contrasts sharply with SABRA in several important
respects. First, unlike SABRA, TNIP is a political party, albeit one
still going through an early formative stage. Second, it is an African
organization. Third, notwithstanding its relative inexperience in the
conduct of modern political affairs, its present control of the machinery
of government in the Transkei gives it a measure of legislative and
executive authority to which SABRA, as a mere study group, could
not even aspire. Fourth, whereas SABRA made the future of race
relations in all of South Africa its concern, TNIP’s professed interest
lies solely in the future of the Transkei’s inhabitants. The two organi-
zations, however, have one noteworthy feature in common. Each one
bears the indelible imprint of a forceful personality — SABRA that
of Professor Olivier, TNIP that of Paramount Chief Kaiser D. Matan-
zima.
The son of a chief and a native of Emigrant Tembuland, a periph-
eral region of the Transkei, Matanzima studied law at Fort Hare
University College in the thirties and was eventually admitted to
practice as an attorney in the Cape Province. He gained some promi-
nence in 1958, when the South African government recognized his
claim to authority as the senior tribal chief of Emigrant Tembuland.
His stature was further enhanced in 1966, when his chieftaincy was
13. The writer attended the conference.
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reconstituted as a paramount chieftaincy. But more than anything
else it was his involvement in the drive for Transkeian self-govern-
ment and his leadership of TNIP, which he founded, that contributed
to his fame.
In 1961 a member of the Transkei Territorial Authority proposed at
a meeting of that body that the South African government be asked
to allow the Transkei to become a self-governing state “under the con-
trol of the Bantu people. The only action the Territorial Authority
could be persuaded to take was to appoint a twenty-seven-member
committee under Matanzima’s chairmanship to study the proposal’s
“implications.” Working in close consultation with officials of the
Department of Bantu Administration and Development, the commit-
tee prepared a report that included a draft constitution for a politi-
cally autonomous Transkei. Though the committee had thus clearly
exceeded its mandate, the Territorial Authority accepted the report
and in 1962 submitted the draft constitution for approval to the South
African government. It was on this basis that Prime Minister Verwoerd
was able to announce in the same year that the Transkei would shortly
be accorded some form of self-government.
The Transkei constitution, which the South African Parliament
approved in 1963, vests limited legislative power in a Legislative
Assembly composed of sixty-four chiefs serving as ex-officio members
and forty-6ve elected members. The Assembly may propose bills,
which become law when signed by the state president of the Republic,
on matters concerning the Transkei’s finance, education, agriculture,
local roads and public works, and justice—save for items falling
within the jurisdiction of the South African police. In addition, the
constitution lodges executive functions in a Cabinet composed of a
chief minister and five ministers. The chief minister may allocate
portfolios among his colleagues at his discretion, but all Cabinet mem-
bers must be elected by the Legislative Assembly.
The election for the forty-five members of the first Assembly was
held on November 20, 1963. It was expected that the Assembly, once
it met, would choose between two contenders for the post of chief
minister, both of them ex-officio members—Matanzima and Paramount
Chief Poto. Each of the two, therefore, campaigned strenuously before
the November election on behalf of candidates expected to support
him. Poto’s speeches during the campaign showed him leaning heavily
14. Transkei Territorial Authority, Proceedings and Reports of Select Committees
at the Session of 1961, p. 49.
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toward multiracialism; he argued, for example, that the Transkei
should welcome any “non-African” prepared to “serve” under its
government. Matanzima, on the other hand, came out flatly in
favor of separate development. In December the Assembly elected
Matanzima chief minister by a vote of 54 to 49. An analysis of the
vote showed that Matanzima owed his victory to the ex-officio mem-
bers; of the Assembly’s elected members only twelve had voted for him.
The defeat induced Poto to organize an opposition party. Named
the Democratic party, it held its first meeting in February, 1964; one
week later Matanzima launched his own political organization, the
TNIP.i^ One of TNIP’s first acts was to endorse a Programme of
Principles, which in substance expressed the same separatist sentiments
Matanzima had aired in a manifesto issued during the campaign for
election to the Assembly. Since then the two parties have been vying
for the electorate’s favor in several by-elections, with the results showing
a small gain for the Democratic party. Some of Matanzima’s supporters
in the Assembly have defected to the opposition;^® but there has also
been a movement, slightly larger in number, in the opposite direc-
tion. So far, therefore, Matanzima’s power has not been seriously
threatened.
What, one may ask, is Matanzima’s separatist ideology? Nowhere
is a precise and coherent formulation of it to be found. All that can
be done is to trace the broad lines of Matanzima’s reasoning as re-
vealed by the TNIP’s Programme of Principles and by various public
statements he has made since he became chief minister.
Theoretically, Matanzima sees only two ways of ending white
domination, which, as an African, he naturally resents. One is by
establishing a multiracial society. He is convinced, however, that most
South African whites do not wish to live together with Africans on the
basis of individual equality; and since the whites have the power to
enforce continued discrimination against Africans, an intermingling
of the two races could not produce a different result. The alternative
is separation of the races.
Central to Matanzima’s espousal of separatism is the notion of a
15. The Star, 8 February 1964; The Daily Dispatch, 15 February 1964.
16. The Daily Dispatch, 15 February 1964.
17. One member, Shadrack Sinaba, was appointed TNIP chief whip after defect-
ing from the opposition. He later resigned to form his own party, the Transkei
People’s Freedom party. He advocates independence for the Transkei at the earliest
possible date and has accused Matanzima of temporizing on this issue.
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Xhosa national culture with hereditary chieftainship as its most dis-
tinctive institution. If the Xhosa are not to lose their national identity,
so the argument goes, it is imperative that the authority of their tradi-
tional chiefs be preserved. And the chiefs, being the “natural” political
leaders of their people, must see it as their duty to work for the annex-
ation of all the ancient Xhosa lands not yet under the authority of the
Transkeian government—for the Xhosa homeland stretches from the
Fish River to the Natal border, according to Matanzima, and includes,
therefore, territories beyond the Transkei Reserve’s present boundaries
—the ouster of all whites (about 13,000 of whom now reside in the
Transkei), and the widening of the Transkeian government’s powers
until full sovereignty is achieved.
The goals that Matanzima and TNIP thus emphasize—retention of
chiefly authority, territorial expansion, Africanization, and sover-
eignty-are all clearly political. Little attention is paid in their state-
ments to the problem posed by the Transkei’s poverty and economic
dependence on the South African Republic—a problem that so deeply
preoccupied SABRA—probably because Matanzima and his supporters
realize that the Transkeian government by itself could do little, if any-
thing, to solve it.
The obvious elements of African nationalism in his political pro-
gram suggest that under different circumstances Matanzima might
have tried to widen his role by posing as the champion of all Africans
who feel the oppression of white supremacy in South Africa. As it is,
he has made no move in that direction. His brand of separatism, if
we are to believe his pronouncements, remains firmly wedded to
Xhosa (or Transkeian) tribal particularism. This suits the aims of the
South African governments so remarkably well that Pretoria could do
no less than give Matanzima its official backing, for which he professes
to be grateful. How deep his commitment to Xhosa traditionalism
actually runs is, however, a topic for speculation. It is noteworthy, for
example, that in its first year the Matanzima government made a
dramatic gesture of joining with the opposition Democratic party in
rejecting a proposal to use the vernacular instead of English or Afri-
kaans as the language of instruction in Transkeian schools.^^ There
is room, then, for the suspicion that Matanzima’s devotion to Xhosa
18. See, for example, Transkei Legislative Assembly, Proceedings at the Meeting
of Members of the Transkei Legislative Assembly, Held on 6th, 9th and 11th
December, 1963, for the Purpose of Electing Office Bearers, Etc., p. 15.
19. Transkei Legislative Assembly Debates, 10 June 1964, p. 218.
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particularism owes less to ideological fervor than to a calculated ap-
praisal of the opportunities open to Africans for political expression and
action in contemporary South Africa. There is no reason to doubt, on
the other hand, that he truly favors the preservation of chiefly author-
ity; but this is just as easily explained by self-interest as it is by ide-
ology.
In any event, the Transkei has made no visible progress toward
fulfillment of TNIP’s separatist program. It is of course true that
Matanzima has been in power for only a few years, during which most
of his energies have been absorbed, perhaps unavoidably, by adminis-
trative tasks and partisan politics.
Evaluation of the Separatist Challenge
It is worth emphasizing once more the central point made at the
beginning of this essay: no political organization can be expected to
challenge white domination in South Africa effectively if it depends in
any way upon the support of the South African government, because
a challenge to white domination in that country implies a threat to
interests that government is bound to protect.
SABRA today is certainly not an independent organization. In
1961 it forfeited whatever opportunity it once had to function as a
self-directed agent, though one may wonder whether it did not intend
all along, despite all appearances to the contrary, to serve as a mere
spokesman for and rationalizer of decisions taken elsewhere. It would
be idle, however, to speculate on this question.
Nor can TNIP, for obvious reasons, be considered an independent
organization. Matanzima’s motives are not entirely clear. Some politi-
cal observers of events in the Transkei are inclined to dismiss him
as a mere henchman of Pretoria, but the majority of those who have
had a chance to study him at close range have come away with a
different impression. Opportunism, in all probability, is what chiefly
motivates him to collaborate with Pretoria. The plain fact is that the
Transkei’s economic conditions give Matanzima—or any other political
leader that might replace him—little bargaining power. For the Tran-
skei has nowhere else to look but to South Africa for badly-needed
budgetary support, development capital, and above all a market for
its huge labor surplus. So long as such conditions obtain, the Transkei
has no practical alternative but to stay, however reluctantly, within
the political orbit of white-dominated South Africa.
The Separatist Challenge to White Domination in South Africa 1 1
1
The South African government is of course committed to bring
about what it calls separate development, but the key to its true inten-
tion lies in the measures used, or assented to, to meet that commit-
ment. It is not impossible that the Transkeian government will some-
day be allowed to expel white residents from its territory. It is
even likely that the Transkei will be granted, at some distant date,
legal sovereignty; according to the Ministry of Bantu Administration
and Development, the South African government has already accepted
the idea in principle. The Tswana of western Transvaal, according
to present thinking in official South African circles, are soon to be
endowed with the political institutions the Transkei now has; if the
same pattern is followed, a sovereign Tswanaland will eventually be
allowed to emerge. In time, other reserved areas—such as the Ciskei
and Zululand—may also be gradually advanced to sovereign status. Such
a “creeping partition” would benefit Africans to some extent, since
it would give those living in the reserves some scope for political and
administrative advance. Yet it would not automatically result in a
substantial disentanglement of the races. To achieve this, it would be
necessary to repatriate the 50,000 or so whites now living in African
areas to “white” South Africa—a task that could be accomplished with-
out undue difficulties; it would also be necessary to improve material
conditions in the African areas sufficiently to enable a sizable number
of Africans to leave the truncated republic—of which there is little
prospect, given the South African government’s reluctance to step up
expenditures for the economic development of those areas.
The Tomlinson Commission recommended in 1955 that 50,000 new
jobs be created in the African areas each year for twenty-five years.
This, in its opinion, would have permitted the reserves to accommo-
date about 60 percent of the projected total African population.^! So
far, the number of new jobs created there since 1955 is well below
that recommended by the commission; in 1965 it probably did not ex-
ceed 10,000. Meanwhile, the demand for African labor in the republic
shows no sign of slackening and in the future is expected to rise to
even higher levels. The partitioning of South Africa into white-con-
trolled and black-controlled states would thus leave most Africans
seeking a livelihood in the republic’s urban areas, where a regime of
white supremacy would most certainly be maintained.
20. Communication to the author.
21. Union of South Africa, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the
Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa
(U.S. 61/1955), p. 184.
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The government’s apartheid policy has, until now at least, imposed
no appreciable hardship on the white community in South Africa. At
most it has resulted in a few minor annoyances, such as, for example,
the need to comply with a regulation limiting the number of African
servants who may “live in’’ with white families. The main thrust of
this policy has been directed at matters lying at the periphery of white
interests, such as the political and administrative structures of the
Transkei and other reserved areas. It is a policy which, while it pays
lip service to the idea of racial separation, carefully refrains from
impinging upon the basic privileges secured by whites through domi-
nation over other races and which the government can therefore suc-
cessfully defend, as indeed it has, before the white electorate.
It would seem, then, that there is little hope of ever seeing what
SABRA called the separatist ideal come even close to being fulfilled. Yet
this need not be the case. For some years now the South African system
of white domination has been under attack from various quarters at
home and abroad that cannot be as easily contained or controlled as
were SABRA and TNIP. Their aim is to transform South Africa into
a multiracial, non-racial, or African-controlled polity. There is every
reason to believe that, as time goes on, the pressures they are exerting
will grow stronger. If the past is any guide, however, the South African
government can be expected to react by moving more closely toward,
not away from, racial separation. There is little doubt, for instance,
that external “non-separatist” pressures were much more influential
than the arguments of Professor Olivier and Chief Matanzima in
bringing about Pretoria’s decision to grant “self-government” to the
Transkei. It would be premature, therefore, to rule out the separatist
solution to the South African problem. The irony of it is that, if
realized, it will owe more to the efforts of those who advocate a united
and democratic South Africa than to the separatist challenges of such
organizations as SABRA and TNIP.
Government Policy toward
African Cult Movements:
The Case of Katanga
bj Edouard Bustin
The political connotations of cult movements in a colonial context
have been pointed out so often that they hardly need to be reempha-
sized here. Lanternari, for example, has described at length the charac-
teristic features of religious and other associational movements in a
society whose culture is pitted against another one in an unequal rela-
tionship. ^ In that respect a colonial situation is nothing more than
a particularly acute form of cultural conflict where an institutional
superstructure freezes the sociocultural stratification into what is from
the viewpoint of the colonized a permanently unfavorable pattern. It
1. Vittorio Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed (New York: Knopf, 1963);
Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., Millenial Dreams in Action (The Hague: Mouton, 1962);
Anthony F,-C. Wallace, ed.. The Ghost Dance and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); A.-J. F. Kobben, “Prophetic Movements
as an Expression of Social Protest,” International Archives of Ethnography 49 (1960):
117-64.
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has been observed, however, that religious and other group phenomena
can also reflect the internal tensions of a society. Class distinctions
and class antagonisms, as well as frustrations and anxieties associated
with rapid social change, can, and frequently do, generate within a
politically independent society religious movements comparable to
those observed among subjugated people. 2 There is, therefore, no
reason to believe that cult movements, which were originally reactions
against colonial rule, automatically cease to exist once formal political
independence is achieved. But though they continue to function, dif-
ferent movements adjust differently to post-independence conditions.
The key problem for them is not unlike that which manifests itself
in the temptation of “permanent revolution” for secular movements:
having secured the right or at least the possibility to operate more or
less openly, will they find for themselves a place within the existing
social order, or will they continue to offer an outlet for the discon-
tented at the risk of generating suspicion and antagonism on the part
of the new national establishment?
No religious movement, to be sure, views the problem in these terms.
Most of them, to the extent that they are truly nonsecular movements,
simply want to pursue their manifest aims free from governmental
interference. They expect greater tolerance from an African government
than from a colonial regime, but whether they receive it or not de-
pends in a significant way on the extent to which they are willing to
“render their due unto Caesar” as well as on their ability to control the
faithful. Some movements, such as, for example, the Kimbangist move-
ment (now called Eglise de Jesus Christ sur la Terre par Simon Kim-
bangu, or EJCSK), found no difficulty in fitting into a post-independence
situation. After nearly forty years of official hostility, Kimbangism was
authorized by Belgian colonial authorities shortly before independence,
presumably as a political concession in a region where passive resis-
tance had reached alarming proportions. It was then elevated to the
rank of an officially recognized religion on the same footing as other
Christian faiths by President Kasa-Vubu, who, though not himself
a Kimbangist, was in a good position as the major political leader of
the BaKongo to appreciate the role played by the movement in the
awakening of Kongo national consciousness.^ Kimbangist schools are
2. See L. Pope, Millhands and Preachers (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1942); E. J. Hobsbawn, “Methodism and the Threat of Revolution in Britain,”
History Today 7, no. 2 (1957): 115-24.
3. See Rene Lemarchand, “The Bases of Nationalism Among the BaKongo,”
Africa 31 (1961): 344-54; Laurent Monnier, “Notes sur I’ABAKO et le nationalisme
Kongo,” Geneve-Afrique 5 (1966): 51-61.
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now subsidized by the state in the same manner as their Catholic and
Protestant counterparts.
Without ever becoming quite as “established,” the Lumpa move-
ment in Zambia, which had been tolerated by the British, felt no partic-
ular compulsion to align itself with the Zambian nationalist move-
ment and remained essentially nonpolitical. Ironically, it was the
Lumpas’ very “quietism” that precipitated a clash between them and
the new African authorities of Zambia in 1965.^
On the other hand, the Kitawala, the Congolese offshoot of the
Watch Tower movement, maintained an ambiguous attitude toward
the new Congolese political elite. The Watch Tower doctrine, as
interpreted by its Congolese followers, not only lent itself readily to
the expression of anti-colonial sentiments but could also be brandished
against any form of “evil” government—and the years following
independence showed no lack of corrupt, tyrannical, and ineffective
authority.
The frequency of religious undertones in the various Congolese
uprisings since 1960 has been repeatedly recognized,^ and no thorough
analysis of Congolese religious movements after independence will be
attempted here. The limited aim of this essay is to scrutinize the
attitude of Congolese authorities in Katanga toward some of the best-
known cult movements and to show the ambivalent feelings of the
new African rulers toward a phenomenon which had long vexed their
colonial predecessors.
Unlike the densely populated areas of the Congo’s southern savanna
—Lower-Congo, Kwilu, Kasai—Katanga had never been notable for
the proliferation of home-grown cult movements. The most important
foci of social change, the urban industrial centers of the Katanga
copper belt, were relatively isolated from the major centers of tradi-
tional culture, and industrial manpower had to be drawn from neigh-
boring British territories and from relatively distant regions of the
Congo. It took time for industrial development and locally based
salaried employment to penetrate the more densely populated areas
of North Katanga. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find that up to the
1950’s cult movements penetrated Katanga from or through neighbor-
4. James Fernandez, “The Lumpa Uprising: Why?” Africa Report 9, no. 10:
30-32.
5. R. C. Fox and W. DeCraemer, “The Second Independence: A Case Study of
the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo,” Comparative Studies in Society and History
8 (1965): 78-109; B. Verhaegen, Rebellions au Congo, 2 vols. (Brussels: C.R.I.S.P.,
1966 and 1969); Etat du Katanga, La Rebellion dite Balubakat dans I’Etat du
Katanga (Elisabethville, 1961.)
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ing Rhodesia. Examples are the Watch Tower movement, which
later spread through the eastern half of the Congo under the name of
Kitawala; the various offshoots of the Apostolic Faith Church, whose
followers are known to non-members as Bapostolo; and the Watchman
Healing Mission. It was not until after World War II that Kimbang-
ism, having filtered from the Lower Congo through Kwango and
Kwilu into Kasai, was imported into Katanga (without any spectacular
success) by some migrants from Kasai and in forms somewhat different
from the original creed. A number of non-Christian movements origi-
nated in the Congo but few of them in Katanga itself.
Non-Christian Movements under Colonial Rule
Excluding those associated with beliefs in sporadically recurrent
rumors such as the alleged kidnapping of Africans by Europeans
(Mitumbula), non-Christian movements suppressed by colonial author-
ities in Katanga can be divided into four major types.
The first type centers on belief in the resurrection of dead ancestors.
A fairly common belief in all parts of the world, it usually associates
the return of departed ancestors with a complete subversion of the
relationship between the conqueror and the conquered. Elaborate
ceremonies known as Zemba among the Lunda and Mungonge among
the Tshokwe helped to diffuse the belief in Katanga and other parts
of the Congo on two chronologically distinct but otherwise quite
similar occasions.
In 1931-32 rumors heralding the imminent return of dead ancestors
circulated among the Tshokwe of the Congo-Angola border. The re-
turn of the ancestors, it was claimed, would be accompanied by the
demise of the colonial order; Europeans and Africans would exchange
their respective social positions, and a golden age would begin. Villag-
ers were urged to slaughter all black domestic animals and in certain
cases to remove from their villages the chief objects of the akishi
(spirits of the dead) cult, such as the muyombo (tree) and mahamba
(life-size clay effigies of spirit incarnations). The movement died out
rapidly, as such adventist beliefs often do, but two important chiefs
—one a Tshokwe, the other a Lunda—were deposed by Belgian author-
ities for their parts in spreading the rumors, while a third chief ffed
to Angola.®
6. See the report by the Assistant District Commissioner of the Lulua District to
the Governor of Katanga (29 February 1932) and attached correspondence between
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An almost identical wave of rumors, followed by the same reactions,
developed in 1950 in the Angolan border area of Texeira de Souza. To
the slaughtering of black animals was added, in this case, the injunc-
tion that white clothes should be worn on the day of resurrection.
Apart from unusually large sales of white cotton cloth in local stores,
however, there were no further repercussions.”^
The second type of non-Christian movement is distinguished by its
use of vitalizing and immunizing objects. Belgian authorities could
not and did not systematically suppress such movements, but they were
more hostile than other colonial powers. Apart from missionary in-
fluence, the Belgian administration in the Congo was disturbed by the
fact that people holding a certain amulet {bwanga or dawa) often
believed that they were immune from the action of magistrates, tax
collectors, and other representatives of colonial authority.
The best-known amulets in Katanga were Ukanga, Farma^on,
Tambwe, and Tshimani. Ukanga took many forms. The two most
common were a brightly colored bottle capped with red feathers and
a lancet containing various ingredients steeped in water from the
first rainfalls of the season and a magical powder in the horn of a
kashia antelope. The amulet, which appears to have originated among
the BaTetela-BaKusu of the middle Lomami valley, became widely
known in various parts of Katanga around 1930.
The use of Ukanga declined in the 1940’s when Farma^on became
more popular. The name Farma^on was apparently derived from the
French “formation” (training)
,
which referred in this case to “medical
training.” Farma^on consisted of the injection of some kind of liquid
with a hypodermic needle, or in some cases of the insertion of just
the needle or some other sharp metal point, under the patient’s skin.
The popularity of Farma^on reached its peak in the late 1940’s in the
Sandoa-Dilolo region® and even stimulated some enterprising people
of neighboring Kapanga territory into launching their own version
of it under the name of Konfirmash (or Confirmation).^
the District Commissioner and local administrators. On related movements outside
Katanga, see Edouard De Jonghe, “Formation recente de societes secretes au Congo
Beige,” Africa 60 (1936): 56-63.
7. Reports by the Territorial Administrator of Dilolo, 18 November 1950, and 5
February 1951; Report by the Territorial Administrator of Sandoa, 17 December
1950.
8. Territoire de Sandoa, Rapport Affaires Indigenes et Main d’Oeuvre (AIMO)
1948, p. 39.
9. Rapport Surele, Kapanga, Third Quarter, 1950. There was apparently some
semantic confusion between formation (training) and confirmation (the Catholic
sacrament).
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Tambwe, like Ukanga, spread through Katanga in the 1930’s. It too
came in two versions. One, meant for adepts, consisted of a bracelet
made of iron and antelope horn containing several magical substances
(Bizimba). The other, for non-adepts, was a sausage-shaped roll con-
taining an assortment of Bizimba—such as dirt from gravesites, crushed
human bones, hawk feathers, and hairs and fragments from the heart
of a lion or leopard—mixed with palm oil. In this second and pre-
sumably more powerful form the amulet was “fed” palm oil through
a small aperture and kept in a box or washbasin along with coins and
bills. Like other amulets, Tambwe was supposed to protect its pos-
sessor against various dangers, especially against disease, evil spirits,
and prosecution for wrongdoing. In 1947 the price of the amulet was
said to have ranged from 200 to 1,500 francs—a considerable sum for
most Congolese. The popularity of Tambwe declined steadily after
World War II, although it retained its appeal among certain groups,
such as the BaSongye residents of Kongolo territory.
The use of Tshimani, a mixture of peanut oil and tree bark, spread
from Kasai into the southeast in the 1930’s and was replaced after the
war by more “modern” practices, like Farma^on. It supposedly gave
immunity against snakebite, disease, and prosecution by the author-
ities; its adherents wore a bangle made of beads with two small
wooden amulets around the arm or ankle.^^
The third type of non-Christian movement focuses on witchcraft
detection. Here, again, Belgian colonial authorities tried to intervene
only when they suspected a possible violation of law and order. They
forbade, for example, subjecting an accused sorcerer to various types of
ordeals, especially ordeals by poison and by torture. Divination, which
was generally tolerated by the administration, gradually replaced or-
deals as a prelude to exorcism.
Witchcraft detection normally went along with the use of amulets in
much the same way as a medical diagnosis is followed by a prescrip-
tion. Diviners dispensed charms that were supposed to protect their
bearers against spells. But the detection of witchcraft, as well as the
preparation of charms against its effects, was considered most effective
when practiced collectively, and diviners and those desiring protection
against witchcraft often formed a single society. It is impossible, there-
fore, to draw sharp dividing lines among believers in the power of
a certain bwanga, anti-witchcraft societies, initiation fraternities, and
10. Jean Vanden Bossche, Sectes et Associations Indigenes au Congo Beige
(Leopoldville: AIMO, 1954), pp. 42-43.
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organizations exercising some form of sociopolitical control. Neverthe-
less, witchcraft detection must be regarded as an important factor.
The rapid spread and early success of the Watch Tower movement in
Northern Rhodesia and the Congo was, according to most sources,
linked to its emphasis on the elimination of witchcraft. And the same,
to a certain extent, appears to be true of the propagation of other
Christian faiths.
Finally, there are movements that try to establish “parallel hier-
archies." Even the organization of independent African churches re-
flects, at least in part, the desire to create a purely African ecclesiastical
hierarchy parallel to that of European churches. Some associations
attempted to duplicate certain features of the colonial system in order
to achieve what they viewed as a more satisfactory performance of
functions normally discharged by the state apparatus. There was the
Pauni movement, for example, which operated in Kivu and northern
Katanga in the 1930’s, whose dignitaries assumed the titles of judges,
administrators, and procureurs in dispensing justice to the members.^!
Similar practices were also found in a movement called Les Beiges. A
movement known as Tutshikele emerged in the mid-1940’s in the
Dilolo area, from which point it spread to neighboring Sandoa. Its
members claimed to be possessed by spirits of deceased Europeans and
behaved accordingly, dressing and eating like whites and even claim-
ing to speak a number of European languages.^^ The colonial ad-
ministration took no measures against this movement. Perhaps it was
flattered by what it viewed as an implicit acknowledgement of Euro-
pean superiority.
Christian Movements during the Colonial Period
The adaptation of the Christian creed to African needs followed
various paths. So long as European and American missionaries insisted
upon retaining both the organizational and the doctrinal control of
Christian churches, the only alternative open to dissatisfied African
converts was open dissidence. Schismatic or fissiparous movements
have been a permanent feature of the history of Christianity in Africa.
In Katanga, as mentioned earlier, the Watch Tower movement was
11. Ibid., p. 81.
12. Rapport AIMO, Territory of Sandoa, 1948: pp. 37-38; Vanden Bossche,
Sectes, p. 66.
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the first major manifestation of African aspirations toward religious
independence.
The Watch Tower movement had expanded northward from Cape
Town in the years preceding World War I and had found a particu-
larly fertile soil in Nyasaland. After the war it appeared in Northern
Rhodesia and spread among the Bemba of the Northern Province,
where it has remained firmly entrenched ever since. Converts, led by
Hanoc Shindano, built a community which they called Jerusalem
near a river they renamed Jordan. In 1925 a native of Nyasaland
residing in Northern Rhodesia, Tomo Nyarenda “Mwana Lesa,” in-
troduced Watch Tower doctrines into the Congo, but after he prac-
ticed baptism by immersion so thoroughly that several of his converts
drowned, he was arrested by the colonial authorities, escaped to
Northern Rhodesia, and was finally hanged by the British in 1927.
The first of many Belgian bans on Kitawala was decreed in 1926. A
second wave followed in 1930-31, prompting Protestant missionaries in
Elisabethville to issue a vigorous condemnation of the movement. By
that time, however, the movement had made many new converts, in-
cluding some traditional chiefs, in the areas of Northern Rhodesia
immediately adjacent to the Congo, and their inhltration into the
Belgian colony became virtually impossible to stop, given the constant
traffic across an artificial border and the presence of thousands of
Rhodesian laborers in the mines of Katanga. By the mid-1930’s the
movement had spread in the direction of Dilolo and had made con-
verts among the evolues in the urban centers of southern Katanga.
The real breakthrough, however, came in the north. During 1937-38,
Kitawala spread like a brush fire throughout this region. Sometimes
hundreds of persons were baptized in a few days, and the movement
made deep inroads into rural areas despite, or perhaps because, of its
opposition to traditional chiefs. Kitawala continued to spread during
World War II, especially in the North Katanga mining center of
Manono and the Mwanza and Kongolo areas. Its success among
salaried workers goes a long way to explain the widely held belief
among European employers and officials that Kitawala was at the root
of the 1945-46 wave of labor unrest in North Katanga. After 1947 the
pressure of Belgian repressive policy in Katanga became so intense
that members were forced to convene in small groups and constantly
change the location of their meetings to escape detection. Rhodesian
13. Ian Gunnison, “A Watch Tower Assembly in Central Africa,” International
Review of Missions 40 (1951): 456-68,
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influences continued to be felt, as the Watch Tower movement held
frequent rallies just across the border. Periodic visits by traveling
propagandists kept the faith burning. The movement even gained
new ground in the mid-1950’s, and during the last years of colonial
! rule it made a new thrust in North Katanga under the name—bor-
1
rowed from Revelations, the movement’s favorite part of the Scrip-
tures—of “[Church of] Philadelphia.’’
j
The appeal of Kitawala to the Congolese is not easily explained.
I Different people were probably attracted by different aspects of the
movement. The millenarian character of Watch Tower doctrines ex-
I
pressed itself in the Congo through adventist beliefs centering on the
|i
departure of all Europeans or on the reversal of the stratified order of
colonial society. Teachings that concerned the evil roots of worldly
hierarchies were interpreted, depending upon circumstances, against
Belgian authorities, against traditional chiefs, or against both, and in
' recent years, sometimes even against African governments. Finally, as
mentioned earlier, the movement’s strong stand against witchcraft and
its insistence that villagers rid themselves of all charms were more
than a marginal factor in ensuring its success in communities where the
web of spells and counterspells had become unbearable. More gener-
ally, Kitawala, like other independent churches, reflected the disap-
pointment of many Africans at the bitter contrast between the pro-
fessed ideals and the actual behavior of white Christians.^^
The reaction to Kitawala in Katanga was such that for years any
new cult movement, even if non-Christian, was automatically viewed
as a disguised form of the Watch Tower movement. This was the
case of the Watchman Healing Mission, for example, whose founder
had indeed been exposed to Watch Tower doctrines before World
War I, as well as of the Apostolic Faith Church—two movements that
appeared in Katanga between 1953 and 1956.
According to its leaders in Katanga, the Watchman Healing Mission
(WHM), also known as Mulenda Mission, was launched in 1909 by
I
Eliotti Acirwa Kamwanya, a native of Nyasaland who had been
trained by an American minister of the Watch Tower Society. Upon
his return to Nyasaland from South Africa, Eliotti was deported by the
British in 1916, but his work was continued by one of his disciples,
Chilele. Eliotti was released in 1938 and allowed to return to Nyasa-
land, where he continued to evangelize until his death in 1955. He was
14. See Jacques E. Gerard, Les fondements syncretiques du Kitawala (Brussels:
I
C.R.I.S.P., 1969).
122 Edouard Bustin
succeeded by Chilele, assisted by a new deputy, Andiford Kaliati.^^
The teachings of WHM, which emphasized the curative virtues of
prayer and forbade the use of medicaments, were introduced in the
copper-belt area of Northern Rhodesia in 1946. Pita Kauto, a Congo-
lese native who had resided in Northern Rhodesia, brought the WHM
to Jadotville, Dilolo, Kolwezi, and Sandoa in 1953. The movement
was outlawed by the Belgian authorities in 1954 and many of its
members were arrested,^® but official repression did not prevent the
spread of the movement, especially in Dilolo territory. i'' The agitation
reached a feverish pitch when a high WHM official from Northern
Rhodesia toured Dilolo in 1958. Kauto was arrested, along with several
other members of the sect, and sentenced to sixty days in jail. Upon
his release he was placed under house arrest, but he somehow managed
to reach Nyasaland in 1959. Appointed bishop by Chilele, Kauto
returned to Dilolo in 1960 “to cause the banner of the Lord to be
raised in the eyes of all the peoples of the Congo.’’^®
The growth of the Bapostolo movement in Katanga is more difficult
to trace. The parent movement, the Apostolic Faith Church, was
founded by W. O. Hutchinson in Bournemouth, England, in 1908 and
transplanted by him to South Africa in 1911. One of Hutchinson’s
aims was to “instruct and train Africans to communicate the word of
God to their own people,” and under European supervision “Bantu
superintendents” were put in charge of the African clergy in each
territory. But the church suffered from some serious rifts, and the
name Apostolic Church has apparently been used by a number of
dissident or even unrelated groups.
One such dissident was the prophet Marange (or Malangu), who
founded a church at Umtali in 1924. Between 1953 and 1956 followers
of Marange’s African Apostolic Church introduced his teachings into
Katanga. Petro Nawezi, a Lunda and a former Methodist catechist,
was converted at Lusaka in 1953 following the miraculous healing of
his wife and he, in turn, according to his own claims, baptized seven
Congolese, hve from Elisabethville and two from Dilolo.
Within less than three years the movement had acquired enough of
15. “L’histoire et la signification de la WHM,” memorandum to South Katanga
provincial authorities, 17 October 1966.
16. Rapport AIMO, Territory of Dilolo, 1957, p. 40.
17. Idem, 1958.
18. ‘‘L’histoire et la signification de la WHM.”
19. Letter by the representative of the ‘‘Eglise Apostolique Africaine Church”
(sic.) to the Minister of Justice of South Katanga, 15 December 1966.
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a following to stimulate competition and attract official attention. The
Belgian administration outlawed all Apostolo movements in 1956, and
four leaders of the movement, including Nawezi, were arrested. In
1957, eighty-two Bapostolo were indicted in Elisabethville and fifty-
four were arrested in Dilolo territory. After his arrest, Nawezi decided
to abandon some of the most conspicuous rites of the sect. He autho-
rized his followers to shave off their beards (the wearing of a full beard
had been the most distinctive mark of the Bapostolo), invited members
to pray at home instead of gathering in the open air as they had done
previously, and administered baptism with water carried in a cup,
instead of by immersion.
These compromises caused his leadership to be challenged by one
Pierre Musumbu. Two senior church officials from Northern Rho-
desia effected a reconciliation at Lusaka in 1957, and Musumbu was
appointed Nawezi’s second-in-command. Though Musumbu left
Katanga in 1958 to spread the faith in his home province of Kasai,
the breach in the movement, far from the healing, was further widened
by the factor of ethnicity that had come to dominate the Katanga
political scene. While Nawezi was a Lunda, Musumbu and most of the
followers of the movement were immigrants from Kasai. Soon the
split in the ranks of the Bapostolo came to reflect the pervasive cleav-
age between so-called authentic Katangese and outsiders. Meanwhile,
the colonial authorities had gradually relaxed their undiscriminating
hostility toward African churches, and by early 1960, despite a con-
tinuing official ban on their activities, the bearded Bapostolo, wearing
robes and carrying staffs, could be seen meeting in vacant lots in
Elisabethville.20
The Apostolo were not the only churches to be affected by the
problem of ethnicity. The Kimbangist movement, which had spread
to non-BaKongo areas during the years it had been banned, was
officially authorized in Leopoldville province in 1960. One of Kim-
bangu’s sons, Joseph Diangenda, acting as the legal representative of
the “official” Kimbangist church, went to Elisabethville to have his
father’s body exhumed. Kimbangu’s remains were reinterred at
Nkamba, the village that had been the center of Kimbangu’s prophetic
career and which his followers called Jerusalem. On the occasion of
20. An ordinance issued by the governor general on 8 May 1959 left the provincial
governors free to decide which sects should be outlawed in their respective
provinces. In Katanga a provincial arrete outlawed the Apostolic Church, as well
as a number of other sects and movements, on 25 August 1959.
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this ceremony the church held an organizational conference, but non-
BaKongo participants were disappointed by what they viewed as the
ethnic imbalance in the apportionment of posts in the church’s central
administration. Of the twenty senior members on the board, eighteen
were BaKongo. This was the source of a misunderstanding which
eventually led a number of Kimbangists from Kasai and Katanga to
form a dissident movement called Eglise Unie du Saint Esprit . 21
Independent Religious Movements during the Katanga Secession
The end of Belgian rule was followed in Katanga by the almost
immediate declaration of that province’s secession from the rest of the
Congo. From the outset, however, the “independent” state of Katanga
had to face the determined opposition of a substantial portion of its
population and the threat of military intervention by the central
government. By September 1960 the latter threat receded into the back-
ground, following Lumumba’s dismissal from the prime ministership,
and the Katanga regime was able to concentrate on the suppression of
domestic insurgency. In these circumstances the attitude of the Ka-
tanga authorities toward African cult movements was bound to be ex-
tremely cautious.
An ordinance was issued in October outlawing the activities of all
associations of a political nature. Although a broad interpretation of
this ordinance could have covered almost any nonconformist move-
ment, Minister of Interior Munongo issued a decree the following
month banning the activities of the Watch Tower association “under
any appellation.” This decision came as an unwelcome surprise to the
officials of the Watch Tower Society in Belgium, where the movement
had always been legal. Having been previously penalized for the faults
of an unauthorized offshoot of their movement in the Congo, they had
naturally hoped that Congolese independence would at last enable
them to reintroduce some degree of orthodoxy in the propagation of
their doctrines. In December the administrative secretary of the Watch
Tower Society for Belgium sent a personal appeal to Moise Tshombe
(himself a Methodist) pointing out that Kitawala had never been
21. Pierre Konji, “Memorandum de separation de I’Eglise du Christ sur la Terre
par le Prophete Simon Kimbangu et la naissance de I’Eglise Unie du Saint Esprit,”
mimeographed (Lubumbashi, 2 August 1966).
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acknowledged or recognized by his denomination. As he passed on the
request to Munongo, Tshombe reminded his associate that the policies
of the Katanga government “had been viewed rather critically, notably
among African circles in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
notably because of certain prohibitions,” and suggested that the No-
vember decree might be aimed more precisely at Kitawala in order
“to avoid offending, to some extent, African opinion in neighboring
territories to the South. ”22
Munongo at first deferred to Tshombe’s wishes and drafted a new
decree in which the words “Watch Tower” were replaced by “Watch
Tower-Kitawala,” but because of the combined opposition of security
agents and of certain Belgian advisers to any mitigation of colonial
policy toward the movement, he subsequently decided not to issue the
new decree. He told Tshombe in a letter that, much as he was attached
to religious freedom, he though it best to maintain the earlier decree
and suggested writing to the Belgian secretary of the Watch Tower
Society that the authorization of their movement should be solicited
again “in a good ten years” after any similarity between their church
and Kitawala had become thoroughly obscured.^s As a matter of fact,
Munongo dispatched the proposed reply the very same day and sent a
copy of it to Tshombe—although the copy, owing to a “clerical error,”
reached the president only three weeks later.
Despite suggestions by security agents that the Watch Tower move-
ment could be utilized against the government by leaders of the
Balubakat opposition in northern Katanga, the attitude of the
Katanga authorities was probably not overly influenced by them, as
the following passage found in a study of the North Katanga rebellion
prepared by the secessionist regime around mid- 1961 indicates:
It is well known that Kitawala, even in versions close to the Watch
Tower, is hostile to any authority. It also opposes belonging to any move-
ment whatsoever. Kitawala refused to join the BBK [i.e., Balubakat], and
its members did not accept the BBK initiation. But while the BBK
showed some understanding toward the Protestants, who also refused the
dawa, it was intractable with the Kitawala. Unlike the Protestants, the
latter refused to man roadblocks. ... It seems that Kitawala might have
been willing to enter into some sort of an alliance with the BBK, if only
out of spite toward those who had harassed them. Their attempts were
22. Letter of 11 January 1961.
23. Munongo to Tshombe, 1 July 1961.
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repelled. A case of this sort was the arrest of Chief Benze by members of
Kitawala. The BBK showed no gratitude for this.24
The main spiritual support of rebel morale in North Katanga was
not Kitawala but the more traditional bwanga. It apparently played a
major role in galvanizing rural insurgents not only in North Katanga
but in other rebel areas as well.^s Meanwhile, despite the official ban
on them, Watch Tower doctrines continued to circulate in the State of
Katanga much in the same way as they had done under Belgian rule—
along the rail line from Northern Rhodesia or simply through the
mails.
The attitude of the Katanga authorities toward the Apostolo, Mu-
lenda Mission, and other independent churches, though generally less
repressive, was nevertheless characterized by overriding distrust. In
1961 Minister of Interior Munongo informed his subordinates that
the Apostolic Church did not seem to present a threat to the security of
the state (although the actions of individual members might be in
violation of law and order and should in that case be punished)
,
but
that if they could prove that the Apostolic Church served as a facade
for the Watch Tower movement, they should prosecute it accordingly.
He concluded by stressing that the movement’s activities should be
watched closely.^®
In September 1962 the Apostolo movement was banned in Dilolo. In
November the district commissioner of Lualaba, the territorial ad-
ministrator of Kolwezi, and a third official allegedly assaulted members
of the Apostolic Church at Kolwezi. In a subsequent letter justifying
his actions to President Tshombe, the territorial administrator of
Kolwezi claimed that “the association as a whole had become uncon-
trolled and uncontrollable,” that many adepts, “in conformity with Kita-
wala practices,” refused to carry any identification, and that they refused
all medical care and spread “racial, anti-medical and anti-missionary
propaganda. ”28 On the same day that these incidents were taking
place at Kolwezi, the mayor of Kikula township at Jadotville person-
ally arrested fifty members of the Apostolo movement, all of them but
24. Etat du Katanga, La Rebellion, p. 26. Similar problems later emerged in the
relationship between the Kitawala and the “Simba” rebels of Maniema. See Verhae-
gen, Rebellions, vol. 2, p. 21.
25. Verhaegen, Rebellions; Fox and De Craemer, “Second Independence.”
26. Circular no. 3021/0529/404, 8 March 1961.
27. Letter by two members of the Apostolic Church to the Speaker of the Katanga
National Assembly, 7 November 1962.
28. Memo. no. J.5/0830, 19 December 1962.
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one being North Katanga BaLuba.^® Four days later the Bena
Apostolo movement was outlawed throughout Katanga on the alleged
grounds that it had “definitely established links with the forbidden
association of the Watch Tower.”^^
Local Kimbangists did not fare much better. In several letters
addressed to the authorities in the fall of 1962, they requested per-
mission to open churches in Elisabethville and Kolwezi.^^ Their re-
quest was turned down in December, but a few days later the Katanga
secession came to an end.
Government Policies after the Secession
The restoration of the central government’s control over Katanga
led to a confused period in the relations between secular authorities
and independent churches. On the one hand, the Leopoldville govern-
ment’s general policy line toward such movements was one of greater
tolerance but, on the other, the administrative personnel of the former
Katanga “state” remained by and large in place and maintained, at
least for a while, its previous attitudes. Furthermore, as the Adoula
government leaned farther and farther away from its Lumumbist ele-
ments and faced the first outbursts of the so-called Mulelist rebellion,
its policy toward such movements as the Watch Tower became in-
creasingly hostile. Tshombe’s accession to the premiership in 1964
only accentuated this trend.
The vacillation of official policy in the months that followed the
end of the secession is illustrated by the Kimbangist church’s com-
plaints in the spring of 1963 that the provincial authorities in
Elisabethville appeared to remain unaware of the fact that their orga-
nization had been officially recognized by President Kasa-Vubu more
than two years earlier. The assistant public prosecutor, to whom this
complaint was presented, felt compelled to remind the provincial
Department of the Interior that “under the present circumstances,
the authorization of the church by a presidential ordinance should be
considered as implying the removal of any prohibition against it.”®^
29. Letter by the Mayor of Kikula “Commune” to the Director of Security Services
in Jadotville, 5 November 1962.
30. Arrete Ministeriel, no. 30/290, 7 November 1962.
31. Letters to Tshombe (30 October 1962), to Munongo (27 November 1962),
and to the District Commissioner of Lualaba (27 November 1962).
32. Letter by the Assistant Public Prosecutor to the Director of the Territorial
Service, 4 May 1963.
128 Edouard Bustin
Watch Tower members also tried to take advantage of the change of
regime. Less than one month after the end of the secession, three
Rhodesian members sought permission to settle in a village near Sa-
kania on the ground that they had relatives there. They soon ran
afoul of the local authorities. One propagandist was arrested at the
Sakania railroad station on 13 March, and a few days later the whole
congregation was rounded up and sentenced to jail by Chief Serenge,
the highest-ranking traditional chief of the area.^^
The provincial administration at Elisabethville was divided over
this incident. On the one hand, as one official in the Department of
the Interior observed, the legal penalties against the Watch Tower
movement were still technically in force and it might be preferable to
uphold the traditional chiefs “who might not understand our new
position” and whose cooperation was, in any case, “more useful than
that of the few incarcerated members of a forbidden sect.”^^ On the
other hand, as the new provincial minister of interior, Alexis Kishiba,
well knew, the central government’s policy was “currently to tolerate
the activities of this sect, pending new regulations concerning religious
associations.”^^ In this situation, the district commissioner of North
Katanga instructed his subordinates that only those individuals who
disturbed public order and tranquillity should be prosecuted.^® Mean-
while, the Leopoldville government was reshuffled and revised its
attitude toward the Watch Tower movement. In an emphatically
worded circular, the new minister of the interior of the central govern-
ment, Joseph Maboti, reminded all provincial presidents that his
predecessor’s tolerance had been unfounded and in support of his
views he revived all the arguments once used by the Belgian authori-
ties.®^
Kishiba asked Leopoldville to clarify whether or not any distinction
should be made between the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) and the Kitawala-Watch Tower.®® Before he
33. Undated report of the Territorial Administrator of Sakania (circa late July,
1963).
34. Memo, by the head of the First Bureau of the Direction du Service Territorial,
2 September 1963.
35. Minister of Interior to the District Commissioner of North Katanga, 25
September 1963.
36. District Commissioner of North Katanga to Territorial Administrators in his
district, circular no. 0310/i, 9 December 1963.
37. Minister of the Interior to Provincial Presidents, circular no. 2531/5674, 5
November 1963.
38. Letter of 16 March 1964.
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could receive a reply, however, the Adoula government resigned and
was replaced by a new cabinet headed by Tshombe. The reply that
Kishiba eventually received from the ministry of the interior in Leo-
poldville, now placed under Munongo’s direction, passed over the
question of Jehovah’s Witnesses and emphasized that pre-1960 or-
dinances against Kitawala and the Watch Tower were still in force.^^
The provincial minister’s caution was understandable, considering
that a group officially called Jehovah’s Witnesses had been lawfully
organized in Leopoldville and was represented in Elisabethville by
Shindano, speaker of the East Katanga legislature. Shindano took it
upon himself to “authorize” the proselytizing activities of one Aron
Kimba on behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses by a safe-conduct written
under his official letterhead and addressed to Mufunga, the Lomotwa
chief of Sampwe.^^ This may explain why shortly thereafter the as-
sistant district commissioner of North Katanga informed the territorial
administrator of Sakania that, pending an explicit prohibition di-
rected against Jehovah’s Witnesses, the latter group’s existence should
be tolerated, except in cases where “public order and tranquillity”
were being directly threatened.^^
The line drawn by the Elisabethville authorities between Kitawala
or Watch Tower on the one hand and Jehovah’s Witnesses on the
other was too fine for local administrators to perceive. They under-
stood that any movement to which the “Watch Tower” label could be
affixed was still prohibited, and they reacted accordingly. They also
knew of the Tshombe government’s distrust of all unorthodox move-
ments, particularly at a time when the spread of the so-called Mulelist
rebellion into North Katanga seemed to coincide with the extension of
the former Balubakat opposition to the Katanga secession. Indeed, the
provincial government of East Katanga had just decided to outlaw
the Apostolic Faith Church,^^ ^nd it seemed likely that other cult
movements would suffer the same fate. The provincial authorities
therefore attempted to maintain a delicate balance between tolerance
and repression. Local administrators kept reporting the existence of
39. Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior to the Provincial Minister of
the Interior of East Katanga, 16 July 1964.
40. Territorial Administrator of Mitwaba to the Director of the Territorial Ser-
vice, 23 November 1964; Chef de Paste of Sampwe to the District Commissioner
of North Katanga, 9 December 1964.
41. Assistant District Commissioner of North Katanga to the Territorial Ad-
ministrator of Sakania, 18 August 1964.
42. Arrete Ministeriel, no. 201/106, 31 August 1964.
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Watch Tower cells and expressing the view that from a practical stand-
point any distinction between the Watch Tower movement and the
Jehovah’s Witnesses was impossible to draw.^^ The bafflement of local
officials was probably shared by official representatives of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses in Leopoldville and in the United States. In rebel-held
areas printed membership cards bearing side by side the designations
“Kitawalisme, Religion Congolaise,” “Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society,” and “International Bible Students Association” (the latter
two being used by the orthodox movement)^^ were being circulated
without any sort of authorization.
Another source of friction had to do with the preparations for the
1965 general election. Tshombe and his associates were hoping that
the election could be turned through careful manipulations into some
sort of a plebiscite that would bolster the incumbent premier’s legiti-
macy and stature both on the domestic and on the international scene.
In view of the administration’s efforts to produce a massive turnout,
the distinct lag in voter registration in areas where the Kitawala, the
Watch Tower, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses had been active was par-
ticularly frustrating. Whether or not this attitude was common to all
three denominations is impossible to detect from the record, but in
any case local administrators were not inclined to quibble over this
matter. “I reiterate my request,” one of them wrote, “for measures
to be taken in order to end the propaganda by [Jehovah’s Witnesses]
especially during this time when we are doing everything we can to
ensure the success of the forthcoming electoral campaign.
In exasperation, the director of the territorial service wrote to the
governor of East Katanga on 1 February asking him to find out from
the central government exactly what attitude to adopt toward Je-
hovah’s Witnesses.^® Interior Minister Munongo, who had always been
anxious to maintain a personal influence in his home area (he eventu-
ally gave up his cabinet post and was elected governor of East Katanga
in June 1965), saw no need to antagonize the speaker of the provincial
43. Territorial Administrator of Katanga to the District Commissioner of North
Katanga, 16 December 1964.
44. The name “Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society” has been used by the
“orthodox” movements in Zambia, Malawi, and Rhodesia, while the name “Inter-
national Bible Students Association” has been used in Kenya.
45. Territorial Administrator of Mitwaba to the Director of the Territorial Ser-
vice, 7 December 1964.
46. Director of the Territorial Service to the Governor of East Katanga, 1
February 1965.
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legislature, who not only acted as the official representative of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses but was also believed to favor Munongo’s local
rival, Jean-Baptiste Kibwe. Possibly with the hope of securing at least
the movement’s benevolent neutrality, Alunongo granted it a provi-
sional authorization on 16 February. At the same time, however, he
reserved for himself the option of a subsequent policy reversal by
requesting the opinions of local officials on the advisability of allowing
the movement to operate lawfully. Predictably enough, the response
of local administrators was largely unfavorable.^"
Meanwhile, individual cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses con-
tinued to be governed by the principle that only those specific activi-
ties that were in violation of law and order would be prosecuted. This
“neither war nor peace’’ policy was also applied to other sects, such as,
for example, the Apostolo. It is nearly impossible to determine with
any degree of certainty to what extent this policy w^as part of a nation-
wide strategy by Tshombist forces or a tactical response to the volatile
political situation in Katanga. In any event, the policy was apparently
continued for a while by Governor Munongo after Tshombe’s fall
from office and the establishment of the Mobutu regime.
The Jehovah’s Witnesses themselves pursued their activity with a
clear conscience, as suggested by Shindano’s secretary in a note: “To be
sure, the current regime forbids any activity by political parties. Re-
ligious associations, however, may continue to pray. For this reason,
I invite you to pray and to praise the Lord.’’^® Whether or not this
interpretation of General Mobutu’s intentions was actually warranted,
the provincial government’s disposition tow'ard nonconformists w^as
far from benevolent. The provincial department of the interior had
just completed a fairly exhaustive survey of a number of associations,
both secular and religious, such as the Watch Tower, the Apostolo,
and a few others, and the conclusions released in 1966 were undis-
criminatingly hostile to all sects.^^
The wheels of government were meanw'hile grinding in a different
direction in the capital city of Kinshasa. The result was the almost
simultaneous passage of two contradictory measures: a presidential
47. Territorial .Administrator of Lubudi to the Director of the Territorial Ser-
vice, 18 October 1965; Territorial Administrator of Kasenga to the Director of the
Territorial Service, 13 September 1965; chief of General .Administration to the
Director of the Territorial Service, 13 September 1965.
48. Letter to Provincial Minister Kibwe, 21 February 1966.
49. Memo, from the Provincial Minister of the Interior to the Governor of East
Katanga, 15 March 1966.
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ordinance permitting the incorporation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a
nonprofit organization,®® and a decree by the governor of South Ka-
tanga banning all offshoots of the Apostolic Church family, the Je-
hovah’s Witnesses, and the Mulenda Mission.
The outbreak of the first Kisangani mutiny diverted much official
attention from the problem of religious freedom, but local officials in
Katanga were still confused about what attitude to adopt toward the
various movements listed in Governor Munongo’s decree. A number
of Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been arrested in Baudouinville before
the passage of President Mobutu’s ordinance were apparently kept in
jail for several months, while some of the Apostolo who had been
arrested immediately after issuance of Governor Munongo’s ban were
released. The Apostolo and the Mulenda Mission, realizing that de-
spite their being lumped together with the Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Munongo’s ban President Mobutu’s recognition of the latter movement
did not actually extend to them, submitted petitions for separate au-
thorizations in the fall of 1966.
Curiously, while independent African churches were meeting
throughout this period with the growing displeasure of the provincial
authorities, one group, the Lumpa, escaped official hostility. The
reasons for this difference of treatment are not entirely clear, but one
may assume that two factors played a part. First, although ethnically
related to populations living in the Congo-Zambia border area, the
Lumpa were clearly a refugee group seeking shelter and not propa-
gandizing for their faith. Second, the circumstances under which the
Lumpa sought refuge in the Congo undoubtedly worked in their
favor, at least initially. The first refugees reached the border post of
Mokambo, where they eventually settled in a village of their own, in
February 1965—when relations between the Tshombe government and
its African neighbors, especially Zambia, were acutely strained. The
refugees, who were disenchanted with the Kaunda government, in-
dicated upon arrival that they considered themselves Tshombe’s sub-
jects and not Kaunda’s. It is not inconceivable that the Tshombe gov-
ernment’s welcoming of the Lumpa refugees was in part motivated
by the consideration that their presence on the border would provide
some leverage on the Zambian government. There were rumors that
the Lumpa might reenter Zambia with weapons supplied to them by
50. Ordinance no, 66/353, 9 June 1966. Two other ordinances extended the same
recognition to the Eglise Unie du Saint Esprit, a non-BaKongo splinter group of the
Kimbangist church.
51. Arrete no. 30/37, 11 June 1966.
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TshombeA^ The Zambians dispatched several envoys to Mokambo to
appraise the Lumpa’s intentions and to persuade them to return to
Zambia. But the number of Lumpa refugees streaming into the Congo
continued to grow throughout 1965.
Tshombe’s fall from power resulted in improved Congo-Zambia
relations and in joint efforts by the two governments to repatriate
Lumpa refugees. Both countries preferred to use persuasion rather
than force. When this failed, the Lumpa were permitted to remain in
the Congo, though at some distance from the border.^^
After an initial display of tolerance, the Mobutu regime stiffened
its attitude toward all religious associations, including independent
churches. During its much-publicized conflict with the Roman Catho-
lic Church (1972-73), the government not only asserted the unqualified
primacy of state over church but also made it clear that it would not
tolerate any sort of mobilizational activities by religious groups that
might infringe upon the single party’s monopoly of social organization.
Protestant denominations were persuaded by a skillful blend of threats
and incentives to coalesce into a single confederation known as Eglise
du Christ au Zaire (ECZ)—a move that made it possible for the govern-
ment to deal with them collectively, while at the same time quietly
stifling nonconformist sects. A 1972 act made it unlawful for churches
and sects to engage in any form of proselytism unless they could meet
a certain number of prerequisites and obtain official recognition as
religious nonprofit organizations. All churches were given three
months to file for legal recognition with the department of justice,
though the Catholic Church, EJCSK, and the newly created ECZ were
exempted from the need to resubmit applications, a privilege subse-
quently extended to the Greek Orthodox, Jewish, and Islamic faiths.
Eaced with the alternative of a costly and cumbersome procedure,
established Protestant groups more or less grudgingly accepted mem-
bership in the ECZ. Eor the independent churches, on the other hand,
the options were far less attractive. They could seek affiliation with the
ECZ, but they knew that their applications stood little chance of being
favorably reviewed by the established Protestant denominations;®^ or
52. Report by the Assistant Territorial Administrator of Mokambo, 29 June 1965.
53. Territorial Administrator of Sakania to the District Commissioner of North
Katanga, 19 February 1966.
54. By spring 1972, 45 independent churches, including 24 from Shaba (Katanga),
had applied for affiliation with the ECZ. No such application was filed by the Watch
Tower movement or by Jehovah’s Witnesses, nor was any anticipated, according to
the Secretary General of the ECZ. Communication to the author, April 1972.
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they could seek legal recognition in their own right but would then
have to face the government’s stringent criteria. These included a
deposit of $200,000 in a local bank, evidence that the founding officer
held a graduate degree in theology, and convincing proof that he was
not a dissident from another church—a set of conditions that no in-
dependent African church could reasonably be expected to meet. It
seemed most unlikely, therefore, that any independent group other
than, of course, the EJCSK, could hope to retain any sort of legal
existence.
Conclusion
The developments in Katanga reviewed here show that feelings of
annoyance and frustration play a considerable part in determining
the attitude of secular authorities toward unorthodox religious move-
ments. In the case of colonial authorities, these feelings are intensified
by the awareness that colonized peoples do not really accept imperial
rule and by the inclination to view all spontaneous “native” organi-
zations, whether religious or secular, with suspicion. But even govern-
ments of newly-independent countries must face up to the basic
problem that nonconformist movements pose. For while these move-
ments do not create alienation, they appeal to the alienated. Not only
are all governments interested in the preservation of law and order;
they are also interested in seeing to it that public authority is not
ignored. On this last point, officials of newly-independent countries
are, understandably, particularly sensitive.
“If the Belgians outlawed the Watch Tower,” said one Congolese
official privately, “it is probably because they resisted imperialism.
Should we hold this against them?” To which another immediately
replied: “If so, why do these people refuse to vote, to be innoculated
or to send their children to school now that we are independent?” This
exchange accurately sums up the ambivalence of official feelings
toward nonconformist sects in many an African country. It is possible,
indeed probable, that the attitude of public authorities toward such
movements is influenced to some extent by the different administrative
traditions of different colonial powers, but even where such traditions
had established a pattern of greater tolerance, occasional clashes have
occurred. Although it had not been outlawed by the British, the
Watch Tower movement and its offshoots, for example, have been
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banned or restricted in Malawi, Zambia, and KenyaA^ Fundamentally,
relations between secular authorities and religious nonconformists are
characterized not so much by mutual suspicion as by lack of a common
base of reference. This hampers the process of communication, and so
long as it does, a certain amount of misunderstanding is bound to
continue in the dialogue between church and state.
55. In 1967 a serious incident occurred in the Kabompo district of Zambia’s
Northwestern Province. Zambian officials had previously denounced the sect be-
cause of its members’ refusal to send their children to school {The Times, 22 June
1967). Jehovah’s Witnesses were banned in Malawi by an Executive Order of 20
October 1967 (Sunday Mail, Salisbury, 19 November 1967). Kenya banned the
Watch Tower and all related organizations in 1973 (Daily News, Nairobi, 27 April
1973).
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The Infrastructure of
Technical Assistance:
American Aid Experience
in Africa
bj John D. Montgomery
Few would now deny the difficulty of transferring technology from a
developed society to an underdeveloped one, even when the knowledge
required already exists in usable form and the social institutions in-
volved are receptive to change. American experience in providing
technical assistance to African countries illuminates the range of
problems encountered when neither of those conditions prevails.
Many of the bromides offered about American foreign aid in the
1950’s, drawing on events in other parts of the world, were tested in
Africa in the 1960’s and found wanting. By 1970 foreign aid analysts
were much less sure than they had been about the importance to be
attached to the personality traits of the “overseas man,” for example.
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or the desirability of using assumed cultural similarities as a basis for
introducing innovations in an underdeveloped society^ Though ad-
vanced with the laudable intention of countering naive views about the
universality of technology and the ease of its transfer, these turned out
to have been hastily conceived and largely impractical notions. They
were bound to be discarded eventually, but the extraordinary diffi-
culties encountered in Africa speeded up the process.
It is to be regretted that the experience gained in Africa should
have had so little influence on American aid policy. Most of the changes
made in the American aid program in the 1960’s—the increased em-
phasis given to loans rather than grants, the sharp limitations put on
the magnitudes of financial commitments in Africa, the preference
shown for using the services of private contractors instead of promot-
ing governmental careers in technical assistance, and the plan to
substitute international agencies for American initiatives—came about
mainly in response to domestic political pressures. For a decade, foreign
aid, like most other manifestations of foreign policy, did not undergo
any comprehensive examination of its own experience. But its costs
were too great and its constituency too remote to permit aid to survive
on the basis of faith alone. Each successive review was a greater chal-
lenge to its original assumptions.
Early in the 1960’s the Kennedy administration had opted for a
new approach to foreign aid based on the liberal economic growth
model, using ever more sophisticated and comprehensive forms of
country programming, and treating aid as a series of instruments that
could be orchestrated in accordance with regional needs. The Kennedy
approach called for more careful attention to the social dimensions of
development than had prevailed in the 1950’s, when programs had
been designed primarily according to technical criteria in order to
reproduce Western systems of education, health, and agriculture in the
underdeveloped world. The Kennedy country approach demanded
more area expertise than had been needed before, especially in dealing
with the newly emerging and little known countries of Africa. More-
over, since the African continent was scheduled to receive only small
amounts of capital assistance, it now became necessary to examine
closely the processes by which technical assistance could be rendered
1. Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mongone, and John Clarke Adams, The Overseas
Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assis-
tance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (New York: Praeger, 1966).
The Infrastructure of Technical Assistance 139
most effectively in that region. Accordingly, in 1961 the aid agency
contracted with Boston University’s African Studies Program to con-
duct research on developmental processes and to train aid technicians
in the arts of rendering assistance in Africa.
There is reason to believe that this perspective on technical as-
sistance is even more relevant to the needs of American aid in the
1970’s than to the decade for which it was prepared. For as the Nixon
administration proceeds with its reorganization of foreign aid, separat-
ing capital and military aid from technical assistance and transferring
much of the dollar volume to international agencies, it is likely that
the American contribution to Third World development will be
increasingly associated with technical assistance. Such a specialization
of functions, leaving capital aid and the more conventional forms of
cultural and technical interchange to international agencies, would
exploit an American comparative advantage in applied technology. It
would also take advantage of a widespread popular concern in this
country with finding ways to improve the quality of life. In the under-
developed countries this would mean concentrating our aid activities
on raising popular standards of health, education, and nutrition, as
well as addressing the more abstract economic goals proposed in na-
tional development plans. And finally, it would contribute substanti-
ally to developing technical skills in the countries where they are
scarcest. These objectives seem especially relevant to the opportunities
ahead in Africa, where already the largest portion of American aid—
about half—is in the form of technical assistance.
If technology is to be increasingly recognized as the favored instru-
ment of American development assistance in the seventies, it is all the
more important to find ways of accumulating knowledge and experi-
ence in the art of rendering technical assistance.
A Typology of Technical Assistance Projects
Induced technological transfer involves three major elements, which,
though interdependent in practice, can be examined separately: (1)
the environmental conditions in the donor country, which shape a
technology to fit local resources and needs; (2) the transmission
process involved in the communication of skills and knowledge; and
(3) the conditions affecting receptivity to the innovation, as measured
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by the infrastructural capabilities an aid-receiving society develops
for adapting and supporting the new technology.^ The first and third
of these elements are least understood, the second having engaged the
attention of a tew social psychologists and anthropologists interested in
the broad processes of induced cultural change. Many Westerners
have gradually become conscious of the problems involved in trans-
ferring Western skills and knowledge to others.^ But they continue to
ignore the infrastructural prerequisites of technology, not so much
because they deem them unimportant as because they take them for
granted.
Foreign aid is frequently offered as a package of administrative units
called projects. Apart from the commodity and “commercial” import
programs used in emergencies to close a country’s foreign exchange
gap,^ most aid involving technology consists of small-scale efforts to
change traditional ways of producing goods or rendering services.
Project aid may be defined as the extension of technical assistance,
with or without a capital component, to sectoral activities affecting a
large number of people and offered either to improve the economic
conditions of a given clientele or to increase the technical capabilities
of a specific professional or subprofessional group. The United States,
in contrast to the United Nations, normally offers technical assistance
as a component of a funded development project. This approach has
two major advantages: first, it gives individual technicians access to
American funds and the opportunity to influence the host govern-
ment’s cooperative ventures; and second, it assigns them specific targets
by which to measure their performance. But it also involves the risk
that the technician may end up concentrating his energies on the easily
solvable and often relatively unimportant problems that were identi-
fied when the aid was first planned. Aid projects, like other bureau-
cratic entities, have a way of perpetuating themselves independently
of their continued social utility. Only by carefully selecting and so
designing a project as to permit great flexibility in its operation and
2. John D. Montgomery, “The Challenge of Change,” International Development
Review 9 (1967): 2-8.
3. Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1962); W. F. Lionberger, Adoption of New Ideas and Practices (Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1960).
4. See John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger,
1962), pp. 85-93, 185-86; Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New
York: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 49-50; Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign
Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 291-93.
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even, where necessary, experimentation can this danger be averted.^
Technical assistance projects are sharply focused according to func-
tion, location, time, personnel, and costs. In some cases they are
expected to influence fundamental economic and social characteristics
of the host country. Though they differ widely in their approaches to
this long-range objective, they can be grouped into three basic types
of activity: the pilot, the demonstration, and the diffusion project.
Pilot Projects. A pilot project may either seek to determine the pros-
pects of applying well-known Western techniques in a new situation or
explore alternative ways of meeting a technical objective. In either
case it may also be used to test cultural responses and make it possible
to predict the probable effects of social change once small-scale experi-
ments are replaced by large-scale operations.
The Gbedin Swamp Rice project in Liberia provides an illuminat-
ing case study of the advantages and limitations of pilot projects. An
official report issued in 1955 publicly labeled it a success because it
proved that a new crop could be cultivated in Liberia’s bush lands;®
but four years later the United States government officially abandoned
the project and Liberia’s President Tubman called it a failure because
it did not displace traditional preferences. Paradoxically, both opin-
ions appear to have been justified. It was a successful pilot project,
but because its lessons were ignored it led to a costly failure as a
demonstration project.
As originally conceived, the project was to be a modest test of the
hypothesis that Liberia could grow swamp rice cheaply enough to aug-
ment the limited supply of red-skinned rice grown along uplands that
were being cleared by the traditional slash-and-burn method. Neither
American nor Liberian technicians were aware of tribal scorn for
swamp rice as “hunger” food, to be eaten only in time of famine. Nor
did the Gbedin planners know that by tradition volunteer women
were the sole cultivators of swamp rice crops until they requested that
each clan supply labor according to a quota and it was discovered that
the best workmen were unavailable. Unenthusiastic and undisciplined
small boys were provided in their place—an expensive substitute, as it
developed. Encouraged by the precedent, still smaller boys began to
demand pay for the chore of bird watching (or, more accurately, “bird
5. Arthur T. Mosher, “Administrative Experimentation as a ‘Way of Life’ for
Development Projects,’’ International Development Review 9 (1967): 38-41.
6. U.S., Foreign Operations Administration, Liberian Swamp Rice Production:
A Success (Washington, D.C., 1955).
142 John D. Montgomery
scaring”) in the swamp rice fields instead of working voluntarily as
they had in the traditional planting. The scale of the enterprise called
for the clearing of new swamplands, construction of water-control sys-
tems and, in some cases, mechanical drilling for seed planting—all in-
volving the use of heavy equipment that would not be available to
individual farmers. The expansion of the Gbedin project thus showed
that new techniques would imply far-reaching changes in the rural
way of life.
Other problems of a technical order also appeared. Some of the
dams and dikes built to control the flow of water broke down, and the
dikes had to be bulldozed over. The first efforts to grow swamp rice
took place on fifty-odd small, scattered plots belonging to various
clans and chieftaincies. In half the cases the seed was furnished by
the government; in the others, to test the economic feasibility of the
project the seed was sold. But in both situations work stopped on many
of the sites soon after the chief American technician went home on
leave, largely because of local taste preferences for red-skinned rice and
a widespread reluctance to work in swampy areas. Soon after the Ameri-
can returned, however, the aid mission initiated a larger swamp rice
demonstration project at Gbedin, without examining the reasons for
the slowdown. Under government financing and with the support of
a new extension service, training programs, and a free seed distribu-
tion program, Gbedin was to become a showplace of American tech-
nology. Heavy mechanical equipment was introduced to supplement
the system of clan-supplied labor, but it soon became apparent that
the demonstration was taking on life of its own. As its scale and costs
rose, it became increasingly difficult for either government to dis-
engage; as its technology became more advanced, it became increas-
ingly difficult for the local economy to absorb.
Early evidence that swamp rice could be grown in Liberia was not
sufficient basis for moving toward new large-scale techniques or to
introduce on a large scale hitherto unacceptable foods. Government
support was not a sufficient reason for converting successful small-
scale individual operations into a large demonstration project when
neither the techniques nor the product were locally desired.
The Gbedin scheme illustrates the consequences of moving too fast
in applying technical knowledge to solve problems that were not
defined in terms of economic, cultural, and social needs. It also demon-
strates the difficulty of using small-scale success as the basis for large-
scale operations.
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Demonstration Projects. The purpose of a demonstration project is
to dramatize an innovation whose technical merits are already known
to experts. In foreign aid, of course, there can never be absolute cer-
tainty of technical success; but a demonstration project is not normally
undertaken until serious technical doubts have been laid to rest.
The Gondar Public Health College and Training Center in Ethi-
opia, which combined a medical school, a provincial hospital, and a
preventive medicine program into one spectacular project, relied on
techniques that were well established in the medical profession. The
project ran into serious difficulties not because of doubts among the
members of the medical team about the value of the techniques used
—there were few differences of opinion among them, and such as were
expressed had to do with minor matters of curriculum and manage-
ment—but because of cultural resistance and weak administrative sup-
port.
To the villagers in the Gondar region the measures envisaged by the
demonstration project meant something more than just better medical
treatment. They implied drastic changes in community living patterns.
The project technicians realized from the very beginning that the local
population would not acquiesce in such changes on the mere advice of
outsiders. For in an Ethiopian village, as in many other small and
relatively isolated communities throughout the world, the stranger is
a natural object of suspicion. Almost as soon as work began on the
project, local medicine men, despite deep divisions among themselves
and bitter competition for patients, quickly united to oppose the
Western technicians who came to their villages. Careful preliminary
work had to be done before rural health centers could be set up in the
Gondar region. It was learned that by first inviting village leaders to
meet with them formally, health officials could usually make their
presence more or less acceptable in the villages, though often at the
cost of having to work through local dehtera (spiritual healers), wog-
gesha (herbalists), or zar (“specialists” in psychosomatic practice)
.
In
some villages, however, health officials were unable to win the support
of local leaders; and though health centers were nevertheless estab-
lished there, they were shunned by all patients except those who had
absolutely no hope of treatment by traditional methods.
The project’s administrative difficulties centered on two problems;
inducing Ethiopian officials to make timely decisions, and establishing
and maintaining proper channels of communication between them.
The source of these difficulties lay in the nature of the Ethiopian
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regime, a tradition-laden bureaucracy dominated by the strong per-
sonality of the emperor. Retention of many decisions of state in the
emperor’s hands led to hesitancy and encouraged delay on the part of
ministers and subordinate officials, many of whom were never sure of
the limits of their responsibility and authority. Even when power was
delegated, tradition-minded officials tended to postpone decisions as
long as possible to reduce the risk of failure or reproach. Documents
were often conveniently misplaced or lost, especially if they required
an action deemed distasteful. “Something that must be performed in a
month’s time, else dire disaster will befall, will eventually be com-
pleted in a year,’’ an Ethiopian staff member of the Gondar project
once remarked philosophically, “and with relatively minor repercus-
sions.’’ Only a crisis, real or imagined, could change this attitude.
“Use of long-range planning, or, indeed, planning of any type, and
anticipation of problems,’’ a foreign observer pointed out, “is still
virtually unknown to government officials. However, in the face of
crises which could easily have been foreseen and aborted, the official
machinery moves rapidly and effectively. A sense of when and how to
accept a crisis situation may help to accomplish the almost impossible.’’
The creation of a technical advisory committee in 1954 helped to
overcome some administrative difficulties. The committee was com-
posed of three members, representing, respectively, the Imperial Ethio-
pian government, the World Health Organization, and the American
aid mission in Ethiopia. It administered a joint fund in its own right
made up of Ethiopian and American deposits. It had direct access to
the Minister of Health, and if necessary it could approach the
Emperor himself. It was also empowered to implement specific mea-
sures directly through United States and World Health Organization
channels. The mere knowledge that the committee possessed these
capabilities usually persuaded Ethiopian officials to treat its requests
seriously and process them through ordinary administrative channels.
Despite the ingenuity shown in the design of these institutional
arrangements, the Gondar project fell short of expectations. In 1959,
after five years of operation and an American aid expenditure of
$418,000, difficulties were still being experienced in assuring timely
budgetary action, following correct purchasing procedures, and de-
veloping a reasonable phasing-out plan. Still, the project could not
be described as a wasted effort. A considerable number of Ethiopian
medical technicians were trained, and the usefulness of preventive
medicine at local levels was effectively demonstrated. Of greater
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relevance here are the object lessons that the project provided: that
one could, at least in some instances, take advantage of certain indig-
enous cultural traits and administrative processes to ensure the survival
of newly established institutions once Western technicians were with-
drawn; that it might be advisable at times to experiment with existing
practices in order to find cooperative solutions to problems of social
change; and that caution should be exercised in anticipating public
acceptance of Western techniques in less-developed countries.
Even when a demonstration project is publicly accepted, it may
sometimes fail to achieve its purpose. Modern equipment and new
construction may be welcomed while their purposes and intended
uses are not. Just as many foreign-aid technicians have reported that
other governments appear at times to welcome American dollars and
material but reject American advice, so aid administrators have en-
countered cases where the appurtenances of a demonstration have
won out over its substance.
A range management project in Somalia illustrates the feelings of
qualified success a technician experiences when he sees his demonstra-
tion equipment serve a useful, but unintended, public purpose. To
reduce overgrazing caused by nomads moving with their herds from
one water hole to another, a group of American technicians proposed
to install a series of carefully spaced permanent stock ponds near
Afmadu, in southern Somalia. They planned to use these ponds to
demonstrate the economic advantages of keeping small, select herds in
a limited area where the animals could have plenty of water and
adequate grazing within short distances. The installation of new water-
ing facilities visibly pleased the local population; more than that, it
attracted nomadic tribes from distant areas, so that grazing in the
Afmadu region became once again inadequate. When the technicians
tried to convince the local notables of the wisdom of either restricting
grazing rights in the area or of instituting compulsory destocking, they
met with a firm refusal. To fence off land and thus deny its use to
others would have meant violating a time-honored Somali custom:
Somali herders could not be persuaded to give up the known benefits
of a nomadic existence for the sake of speculative advantages described
by outsiders. An opinion poll taken shortly thereafter in the region
showed that most of the inhabitants welcomed the installation of the
ponds as a useful government contribution to public well-being,
although a few thought that the ponds were too close together to serve
the needs of nomads. None viewed the undertaking as a range manage-
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ment project. In the end, the project managers agreed to allow the
stock ponds to be used as water holes, to build new ones in dry areas,
to encourage stock raising by private entrepreneurs, and to organize
long-term range management training programs.’^
A demonstration project may also suffer from an “excess of success."
The experience of a South African community development project,
Entokozweni (Place of Happiness), illustrates this phenomenon so
vividly that it seems appropriate to cite it here, even though it was
not an American aid project.®
Entokozweni was a family welfare center that catered to the needs of
about 130 African families living in a Johannesburg suburb of more
than 60,000 people. It was financed by both public and private sources.
Its activities included a day nursery, a children’s club, a women’s club,
a school, a social welfare center, and a public health program. It had a
racially integrated staff. There was little harmony between the white
and black members of staff, but this did not prevent the welfare center
from becoming immensely popular with the families it served. Indeed,
the demands for its services soon began to overtax the center’s physical
facilities. New nursery school enrollment, for example, had to be
stopped after only one year of operation because of lack of space. The
center had clearly been designed for far fewer people than those who
needed and sought its services.
Because the South African government refused to provide the neces-
sary funds, the center was unable to expand its facilities. With the
limited means at its disposal, it did what it could to accommodate as
many people as possible; by attenuating the family basis of its opera-
tions it was eventually able to serve about 2,000 persons. After about
twelve years of activity, it was nevertheless forced by the government to
close its doors. With the hardening of its apartheid policy, the South
African government found it increasingly more difficult to continue to
provide financial support, however meager, for a welfare project that
did not fit in with that policy, and it is probable that the popularity
Entokozweni enjoyed and the expectations it generated weighed
heavily in the government’s decision to terminate the project.
It is possible, then, for a demonstration project to succeed too well.
7. Arthur H, Niehoff, ed., A Casebook of Social Change (Chicago: Aldine Pub-
lishing Co., 1966), chap. 11.
8. Violaine Junod, “Entokozweni: Managing a Community Service in an Urban
African Area,” Human Organization 23 (1964), reprinted in Niehoff, Casebook of
Social Change, chap. 10.
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If it creates the desired contrast with traditional ways and its services
are accepted, it may succeed in stimulating new wants the government
is unwilling to satisfy.
Diffusion Projects. Diffusion projects are concerned with the direct
spread of knowledge, assuming both its soundness (perhaps as a result
of a pilot project) and its acceptability (presumably because of success
in a demonstration project). The target groups may vary in size and
nature from a small number of specialists to a broad, perhaps even an
illiterate, mass. Many, perhaps most, technical assistance projects are
of the diffusion type.
Universities have played a substantial role in American diffusion
projects. In 1967, forty-eight American university teams were operating
in Africa under contracts with the Agency for International Develop-
ment.® Though on balance the universities’ involvement in diffusion
projects has probably resulted in positive contributions to technical
assistance, it has caused considerable dissatisfaction. Critics have
charged that universities do not provide adequate logistical support
for project teams, that the members of these teams are often less well
trained for overseas service than government technicians, and that
academics tend to be too preoccupied with their personal status and
prestige to exhibit the flexibility of conduct required in an aid proj-
ect.i® For their part, university spokesmen have pointed to the rigidity
of contractual arrangements and the detailed agency control over the
activities of university teams as the principal obstacles to a more
effective performance.
Whatever the merits of these complaints, the fact remains that a
university is not well equipped to cope with the delays and uncertain-
ties inherent in aid project management. For financial and other rea-
sons it can rarely afford to keep personnel and plans in abeyance
during the long periods needed by government agencies to complete
numerous formalities. The experience of Ohio State University, which
agreed to assist in establishing a vocational-technical training program
9. U.S., Agency for International Development, Operations Report: Data as of
June 30, 1967 (Washington, D.C., 1967); idem, AID-Financed University Contracts
as of December 31, 1967 (Washington, D.C,, 1967).
10. Walter Adams and John A. Garraty, Is the World Our Campus? (East Lan-
sing: Michigan State University Press, 1959).
11. John W. Gardner, AID and the Universities: A Report to the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development (New York: Education and World
Affairs, 1964).
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in Sierra Leone under a government contract, provides a typical cased^
The initial plan called for a two-year project beginning in December
1955, but the signing of the contract, because of United States govern-
ment procedural requirements, had to wait until February 1957, and
approval for sending university personnel and equipment to Sierra
Leone was not obtained until February 1958. Thus the project got
underway more than a year after it was supposed to have been com-
pleted. The delay forced Ohio State University to change the composi-
tion of the project team. And by the time the team arrived in Sierra
Leone, the curriculum under which the project was to be conducted
had been substantially revised by the country’s educational authorities.
There no longer was any real need for curriculum advisers, and the
shortage of teachers—one of the basic reasons for undertaking the proj-
ect-had eased markedly.
Diffusion projects require a high degree of mutuality between
donor government experts—who may act as advisors, teachers, or exten-
tion workers—and host government personnel. To carry out pilot and
demonstration projects little is actually required of the host govern-
ment, apart from its consent, and it is not uncommon for such projects
to be staffed almost entirely by foreign technicians. Whereas in dif-
fusion projects, at least those financed by the United States govern-
ment, foreign experts are usually outnumbered, and always outranked,
by host country nationals. Diffusion projects therefore court certain
failure if a high degree of cooperation and mutual understanding
between the two groups cannot somehow be assured.
Ohio State University found in Sierra Leone, for example, that
even though the project seemed doomed, it was not easy to abandon it.
The prospect of terminating it appealed neither to the Americans in-
volved, who feared that they would thus lose “face,” nor to the
authorities of Sierra Leone, still a British dependency then. The
reasons were, as one British official put it, that they feared that they
would “lose the immediate aid including equipment grants; secondly,
[that they would] find it very much harder to get U.S. technical aid on
other projects possibly of greater importance to [them], and thirdly,
[that] it would no doubt be turned against [them] locally.” Neverthe-
less, differences in their educational philosophies proved too great to
permit any meaningful cooperation between the Americans and the
British in Sierra Leone. While the Americans argued that the London
City and Guild Examination did not suit the needs of Africans, the
12. Gardner, AID and the Universities.
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British insisted on maintaining it as a qualifying requirement for Sierra
Leone graduates enrolled in the vocational training program. Although
the Ohio State University contract called for the training of technical
teachers, the British authorities believed that such training was no
longer required. Whereas the Americans thought that they were to
serve as consultants, the British wanted them as instructors. Though the
contract required the Ohio State team to set up an electrical workshop,
the British authorities could not be persuaded to supply the necessary
power because they did not consider the workshop necessary. In a
last-ditch attempt to provide some of the teacher training for which
they had been recruited, two members of the Ohio State team offered
Saturday morning demonstration classes to the entire staff of the
vocational school, only to encounter resentment because of the implied
suggestion that American instructional methods were superior to
British ones. After eighteen fruitless months the project was, with
great reluctance, terminated.
Not all diffusion projects operate within the framework of formal
training institutions. Some of them, for example, make use of com-
munity development, public health, or agricultural extension programs
to change citizen behavior directly. The participation of foreign
technicians in such roles is especially sensitive.
Most technicians realize that at some time their advice is going to
have to be accepted, modified, or rejected. Their greatest disappoint-
ments have usually accompanied the most ambitious projects, espe-
cially those of the “diffusion” category where large-scale social change
was desired. Yet it is precisely in the field of mass change that the
greatest hope lies for significant improvement in African ways of life.
It is therefore important to test the feasibility of proposed widespread
changes through the judicious use of pilot projects and then to investi-
gate their acceptability and administrative feasibility by suitable
demonstration projects. While the ultimate responsibility for mass
changes in citizen behavior rests with the leadership of the host
country, external advisors accept joint responsibility when their aid
contributes to errors of judgment that could have been avoided by
better project design and sequence.
The Problem of Evaluation
Bilateral aid projects are more difficult to evaluate than any other
form of government operation, involving as they do two governments.
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a mixture of political and economic purposes, and uncertain tech-
niques, as well as all the other difficulties of assessing public activities.
Aid operations are vulnerable to political attack in each country. The
best defense is the greatest precision in identifying the impact of
development operations, leaving their evaluation as a separate task to
be carried out independently. The most obvious sources of information
are the technicians involved, but their opinions are often self-serving
and in any case have limited value because of their usual ignorance
of the long-term consequences of their work.
Individual Technicians' Views. In assessing their own difficulties and
experiences in Africa, American technicians showed more concern
with problems of policy and administration than with those in-
volving Africans, or with the adequacy of Western technology, or even
with the difficulties of technological transfer. In the period 1959-1961,
a team of American aid technicians under the direction of John H.
Ohly interviewed nearly 1,000 returnees from overseas assignments in
an attempt to “capture and record” experiences that might contribute
to a better understanding of technical assistance. Only 66 of the inter-
views (or “debriehngs”) involved technicians returning from Africa,
since American aid activities on that continent were then only begin-
ning to get underway. But a content analysis of these interviews con-
ducted at Boston University developed information not otherwise
available to administrators of United States aid in Africa.
The hrst correlation of responses showed some connection between
mission organization and communications system and the technicians’
view of mission success. The highest correlations were between reports
of relative failure^^ and culture conflict (.9) and between the sense of
failure and the technician’s low opinion of his superior officer (.9)
.
High correlations also occurred between perceived failure and re-
ported indifference to Americans on the part of host government per-
sonnel (.7).
Mission “rigidity,” or inability to respond to changing needs, as
judged by the respondents, correlated highly with low morale (.9) and
a low degree of mission autonomy (.9). There were also correlations
between rigidity and the degree of cultural difference (.9),^^ lack of
13. “Failure” is defined in this study as a low evaluation of the success of a
mission.
14. Culture conflict was also associated with “inadequate communication with
the host government” (.8) and the belief that many of the host personnel were in-
competent (.8).
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host cooperation (.8), and frustration of the host government’s needs
(.8). Rigid missions were also viewed as those that considered their
purposes or nature as “technical” (.7). An administrative lesson can
also be drawn from the strong correlation between a high evaluation
of a superior and frequent communication with him (.9).
Political, economic, and institutional difficulties probably combine
to make Africa the most complex setting for foreign aid. Yet it was not
the African setting but American policies and operations that provided
American aid technicians with their greatest problems. Evidence of the
need for reorganizing the aid agency was nowhere more urgent than
in the field missions that were just beginning to function but were
carrying into Africa the bureaucratic baggage that had been accumu-
lated on other continents.
Critical-Incidents Study. In 1961 Paul A. Schwartz of the American
Institutes for Research joined with the author in examining the ex-
periences of veteran technical assistants who were then in training for
an African assignment. The expectation was that their experiences in
other parts of the world would suggest means of analyzing technical
assistance operations—a pilot project for American foreign aid that
would be useful in selecting and training personnel and in organizing
their activities more effectively.
The critical-incident technique was first used during World War II
to gather quantifiable data regarding organized human experience.
The method has been successfully applied to analyzing the work ex-
perience of a variety of occupations, from airline pilot to clergyman.
The method requires the respondents to report specific occurrences
(not impressions or attitudes) that they personally observed and that
they judged to be favorable or unfavorable in connection with an
aspect of their work (their own effectiveness, for example). When
enough of these incidents are collected, the job itself can be defined
operationally in terms of the specific factors that are “critical” deter-
minants of the outcomes achieved. Between 3,000 and 15,000 separate
events may have to be collected to get a complete catalogue of the
significant factors of a given occupation.
The technical assistant’s role is more complicated than that of most
of the other occupations that have been so studied, since it is not only
ill defined in its objectives but also cross-cultural in setting and
multidimensional in terms of technical skills required. For these
reasons it is possible that an even larger number of incidents might
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be necessary to bracket this occupation. Only about 500 incidents
could be gathered from the trainees available in the year’s time at
Boston University, and they covered experiences in many different
parts of the world from 1956 to 1961. Obviously the task was only
begun, but it was carried far enough to demonstrate the feasibility of
pursuing this approach further.
The findings will not be reported here, since the data are so few.
But the incidents collected strongly suggest what technical assistants
who have had overseas experience consider to be the central factors in
effective performance. Incidents suggesting a limited number of specific
factors were cited repeatedly as either disturbing or as contributing to
“success” as perceived by the technicians themselves. Significantly, the
incidents revealed that many of the most important perceived diffi-
culties are problems that lie outside the control of the technicians or
their supervisors. There is also a sizable number of self-generated
problems brought about by fixed attitudes or other basic personal
characteristics of the technicians themselves. These are appropriate
matters for training or, even more importantly, for selection. But it is
significant that the possibility that general cultural factors or profes-
sional deficiencies may be responsible for want of success does not
appear to be strong in the minds of the technicians themselves.
Impact Evaluation. One of the primary difficulties in evaluation proce-
dures, regardless of the skills and sensitivities of the evaluators, is the
tendency to consider only the question of whether the project accom-
plished its intended goals or not and the cost of doing so. The diffi-
culty with such an approach is that it ignores the unplanned and
unexpected consequences of a foreign aid project that may be more
important than the original mission itself.^® It is important, therefore,
to assess both the planned and the unplanned impact of project
activity.
The immediate consequences of an induced innovation may be mis-
leading if judged only in terms of its technical feasibility. A thorough-
going evaluation of a project’s impact will include the changes it
promotes among individuals, institutions, and society at large ob-
served in accordance with the different rates at which these changes
occur. While individuals in an aid-receiving country who are directly
15. John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), chap. 4; Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects
Observed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 9-34.
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exposed to a technological innovation are likely to respond to it fairly
rapidly, institutions change so slowly that the impact of an innovation
j
on them may not be felt for some time. And members of the society at
large, changes in whose behavior is the ultimate purpose of technologi-
cal innovation, may take even longer to react. Indeed, one should also
consider various infrastructural changes in the host society.^® For if a
technological innovation is to take root, its introduction must be
I
followed by the formation of new technical and entrepreneurial
‘ classes, the emergence of new values and priorities, and the develop-
ment of new economic interests and political action groups. Such
changes, even though they may take a long time to come about, are of
vastly greater importance than the purely technical ones that may be
immediately observed in the target groups of foreign aid operations,
i
The problem of evaluating foreign aid projects is thus exceedingly
complex. Only through an immense research effort by social scientists
in and out of universities can there be any genuine hope of solving
I
it. Among other things, more needs to be known about the varying
elements of receptivity to social change in aid-receiving cultures. This
at least is what the experience gained from America’s involvement in
I
aid to Africa during the past two decades suggests.
16. Samuel P. Hayes, Jr., Evaluating Development Projects, UNESCO Series:
Technology and Society (Paris, 1966).
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Manpower Requirements and
Allocation of Educational
Resources in Underdeveloped
Countries
bj Idrian N. Resnick
Cost-benefit analysis, the cultural approach, and the manpower re-
quirements technique are the major tools for planning the allocation
of educational resources in underdeveloped countries. While cost-
benefit analysis has been used operationally in Argentina and applied
in individual studies of various countries,^ it has certain drawbacks—
for example, the impossibility of measuring the widespread indirect
benefits and costs associated with education—that make its application
1. See, for example, Samuel Bowles, “The Efficient Allocation of Resources in
Education: A Planning Model with Applications to Northern Nigeria” (Ph.D. diss..
Harvard University, 1965); C.R.S. Dougherty, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
Colombian Educational System” (Paper delivered at the Development Advisory
Service Conference, Sorrento, Italy, September 5-12, 1968).
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to educational planning difficult and of somewhat dubious value for
most underdeveloped countries. The cultural approach, the specifica-
tion of the objective function simply in terms of the proportions of the
population that should receive various levels of education, is used in
francophone Africa. Most underdeveloped countries, however, tend
to view educational expenditures largely in economic terms; they
prefer the manpower requirements technique, which treats education
as a source of high- and middle-level manpower and which has the
great advantage of employing rather simple methods for calculating
the skilled labor “required” to achieve specific development goals.
In planning manpower requirements, use is sometimes made of the
“Tinbergen model.” Though there are several forms of it,^ the model
basically involves a linear regression relating enrollments and outputs
at each educational level to aggregate production. This nets the
amount of various types of educated manpower required by the
economy to grow at a particular rate.
More frequently, however, use is made of the so-called Mediter-
ranean approach.^ A manpower survey is made to determine the stock
of skilled labor in each of the occupations listed in the International
Labor Organization’s International Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ISCO). To this is added the flow of the educational system,
broken down by type of output (lawyers, doctors, economists, agri-
cultural technicians, etc.). An estimate is then made, covering the
period of the development plan, of the demand for various types of
skilled manpower, as defined by ISCO. Vacancies are added to this
demand estimate, and mortality, retirement, and emigration are sub-
tracted from the stock and flow figures. Finally, the supply and the
demand are compared on an occupation-by-occupation basis to deter-
mine the excess or deficiency. The education plan thus becomes a pro-
gram to channel students into instructional pipelines in numbers
approximating manpower requirements as closely as resources permit.
The short-run goal is to minimize the supply-demand gap; the long-
run goal is to eliminate it altogether.
While much can be said in favor of the manpower requirements
2. See Jan Tinbergen and H, Correa, “Quantitative Adaptation of Education to
Accelerated Growth,” Kyklos 40 (1962): 776-86; Jan Tinbergen et al.. Planning
Models of Educational Requirements for Economic Development (Paris: OECD,
1964); Jan Tinbergen and H. C. Bos, Econometric Models of Education (Paris:
OECD, 1965).
3. See Herbert S. Parnes, Forecasting Educational Needs for Economic and Social
Development (Paris: OECD, 1962); idem, ed.. Planning Education for Economic and
Social Development (Paris: OECD, 1963).
i
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technique, its various shortcomings are also worth noting. To begin
with, what should be understood by “high-level manpower” is not
entirely clear. Harbison defines high-level manpower as people with
“two years of post-school certificate work or its equivalent.” His defini-
tion includes all “administrators, executives and managers of sizeable
establishments in government, commerce, industry, education, etc.;
professional personnel; technical, sub-professional and supervisory
personnel . . . teachers . . . army and navy officers and police officers
. .
.
judges, members of parliament, government ministers, local
government councillors and senior staff. Fames and Thomas define
high-level manpower in terms of specific occupational classifications
and educational requirements normally associated with those occupa-
tions.^ Zack also uses an occupational definition, but his definition
covers only those occupations that “should be filled by individuals
with university training, or university coupled with experience.”®
There is, then, little agreement as to the precise meaning of high-level
manpower.
More important, however, are certain substantive problems. The
manpower-requirements technique assumes that technical coefficients
i are fixed (zero elasticity of factor substitution) and that increases in
the supply of manpower will either fail to bring about changes in its
relative price or meet with a completely unresponsive demand.”^ There
are also problems on the supply side. Several economists have ques-
tioned the somewhat rigid links that the manpower-requirements
technique assumes to exist between specific occupations and educa-
' tional attainments. The level of education of job holders in various
high-level occupations, they have pointed out, varies widely from
country to country.® Most categories in the occupational classification
[
4. Frederick H. Harbison, “High-Level Manpower for Nigeria’s Future,’’ in
Investment in Education, Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and
Higher Education in Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Education, 1960), pp.
i
51-52.
5. Parnes, Forecasting Educational Needs, App. B; Robert L. Thomas, Survey of
the High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources for the Five-Year Develop-
I ment Plan, 1964-65 to 1968-69 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), p. 2.
6. Arnold M. Zack, “Ethiopia’s High-Level Manpower—Analysis and Projections,’’
: mimeographed (Addis Ababa, 1964), p. 4.
7. Bowles, “Efficient Allocation,’’ p. 4.
8. See Frederick H. Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Education, Manpower and
Economic Growth (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), pp. 186, 191-2, and 198; Bowles,
“Efficient Allocation,’’ pp. 7-9; James Blum, “Educational Attainment of Occu-
pational Categories of Workers in Selected Countries,’’ in Planning Education, ed.
Parnes, App. D.
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system are therefore likely to be associated “with a range of educational
preparations rather than a single educational background.”^
Going further, there are two major defects that so far have received
relatively little attention. One is that the manpower-requirements
technique underestimates additions to the stock of high-level man-
power. The other is that the use of international standardized job
classifications induces planners to express demand for manpower in
terms of occupations rather than skills.
Underestimation of Skilled Manpower
As already noted, the first step in the Mediterranean approach to
educational planning is to undertake a manpower survey of the
country’s skilled manpower resources. Calculated additions to the
surveyed stock, once demand estimates are made, include only the
outputs of formal educational institutions (secondary and above)
,
formal training facilities in private industry, and immigration. No
attempt is made to determine whether or not changes in the stock of
high-level labor have been greater than these calculated outputs. Some
manpower analysts admit that certain jobs, particularly those requiring
skilled craftsmen, may be filled by people with less than secondary
education when secondary school graduates are not available in suffi-
cient numbers. Others believe that employment and education should
not be too closely linked. But no suggestion has been made that the
flow of “uneducated” high-level manpower should be estimated,
despite the probability that this type of manpower is available in
significant quantities in many underdeveloped countries.
The process of change creates certain forms of knowledge and skill
that are required for, and further stimulate, development. They are
acquired, in part, as the result of job experience, training programs,
imitation, and instruction received from parents and other members
of the individual’s community. Experiences of this kind coupled with
other modern phenomena, such as mass communication in various
forms, add to the stock of human capital as the economy progresses.
The hypothesis that human capital is endogenous to development
falls within the theory of the aggregate production function. The argu-
ment that human capital contributes to output differently than labor
9. Parnes, Forecasting Educational Needs, p. 41.
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(in the traditional sense of the term) suggests that the aggregate pro-
duction function includes at least two types of labor: skilled and un-
skilled. If no further distinctions were made, the only problem would
be to estimate the parameters of the system in order to determine the
relative importance of human capital in changing output. The hypoth-
esis presented here, however, postulates that the skilled labor, human
capital, is given by the sum of the outputs of the educational system
and increases of uneducated skilled labor.i<^ The supply of skilled
labor in the present formulation thus becomes a function of aggregate
output and of an institutional parameter for the educational system.
The former relationship is the important feature of the hypothesis, in
that growth in aggregate production brings about the creation of
supplies of skilled labor outside the educational system. The problem
of estimation then becomes one of discovering the parameters of all
the independent variables in the production function and of finding
the coefficient that describes the relationship between changes in aggre-
gate output and changes in the supply of uneducated skilled labor.
As long as secondary education is not compulsory, a certain propor-
tion of the total labor force will be uneducated. Most workers in this
category will enter employment in unskilled jobs. Assuming no in-
stitutional or other kinds of barriers to learning skills on the job,
some uneducated workers will acquire skills and techniques through
their participation in the production process. To what extent this will
occur will depend upon the personal capabilities and ambitions of
individual workers. As pointed out earlier, skills may also be learned
outside actual job situations, from technical literature and from
persons who previously acquired them. As aggregate output increases,
therefore, the stock of uneducated skilled labor may be expected to
increase as well.^^ Uneducated workers will also acquire skills when
drawn into skilled positions and trained on the job in a situation of
excess demand for skilled labor over and above that met by the sup-
plies from the educational system. When the demand is fully met by
the supplies of educated labor, uneducated workers will no longer be
taken on and those who have been employed previously will be re-
placed by educated workers if the returns from such replacements are
10. The term refers to labor with less than a secondary education.
11. There are circumstances under which the stock of uneducated skilled labor
might decrease as aggregate output increases: if a larger proportion of the labor
force completes a secondary education, even though not required to do so; if pro-
ductive processes become more capital-intensive; or if population declines.
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greater than the costs. Where preference is shown for educated over
uneducated skilled labor despite equal productivities, a noneconomic
variable would have to be introduced in the production function to
explain this preference. In an excess demand situation of this kind,
changes in the stock of uneducated skilled labor depend on (1) changes
in output, (2) changes in supply of educated skilled labor, (3) the gap
between the demand for and the supply of skilled labor, and (4) the
relative marginal productivities/costs of educated and uneducated
labor.
In those countries that have little uneducated high-level manpower
flowing into the labor market, filling high-level requirements from the
educational system or by importing foreign manpower are of course
the only options open to the manpower planner. But in other countries
his choices are wider, and before reaching a decision he should: (1) com-
pare the productivities of the two types of skilled labor; (2) compare
the costs of training uneducated labor with the costs of educating
labor; (3) relate differences in market prices, if any, to differences in
productivity, if any, between uneducated and educated manpower; (4)
estimate opportunity costs involved in supplying skilled manpower
with and without various educational inputs; (5) examine curricula
in the educational system at all levels in order to determine which is
best suited for learning various jobs, and (6) evaluate the manpower
plan in light of the possibility and desirability of concentrating edu-
cational resources in those areas where manpower is not supplied
without education and allowing other high-level requirements to be
filled with uneducated labor.
The hypothesis presented here thus suggests that in many under-
developed countries the elasticity of substitution between educated
and uneducated skilled workers is likely to be positive. By discarding
the false assumption that certain types of high-level manpower can
only be provided by the educational system, many development proj-
ects could be undertaken sooner than has been thought possible thus
far, and with less waste of scarce human resources.
Inappropriate Measurement
The other major weakness of the manpower-requirements technique
which has not received as much attention as it deserves is that it
measures supply and demand in terms of occupations rather than
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skills. This stems from its application, rigidly at times, of the ILO’s
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO):
The occupations identified and coded in the international standard clas-
sification are defined in terms of the work customarily performed in most
countries by the workers concerned; the definitions provide descriptions
of their functions, duties and tasks, and occupations or workers perform-
ing similar types of work are brought together in larger groups.12
Occupational definitions were first developed in the 1930’s by the
United States Bureau of the Census. With the establishment of the
ILO, they were applied to Western European economies—a justifiable
procedure, in view of the many similarities to be found in the occupa-
tional duties of industrial workers in Western Europe and in North
America. Not only was the state of technological knowledge com-
parable within competing industries, but a whole range of factors
led to the absence of wide divergences in labor productivity.^^ Trade
unions, apprenticeship schemes, the level and type of education, the
standards of living, and the industrial composition of the labor force
were all similar enough in these countries to make occupational classi-
fications useful measures of comparison.
Such similarities are not to be found, however, in any comparison
involving developed and underdeveloped countries. The productivity
of unskilled labor is considerably lower in underdeveloped countries,
owing to extreme differences in health, climate, the relation of the
worker to his task and product, and the nature and relative value of
payoffs for effort. Disparities in skilled-labor productivity arise for the
same reasons, as well as because of the absence of certain skills in the
worker in the underdeveloped country that are usually commanded by
his counterparts in developed economies. Diversity in training, ex-
posure to different capital, and non-uniform possession of complemen-
tary skills such as literacy give rise to international variations in the
productivity of skilled workers in the same occupations. Dissimilar
productivity and techniques of production lead to the evolution of
different occupational tasks. Moreover, owing to differences in the
relative supply of various skills, tasks that by ISCO definitions are
associated with one occupation are often performed by people in other
occupations. ISCO definitions tend to compartmentalize functions;
12. ILO, International Standard Classification of Occupations (Geneva: ILO,
1958), p. 2.
13. The reference here is to output per man-hour when labor is applied to nearly
identical plants and equipment.
162 Idrian N. Resnick
their application to underdeveloped countries causes high-level man-
power to be viewed as having little cross-occupational substitutability,
while in practice functions are likely to be variable and many types
of manpower highly substitutable.
The application of ISCO definitions to underdeveloped countries
comes from various sources: the education and training of nationals
in foreign countries, union acceptance of occupational classifications
as a means of obtaining higher wages, the presence or dominance of
foreign firms in the industrial sector, technical assistance, an often
blind belief by government officials in the superiority of foreign
techniques, and a general tendency to explain the failure of workers
to meet “standards” by the lower formal educational achievements of
high-level manpower.
The consequences of this application of international occupational
definitions and standards are far-reaching. Since wages are usually paid
on the basis of occupations, nationals in underdeveloped countries
receive higher wages than are justified by their productivity. Labor
unions fight for the designation of workers with international occupa-
tional titles, even though the workers do not possess the skills asso-
ciated with those titles in developed economies. Where “equal pay for
equal work” between nationals and foreigners is a government policy,
equality is generally determined by title. Since occupational entrance is
often determined by some educational prerequisite both in the public
and in the private sector, artificial barriers to the localization of high-
level jobs are more than likely to emerge. And where these qualifica-
tions are rigid and unjustifiable from an economic point of view,
resources are either wasted on securing a higher-cost (educated) worker
than is necessary or factors go unemployed while they wait for com-
plementary (unnecessary) educated manpower to be produced to put
them to work. This, in turn, leads to an excess supply and/or mis-
allocation of educational resources: either too much is spent on edu-
cation in general, if the pure manpower approach guides these
expenditures, or the wrong kinds of manpower are produced.
The application of imported standards leads to capital intensity,
where labor is the relatively abundant factor. Because of its low-skill
concentration and the lack of complementary labor and capital, this
labor tends to be economically inefficient. The nurse, for example, is
trained to perform a range of duties including many tasks that could
be carried out efficiently by aides but which are occupationally re-
served for her. At the same time, there are many skills that she could
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have been taught during her training period but are reserved for the
physician. In practice, the nurse carries out functions far below her
skill level and training because of a lack of lower-skilled operators
within whose duties these jobs would ordinarily fall. Given the excess
demand, particularly in the medical market, and the attempts to meet
it, choices have to be made. Current occupational task definitions tend
to make these choices uneconomic and, in some cases, socially unde-
sirable. The decision most frequently made is to reduce the service or
quality of output for all product recipients. Better results could be
achieved if the reduction in quality were pushed to the lowest skill
level rather than spread across the occupations. Physicians should de-
vote full time to those duties that can be performed only by people
with their training and knowledge; clerical work, sutures, dressings,
injections, minor examinations, etc., should be assigned to lower-
skilled operators. If the same process were undertaken at each skill
level, inefficiencies would be substantially reduced. At the same time,
the reallocation of functions would provide a clearer picture of the
actual stock of skills as a basis for calculating real shortages.
Planning would become easier in some respects and more difficult
in others. Instead of calculating the manpower required on an oc-
cupational basis, estimates would be made in terms of skill require-
ments. A knowledge of different skill packages (production functions)
and the relative costs of obtaining labor with these skills would pro-
vide the basis for rather simple calculations; the production of man-
power would change over time as relative prices altered. Of course,
the educational facilities for producing labor with the kinds of skill
concentrations suggested do not exist at present. But this difficulty,
though real, is not insurmountable in the underdeveloped country it-
self; and as for students who would be sent abroad, it is possible to
think of them taking courses providing specific skill training rather
than the current degree packages which lead to knowledge consistent
with present occupational definitions. In addition, it would be
necessary to persuade governments and employers to rearrange their
productive processes along the lines suggested—admittedly a most diffi-
cult task.
Not only is there evidence that high-level occupations can be filled
by people with less formal education than is generally required,
14. See statistics on India in Blum, Educational Attainment, App. B; and Repub-
lic of Zambia, Manpower Report (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1966), App. C, es-
pecially Table C16.
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there are also some theoretical grounds for doubting the links between
occupational designations and their functions. The theory of the pro-
duction function in its simplest form treats labor as a homogeneous
factor. It does so in order to draw attention to the fact that the critical
division of effort is between land, capital, and labor. It thus empha-
sizes the different nature of these three factors. Land tends to be fixed
in supply, does not lend itself to accumulation, and makes its con-
tribution to production through its natural powers; capital can be
accumulated, can replace itself, is capable of having large amounts of
energy concentrated in it, and depreciates with use; labor cannot be
accumulated in its unskilled form, is dexterous, and has rejuvenative
productive power—it tires the longer you use it, but recoups with
rest. The distinctions, of course, are oversimplified: the very heart of
human capital theory is that labor has enough of the properties of
capital to be fruitfully analyzed in the same theoretical framework.
However, simple production function theory facilitates the under-
standing of the concept of substitution.
When labor is no longer regarded as being homogeneous, it becomes
necessary to reexamine the concept of substitutability. The more pre-
cisely labor is defined in terms of skills, the less substitutability there
will be among units of labor. Typically, occupations rather than
tasks and skills are discussed when labor is differentiated. Workers in
different occupations are often interchangeable because there is always
an unskilled element in their duties and many of the skills and tasks
in the productive process looked at as a whole are performed by labor
in various occupations.
But the skill mix within occupations is institutionally, rather than
technologically or economically, determined. It evolves over time and
is explained by the habits, prejudices, and distribution of power of
labor, management, government, and professional groups. Few would
contend that the result has been sorted out by the market and, how-
ever arrived at, has yielded an efficient division of tasks; if anything,
the reverse is now being argued.^®
Conceptually, it should be possible to analyze the functions of differ-
ent labor units in a production process and arrange tasks in a tech-
nically and economically efficient manner. The range of labor tasks,
given the technological constraints of land and capital, could be
15. See Ralph E. Berry, Jr., “Competition and Efficiency in the Market for
American Hospital Services” (Ph.D. diss.. Harvard University, 1965).
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ranked by degrees of difficulty and length of time it takes to acquire
a skill. If we obtained a perfect classification in which there were no
inseparable connection between skills of one level and those of an-
other,!® we would be able to construct a labor-production expression
with each skill denoted separately. Given the technology of capital
and land, if each of these skills were regarded as factors, the elasticity
of substitution among them would be zero. If it were not possible to
fully separate skills along these lines, there would be some overlapping
of the rankings, but the junctions would be technical and not institu-
tional as they are now. In terms of optimal technical efficiency, it
might be desirable to combine various skill mixes in particular work-
ers. With these modifications we would obtain a new production-labor
expression and the elasticity of substitution between labor units might
be, though not necessarily, greater than zero.
This entire process would result in a new set of isoquants showing
the combinations of unskilled and skilled labor possible to obtain
various levels of output. It would be different from the present oc-
cupational set, since it would involve a different skill mix for labor.
Providing the new arrangement resulted in a reduction of costs for
various output levels, it would be superior to the skill mixes in use at
present. Defining the labor side of the production function along skill
lines would also tend to make functions similar internationally. It
would eliminate the hidden factors that once exposed currently lead
us to the view that functions are not similar.
The practical implications of this approach to manpower planning
lie on the production side of labor skills. It has already been noted
how current skill mixes find their way from developed to under-
developed countries. An efficient combination of skill mixes in the
former does not imply that technical and economic efficiency will coin-
cide in the latter. But knowledge of technical optimality and some idea
of the range of possible skill combinations will provide a basis for two
kinds of decisions: (1) the optimum labor combination, given present
relative prices for different types of labor, and (2) the best future
combination, given the relative costs of producing different labor
skills. This, in turn, will provide a guide for manpower production in
general and educational planning in particular.
16. This is conceivable but not practically possible. It takes no skill to hold a
piece of raw material being fed into a precision machine but a high degree of skill
to feed it in correctly.
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Modifications for Educational Planning
The foregoing arguments showed the need for introducing quanti-
tative changes in the manpower-requirements technique. The two
shortcomings discussed can be overcome by modifying the analytical
techniques of manpower planning. The supply hypothesis—that hu-
man capital is created by the development process, as well as by the
educational system—is pertinent to all countries in the long run and to
many countries also in the short run.
But the hypothesis can also be used to improve manpower estimates
on the demand side. One of the chief criticisms in the literature on
manpower planning is that the manpower requirements technique
assumes fixed technical coefficients of production. The hypothesis im-
plies that coefficients are variable. Accepting this implication would
lead the analyst to estimate the elasticity of substitution among factors.
The elasticities of substitution between capital and high-level man-
power would be of particular interest; but so also would be those
between uneducated and educated high-level manpower.
The presence of a stock of uneducated high-level manpower in a
country suggests that the elasticity of substitution between uneducated
and educated labor may be substantially above zero in some high-level
occupations. To the extent that there are variable factor proportions
in the production processes of a particular country, producers may
choose among various combinations of factor inputs for each level of
output, including alternative combinations of uneducated and edu-
cated skilled labor. The demand for high-level manpower, particularly
educated manpower, will thus depend partly upon the supply of
uneducated skilled manpower. To put it another way, adequate anal-
yses of demand depend upon proper supply estimates.
How the hypothesis can be quantified in a manner useful to man-
power planners is a subject that requires further examination. One
approach might be to find the relationship between aggregate output
and the supply of “uneducated” (less than secondary) high-level man-
power over the short-run planning period. The obvious shortcoming
of this method is that one must have an adequate time series to esti-
mate the parameter of the suggested relationship between output and
the supply of manpower. Such series are generally not available in
underdeveloped countries, and there are also no a priori grounds for
choosing among the various possible forms that relationship might
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take. For example, projections of short-run trends would give planners
entirely different estimates if they assumed linear, rather than non-
linear, or lagged, rather than leading, functions. Furthermore, it is not
simple to project the output itself.
Where manpower data are limited, another approach may be used.
In order to measure the magnitude of the stock of uneducated high-
level manpower and the rate at which that stock has increased in re-
cent years, the manpower analyst may introduce a series of questions
into his manpower survey designed to discover: (1) the educational
attainment of workers currently employed in high-level jobs; (2) the
date at which workers entered their current jobs; (3) the rate at which
new high-level jobs have been added to the total; and (4) the rate of
turnover in high-level occupations. This information will give the
planner a rough estimate of the annual rate of entry of uneducated
workers into high-level positions. This rate may then be projected for
the short-run planning period. The planner may next group high-level
occupations according to the range of educational attainment of work-
ers in the jobs. This would give an indication of those occupations
that are not filled by uneducated manpower and, therefore, must,
ceteris paribus, be filled from the educational system or through im-
ports.
It must be reemphasized that this is a method of introducing the
manpower supply hypothesis into manpower planning where data do
not permit a more sophisticated approach. Productivity data are not
provided by this method, nor are the various elasticities of substitu-
tion. Prices are neglected entirely. The chief advantages of this method
are that it is simple and does not require limiting assumptions, that
it lends itself to short-run analysis and may be easily incorporated in
other manpower supply-and-demand analyses, and that it relies upon
data that are available in underdeveloped countries and easily col-
lected.
The incorrect classification of occupational functions arising out of
the use of ISCO can be remedied, but the means required involve prac-
tical difficulties unlikely to be met in correcting the underestimation
of supply. The ultimate aim is to be able to distinguish the skill
component of productive processes in the entire economy. But the
distinction would have no impact if the implications were not trans-
lated into changes in the duties of labor working in specific industries.
For if it is possible to group skill requirements in a productive process
according to their level of difficulty, it follows that functions should
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be reallocated in the private as well as in the public sector, so that each
worker performs as much of his work as possible within his skill range.
A reallocation of functions along these lines will require, in the first
instance, a microanalysis of the entire labor contribution to the pro-
ductive process so as to divide it into technologically inseparable
segments. For in every establishment there will be some operations
which cannot be separated regardless of whether or not they contain
skilled and/or unskilled aspects. Technological “packages” will have
to be examined in detail so as to specify their part in production in
terms of their skill contribution. In turn, the “skill contribution” will
have to be determined with respect to prerequisites and the training
time necessary to acquire it.^^ Prerequisites will include such things
as literacy, the ability to read blueprints, knowledge of various levels
of mathematics, and technological knowledge of a certain field (me-
chanical engineering, etc.).
Within a hospital, for example, certain functions are inseparable,
such as filling syringes and giving injections, although the first may be
considered an unskilled and the second a skilled operation. Making
beds, turning patients, and carrying trays are unskilled functions;
answering patient calls, aiding semi-ambulatory patients, and admin-
istering pills and liquid medications are low-skilled functions; chang-
ing bandages, giving injections, administering to minor emergency
ailments, and even sewing certain kinds of wounds are skilled func-
tions; and operating, diagnosing, prescribing, and counseling are high-
skilled functions.
Reasoning along these lines, one could group labor tasks into four
general categories: (a) those requiring no prerequisites or training
time; (b) those requiring prerequisites but no specific training or
breaking-in time; (c) those requiring training but no prerequisites;
and (d) those requiring both prerequisites and on-the-job training.
Within each of these one might arrange tasks, as far as possible, ac-
cording to the time required to acquire the necessary skills. What
would emerge would be essentially an input-output table of labor in
the productive process.
These groups and their subdivisions could then be ranked according
to the input time required for each skill. Finally, the tasks could be
grouped into occupational packages, satisfying two constraints: that
17. Prerequisites might prove difficult to assess along these lines. While it may be
known how long it takes to acquire a medical degree, it might be difficult to define
the time it takes to become literate.
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workers be fully employed^* and that all required tasks be performed.
While this analysis may appear at first glance to be time-consuming
and difficult, it need not become too complicated. Basically, what is
needed is a knowledge of which tasks can be shifted away from higher
to lower skilled labor and which skills can be shifted upward from
primarily unskilled occupations to skilled jobs. Looked at in this way,
it should be possible to carry out a relatively sim.ple analysis using
current occupational divisions to determine which operations could be
rearranged on a task-by-task basis.
The result would be that skilled operators would be freed to under-
take more of those tasks for which they are peculiarly equipped and
that other workers would contribute more to production with the
lower skills that are often associated with their present occupations.
To the extent that there are no serious technological constraints to
prevent such rearrangements, manpower constraints in any establish-
ment would be reduced, for with a general downward shifting of tasks,
relative demand will move toward the less-skilled occupations for
which prerequisites and training-time inputs are smaller.
In summary, the manpower-requirements technique used in many
African and other underdeveloped countries can be significantly im-
proved with the introduction of a few simple changes that would
provide better estimates of supply and refine analysis of demand.
These changes call for an economic rather than an institutional
classification of tasks. Their chief advantage is easy application in
underdeveloped countries. Formal education and training is not the
only source of skilled manpower, and the current assumption that it
is results in considerable underutilization of scarce human resources.
This underutilization can be substantially reduced, if not eliminated,
by including the skilled labor supplied by sources other than the
educational system in manpower estimates.
18. It is possible to think of some part-time employment within this constraint.
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A Comparative Analysis of
Industrial Relations Systems
in French West Africa
and the Gold Coast
bj Elliot J. Berg
There has been considerable writing in recent years about African
labor, the bulk of it focused on trade unionism and, in particular,
the political aspects of trade unions. Few studies have appeared,
however, that are concerned with the broader industrial relations en-
vironment within which African trade unions have operated, and
comparative analyses of African systems of industrial relations are
rare.^
1. The International Labor Organization study, African Labor Survey (Geneva,
1958), provides much useful background, but as is usually the case with surveys of
this sort, it is very general in scope and legalistic in tone. A recent book by
B. C. Roberts and L. Grefie de Bellecombe, Collective Bargaining in African
Countries (London: Macmillan, 1967), is explicitly comparative in intent and
does contain observations and information of a comparative kind. While it is a
noteworthy first step toward comparative analysis in this area, it too is quite gen-
eral, largely descriptive, and based heavily on documents available in Geneva.
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The lack of comparative studies is surprising as well as unfortunate,
since one of Africa’s continuing sources of interest for social scientists
is precisely its potential for study of the process of institutional trans-
fer and social change on a comparative basis. Into African areas with
similar cultural, social, and economic systems were injected a variety
of new institutions, including industrial relations institutions. The
study of how these institutions were adapted to the new environment
can tell a great deal about the process of social change, as well as
about the nature of the colonial relationship. The evaluation of in-
dustrial relations institutions is of particular interest to students of
comparative industrial relations, especially since studies of non-Western
systems of industrial relations are still very few.
A description and comparison of some of the main aspects of indus-
trial relations in British and French colonial territories in West Africa,
using French West Africa and the Gold Coast (now Ghana) as units of
comparison, is presented in this study. The focus is on the period be-
fore independence, roughly the years between World War II and the
late 1950’s. Much of what is covered is meant to be explanatory and
tentative, since so much about the two areas in the colonial period
remains obscure. A comparison of French West Africa and the Gold
Coast is not, of course, the same as a comparison of French and
British African colonies in general. Nonetheless, the analysis here
should shed some light on the general character of industrial relations
in British and French colonial Africa.
The Characteristics of the Two Industrial Relations Systems
The major differences between the French West African and Gold
Coast industrial relations systems can be summarized by considering
in turn the trade union movements, the organization of employers, the
role of government, the structure of collective bargaining, and dispute
patterns.
Trade Union Organization. The major differences in trade union
organization between the two areas were: (1) a greater degree of po-
litical involvement and ideological concern in French West Africa;
(2) less attention in French West Africa to the development of trade
union institutions in the sense of organizational machinery and pro-
cedures, and less activity at the shop level; (3) a smaller degree of dif-
Industrial Relations Systems in French West Africa and the Gold Coast 173
ferentiation in French African trade union structure along economic
or occupational lines, and a greater degree of centralization of au-
thority at the territorial level.
It is not easy to define and measure the “politicalness” or degree of
ideological commitment of a labor movement, and it is even harder to
compare these qualities.^ All labor organizations have interest in
issues beyond those of bread and butter, and all mix some politics
with some job-oriented and institutional (union-building) activity.
The relative importance of the two components of union activity
varies among countries and over time within countries. It is nonethe-
less fairly clear that the mix of activities contained relatively more
politics and ideology in French West Africa than in the Gold Coast; in
the allocation of trade union energy, time, and money, the French
African unions gave relatively more attention to political issues than
did the Gold Coast unions and relatively less to job-oriented or union-
oriented activities.
One indication, rather intangible, is to be found in the marked
differences in the language of trade unionism and trade unionists
in the two areas. Marxist thinking of one shade or another permeated
the writing and speech of French African unionists. In the Gold
Coast labor movement the mainstream of thinking and writing con-
tained much less in the way of political or social philosophy or con-
cern and very little of a traditional Marxist flavor in particular.
A firmer clue is the fact that the divisions within the labor move-
ment in French West Africa were apparently due almost exclusively
to political factors arising either from local political circumstances or
from the rival union situation inherited from France, itself largely
ideological in nature.^ In the Gold Coast, political disagreements
played a much less important role; only for a brief period in the early
1950’s and again in the year before independence were they at all
significant. Even then the ideological content was slight, and in any
event the conflict existed almost entirely at the Trade Union Congress
2. For a discussion of some of the semantic and conceptual problems see E. Berg
and J. Butler, “Trade Unions,” J. S. Coleman and C. Rosberg, eds.. Political Parties
and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1964).
3. Throughout the colonial period the unions in French Africa were grouped into
rival centrals attached to the three main French union centrals, the Confederation
Generale du Travail (CGT) (communist); the Confederation Generale du Travail-
Force Ouvriere (FO); (socialist); the Confederation Fran^aise des Travailleurs Chre-
tiens (CFTC) (Christian socialist).
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level. Trade union splits in the Gold Coast had their origins for the
most part in job-oriented conflicts. In the 1950's, for example, first
railway engineers and then maritime workers seceded from the railway
union because they felt the railway clerks were running the union and
that their particular interests were not being taken into account.
There were also some breakaways that reflected ethnic particularism
or regional conflicts.
In the evolution of every trade union movement two related sets
of structural questions arise. The first involves the form of organiza-
tion to be adopted; the second relates to the distribution of functions
and power among the various layers of union structure.
Between French West Africa and the Gold Coast some fundamental
differences arose in these structural matters. According to the theoreti-
cal blueprint of union structure in the French-speaking areas, workers
were organized in syndicats professionels, occupational unions most
often industrial in scope. Electricians in XYZ Company in Dakar
would be organized with all other XYZ workers in an XYZ Company
Section Syndicale, a local unit of the Construction Workers’ Union of
Dakar. The structure then rose horizontally (geographically), as well
as vertically (occupationally). The Construction Workers’ Union of
Dakar joined with all other Dakar unions in a kind of city central or
district council—a union locale or regionale, which was grouped with
other unions locales on the national level into a territorial federa-
tion—a union territoriale (after independence union nationale) . The
Construction Workers’ Union of Dakar would also be grouped with
construction workers in other parts of Senegal in a Construction
Workers’ Union of Senegal.
The key organizational unit, where true authority in the labor
movement resided, was the geographical federation, the union ter-
ritoriale. The “house” (or enterprise-level) unions never had much
vitality. An all-French West Africa-wide organization came into being
after 1951 but was mainly a coordinating body with little authority.
Industrial unions, except among teachers and railwaymen, existed
more on paper than in reality, though after 1956 they assumed a some-
what more important role in negotiations. Throughout most of the
history of the labor movement in French-speaking Africa, the territorial
(national) federations handled grievances for all workers, bargained on
most important questions, and decided the major strikes as well as
leading them.
In the Gold Coast a different structure emerged. The basic unit
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became the “house” or company-wide union. Industrial unions de-
veloped in mines and railways and in a few other sectors, as in French
West Africa. But most unions were limited in scope to a single com-
pany. The Trades Union Congress, which existed at the top before
independence, was a relatively powerless body, with little money, few
full-time staff workers, and limited control over the constituent unions.
Authority in the labor movement of the Gold Coast thus tended to be
more decentralized than in French-speaking Africa, and the geographi-
cal bodies so important in the French West African union structure
had no counterpart there.
The French West African unions were less concerned than Gold
Coast unions with organizational matters, with improving the union’s
institutional position, and with procedures and administrative ma-
chinery. They had less presence at the shop or office level, though in
neither area did the labor organizations have much of a hold among
the rank and file. There are a number of indicators of these differ-
ences.
1. In French West African trade union affairs of the period there
seems to have been very little preoccupation with matters relating to
internal union machinery; neither trade union administration nor
structural problems were much discussed at conventions, except oc-
casionally and when they bore on broader political issues.^ Among
unions of comparable strength in the two areas, the internal admin-
istrative machinery was more developed in the Gold Coast—committee
structure and branch organizations were more articulated, for ex-
ample, in the Gold Coast Mineworkers’ Union or railwaymen’s or-
ganizations, than in the mining or railway unions in French West
Africa.
2. The most direct impact of unions on workers is normally in the
area of grievance handling. The French African unions played a sig-
nificantly smaller role with respect to grievances than did the Gold
Coast unions. There was very little formal grievance machinery in
either place, but consultation and negotiation machinery at the shop
or office level was more frequent in the Gold Coast. In the bigger
private firms and government departments there was a fairly well-
4. At the UGTAN (General Union of African Workers) convention in Conakry
in January 1959, for example, there was considerable discussion of “corporatism”—
that is, tendencies toward job-oriented union positions as opposed to “revolution-
ary” unionism. But this apparent discussion over union structure was simply the
overt manifestation of basic political differences that could not prudently be dis-
cussed openly.
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developed system of joint consultations. In 1953-54, for example,
some 47 such committees were functioning in private enterprises and
125 in public services.® Individual grievances in French Africa, on
the other hand, were almost invariably handled by the representatives
of the trade union central, not the local representative. At the local
level, the labor law provided (as in France) for the election of workers’
delegates (delegues de personnel), who were to act as spokesmen on
grievances. Although the unions usually put forward slates at these
elections, and so were represented in this sense at the local level, there
was an ambiguity in the relationship between workers’ delegates and
trade unions that did not exist in the Gold Coast. It is not clear, in
any event, that the worker delegate system functioned satisfactorily,
though very little is known about how it worked in practice.
Equally little is known about the actual functioning during these
years of one other shop-level institution: the joint classification com-
mittees, provision for which was included in collective agreements.
These committees, composed of worker and employer representatives,
were intended to resolve grievances related to job gradings.
The presence of labor courts, and the absence of comparable in-
stitutions in the Gold Coast, further contributed to the dilution of a
trade union presence at the shop level in French Africa. Not only was
there in the French West African system less face-to-face discussion
between unions and employers about local issues and grievances, but
these issues were less frequently settled directly by the parties. Media-
tion and conciliation by labor officers were general in both systems,
however.
3. Accounting and financial problems absorbed far less leadership
energy in French West Africa than in the Gold Coast. The Gold
Coast unions operated on locally-raised dues revenues to a greater
extent and were much more concerned with financial reporting, both
within the labor movement and between the unions and the govern-
ment. The French West African unions could exist without much
dues income, thanks to provision by municipalities of office space in a
Bourse du Travail and the French administration’s practice of allow-
ing civil servants to be “detached” with pay for union duties.
4. Broader efforts at rank and file education were made in the
Gold Coast. Soon after the formation of the first university in the late
1940’s, an Extra-Mural Department was set up, which sent out trade
5. Gold Coast, Annual Report of the Labor Department, 1933^.
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union tutors throughout the 1950’s and held frequent in-service train-
ing courses for trade unionists. In 1953, the Trades Union Congress,
with the help of the British TUG and the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions, set up a Workers’ Education Association, which
was supposed to concern itself with rank-and-file education, though
what it actually did is obscure. In French Africa the only union educa-
tion efforts were those that took union leaders abroad, though the
Christian unions in Senegal did set up some courses in the late 1950’s.
This seems to have been the only effort of its kind in all of French
West Africa before independence.
The Organization of Employers. Differences in trade union organiza-
tion were matched by differences in employer organization in the two
areas. In French Africa almost all employers were members of an
industry-based trade association; there were over 120 such associations
in French West Africa in the early 1950’s. Through their trade associa-
tion most employers belonged to one of the two major groups that did
most bargaining for employers: an organization of employers in manu-
facturing and construction (Union Syndical des Industriels, UNI-
SYNDI), and an organization of employers in trade, commerce and
service (Syndicat des Commercants Importateurs et Exportateurs,
SCIMPEX). (Where there were expatriate planters, as in Guinea and
the Ivory Coast, they had their own organizations.) Each of the two
major employer associations maintained an office with paid staff in
each of the territories, in Dakar, and in Paris. Finally, overseas em-
ployers formed a special section in the French Employers Association
(Comite National de Patronat Fran^ais, CNPF).
In Ghana employer organization was much sketchier. The big
mining companies, with one major exception, were members of the
Chamber of Mines, which bargained for its members over wages and
had a joint policy on conditions of service. There was a variety of trade
associations and numerous chambers of commerce, but there was no
joint bargaining other than in the mining industry. The Ghana Em-
ployers’ Association, composed of most of the important British enter-
prises, was a poorly financed, loosely organized group, which played
no significant role in collective bargaining. Some employers in com-
mercial enterprises attempted late in the colonial period to organize
along racial lines: the Indian Merchants Association, the Syrian Mer-
chants Association, etc. But when in 1958 these associations were urged
to bargain collectively with a newly formed Union of Distributive
178 Elliot J. Berg
Retail and Allied Workers, they were unable to do so effectively. British-
based firms had relations with the British Overseas Employers’ Federa-
tion, but the links were less formal and less continuous than were those
that tied the French overseas employers to the French Employers’ As-
sociation.
The Role of Government. In both areas government wage decisions
were the major determinants of the general level of wages and the
wage structure. In the Gold Coast the government influenced general
movements in wages through its position as employer of over half the
nonagricultural labor force. Private-sector wage changes tended to
follow those of government, but there were substantial variations be-
tween firms and industries, and the whole process of private sector
wage determination was decentralized. There was, for example, no
statutory minimum wage until after independence. Decisions about
non-wage conditions of employment were also decentralized and varied
fairly widely from firm to firm.® The scope for determination of these
conditions by the parties was relatively large, since the law was not
extensive on these matters.
In French Africa it was otherwise. There was first of all a statutory
minimum wage (salaire minimum interprofessionelle garanti, SMIG),
which affected privately as well as publicly employed workers and
which became the effective rate for unskilled labor throughout the
territory. Furthermore, the change in the SMIG was the basis of dis-
cussion for changes in the wages of skilled workers. And finally, the
scope of bargaining was highly restricted: all the basic conditions of
employment were set down by law—overtime rates, vacations, etc. The
law also prescribed the form of collective contracts, including direc-
tives as to what had to be included in the agreement. The government
role in the negotiation of collective agreements was more direct than
in the Gold Coast, since agreements were negotiated in the presence
of government officials and could be “extended” to cover entire in-
dustries, thereby acquiring the force of law.
With respect to wages, bargaining procedures were more or less
the same in all the territories of French West Africa. There existed
in each territory a tripartite (government, employers, union) Labor
Advisory Committee (Commission Consultative du Travail), whose
6. Cf., Report of the Ghana Employers’ Association of Terms and Conditions of
Service, 1957. See also Roberts and Grefie de Bellecombe, Collective Bargaining,
chap. 5.
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main, almost exclusive, function was to discuss changes in the SMIG.
The “bargaining” procedure consisted of the two parties presenting
the government representative with conflicting claims as to how much
the cost of living had gone up since the last SMIG revision^ In states
other than Senegal demands also focused on closing the gap between
the SMIG in Senegal and other states. More meaningful wage bar-
gaining took place when the time came to discuss the wages of graded
workers—that is, those in skill categories above that of unskilled
laborers. These discussions took place in tripartite territorial joint
councils {commissions mixtes), also under the chairmanship of a gov-
ernment official. In these councils collective agreements were worked
out. In the French areas, therefore, the procedures of wage determina-
tion and collective bargaining in general were highly structured.
In the Gold Coast the instrument of wage changes in the public
sector was the wage or salary commission, a body of experts, usually
chaired by an expatriate called in from Britain. The major wage
changes after World War II were based on the recommendations
emanating from such commissions: the Harrigan Commission in
1946, Korsah in 1947, Lidbury and Gbedemah in 1951 and 1952,
Waugh in 1957. Between commission reports, bargaining took place
mainly with respect to cost-of-living adjustments; public sector unions
demanded, and generally won, cost of living allowances. But what
usually happened was that between commission reports, “anomalies”
in the wage structure and dissatisfaction with cost-of-living allowances
led to accumulation of grievances and consequent pressures that were
temporarily dealt with by the succeeding salaries commission.
Bargaining over wages and conditions of employment in the private
sector almost invariably involved demands by unions that employers
meet government rates or conditions. Changes in the general level and
structure of wages of privately employed workers did tend to follow
government changes, though larger enterprises retained considerable
flexibility. The important point is that the government’s role in deter-
mining private-sector wages and conditions, either through direct wage
regulation or by legislation, was far less significant than in French
Africa.
Colonial administrations in French Africa were not uniformly more
7. In periods of price stability, as in the mid-fifties, bargaining revolved around
arguments as to what was suitable to include in the minimum subsistence budget
(budget du minimum vital), the composition and cost of which was the peg around
which all discussions over wages took place.
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“interventionist” in industrial relations matters than the British ad-
ministration in the Gold Coast. In several respects the roles were
reversed. Thus, in matters of political activity French administrations
generally took a more permissive line toward the trade unions. In
1949-50, when there were a number of serious “incidents” in the
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, the authorities in those territories did
move to suppress overtly political acts by the trade unions. But the
normal response of the colonial administrators was to play the politi-
cal game themselves, manipulating where they could trade unions as
they tried to manipulate political parties and other groups.
Related to this was the policy regarding the scope of activity allowed
to civil servant organizations. In the Gold Coast, as throughout British
Africa, civil servants had particular restrictions put on them, especially
insofar as their activities touched political nerves. In French West
Africa this was decidedly less of a concern, and trade union activities
among civil servants were subject to fewer constraints.
Finally, the British were a good deal tougher about accounting
practices than were the French. In the Gold Coast trade unions were
required by law to register with the Registrar of Trade Unions and to
submit annual reports on membership and finances. Proper reporting
and accounting were taken seriously by the Registrar of Trade Unions,
who subjected the unions to a continuous flow of nagging letters and
complaints about inadequate financial accounting.
The French West African unions were not exposed to the same
controls. It is true that in the beginning years formal regulation by law
was more extensive than in the Gold Coast. In the latter country, for
example, the Trade Union Ordinance that appeared just before World
War II required registration and financial accounting as a precondition
for union recognition. In French Africa the 1937 legislation authoriz-
ing unions had accounting regulations, educational qualifications for
membership and leadership, and prohibition of political discussion by
some of the new associations of wage earners. In 1944 most of these
restrictions were swept away. Between 1944 and 1952 there existed a
peculiar legal situation in labor matters: it was not clear which laws
applied to Africa and which did not. African trade unionists claimed
that the French Constitution was applicable in certain matters of
African labor law. They therefore refused to comply with unfavorable
legal provisions supposedly in force in French West Africa. Thus, the
registration and accounting provisions of the 1937 law on trade unions
were ignored after 1944, and the unions sent in no reports. In the
Labor Code of 1952, the omnibus labor law governing industrial rela-
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tions until independence, no provision was made for registration and
regulation of financial practices.
The Nature and Structure of Collective Bargaining. The structure of
bargaining—like the union and employer organizations themselves—
was more centralized in French West Africa than in the Gold Coast.
In the Gold Coast typical negotiations took place between the manage-
ment of a given plant or company and the employees of that company.
In some of the bigger firms bargaining was on an establishment rather
than an enterprise-wide basis; the United Africa Company Employees’
Union, for example, did not negotiate for all the employees of the
UAC in the Gold Coast, since important subsidiary companies had
their own unions. In a few cases, bargaining took place along craft
lines, though this was rare; the main example was in the railways,
where the skilled locomotive engineers had their own union and
negotiated separately. In some cases, too, there were approaches to in-
dustry-wide bargaining. The most important example was in the
mining industry, where the Mines Employees’ Union and the Chamber
of Mines bargained for most mines and companies. The African
Manganese Company, however, which employed approximately 20
percent of the mineworkers in the country, was not a member of the
Chamber of Mines and bargained directly with the union.
In French West Africa matters were more complicated. In each of
the territories union and management representatives selected by the
government met with government representatives in the territorial joint
councils (commissions mixtes), where they worked out long collective
agreements covering large blocks of workers. In some territories, as in
Senegal and Dahomey, there was one basic agreement covering all Afri-
can workers; in other territories there were two agreements for African
workers—one for all manual workers, the other covering all office
workers. Expatriate European workers were covered by separate agree-
ments.
That these arrangements involved more centralized decision-making
in the French African areas is clear. Wage decisions made in any of
the territories (the Ivory Coast, for example), were influenced by em-
ployer and government representatives in Dakar (where the govern-
ment of the Federation of French West Africa was located) and in
Paris. Employer policies on wages and other labor matters were often
set on a broader basis than the territory, because of a concern with
territorial “whipsawing,” whereby an increase granted on the territo-
rial level could become the target wage of unions in other territories;
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employer organizations in each territory often had to clear with Paris
before making final offers in wage discussions in the Labor Advisory
Commission or the joint councils. With respect to conditions of em-
ployment, Paris played an even more decisive role; for it was in Paris
that the big legislative decisions were made, such as in the substantive
provisions of the Labor Code of 1952, which applied to all the overseas
territories of France.
All of this suggests a second major difference in the nature of the
industrial relations systems in the two areas, as evidenced in the collec-
tive-bargaining process: the Gold Coast system was much more
“indigenous,” or “inward-looking,” involving essentially domestic con-
siderations, while the French West Africa arrangements were outward-
oriented, embedded in the colonial relationship.
In French West Africa one general issue dominated collective bar-
gaining: equality of treatment of wage earners, and in particular equal
pay for equal work. Trade union demands were invariably focused on
the existence of “unjustified” wage differentials between African and
French civil servants working in the African administrations, between
workers in private industry and workers in the public sector, and be-
tween workers in one territory and workers in others within the
Federation of French West Africa. The essence of trade union strategy
was a kind of generalized “whipsawing,” frequently using expatriate
conditions as the lever or target.
The process is illustrated most dramatically in the civil service. An
adjustment of civil servant salaries in France was normally followed
by a comparable adjustment of the salaries of Frenchmen at work in
the colonial territories in West Africa. But these adjustments in Africa
led to a widening of differentials between Frenchmen and African
civil servants doing comparable jobs, a situation that generated in-
sistent demands by African unions for equalizing increases. Up to
1957, near the end of the colonial period, this procedure dominated
discussions of civil servant salary policies and invariably led to in-
creases in African civil salaries.
Private-sector employees had two comparison groups: African civil
servants, who enjoyed better conditions, and European (French)
workers in private employment. Not only were demands for private-
sector wage increases generated by increases granted in the public
sector, but equally favorable fringe benefits were sought and frequently
won.
In discussions over statutory minima a similar kind of whipsawing
occurred. Here the target was the narrowing of what can be called
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“the Dakar differential.” The SMIG in Senegal was always the highest
in the federation, and in territories other than Senegal it served as the
reference point in bargaining over minimum wages.
Thus the issues and strategies of collective bargaining in French
colonial Africa depended to a unique extent on the special conditions
of French colonial rule. The main grievances sprang from the con-
nection with France and the presence of French administrators and
wage earners in Africa. This was far less so in the Gold Coast or in
British colonies generally. The issue of overseas allowances for ex-
patriates in the civil service did exist in the Gold Coast and was a
source of grievance, as were differences in leave provisions and other
fringes. But the issue was faced squarely in the early 1950’s insofar as
the public sector was concerned, and it did not arise again as a major
source of organized protest in the public sector, nor was it an over-
whelming issue in the private sector. Into the public-sector salary struc-
ture there was put an inducement in the form of an overseas allowance,
which was recognized to be necessary to recruit expatriate civil ser-
vants and hence was limited to expatriates.
Strike Patterns. In certain basic respects work stoppages in both the
French areas and the Gold Coast displayed common characteristics.
First of all, most work stoppages in both areas were short demonstra-
tions, lasting one day or less; many of these were spontaneous in
character—that it, not organized by local union leaders. In both areas,
too, most stoppages were limited to the workers of one enterprise and
were, insofar as one can tell from the strike descriptions contained in
official reports, essentially “defensive” in nature; they were the result
of some action by management felt by the workers concerned to be
unnecessary or unjustified. These stoppages were really a method of
airing a grievance, or of initiating bargaining.®
Where differences in strike patterns appear most clearly is in the
character of big strikes. In the Gold Coast before 1958 there were three
large-scale strike movements. Two of them, in 1947 and in 1955-56,
were long strikes in the mining industry; the third was the semi-
general political strike of 1950. In French West Africa the major
strikes were sometimes on an industry basis, such as the railway strike
of 1947-48, which lasted five months in some areas, but they generally
tended to involve larger blocks of workers, such as all government
8. Analysis of strike histories given in Labor Department reports in the Gold
Coast between 1947 and 1959 indicates that some 300 out of a total of almost 500
work stoppages during these years were “defensive” in this sense.
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workers (Senegal and the Ivory Coast in 1959) or all workers in the
private sector (Senegal, 1957), and frequently engaged the African
wage-earning community in general protest demonstrations (1952 and
1953 stoppages throughout French West Africa). Major French West
African union efforts were thus not only broader in coverage than
those in the Gold Coast but were strikes against the government itself.
A typical union effort was a one- or two-day protest demonstration by
most workers in a territory against a government wage decision. The
substantive issue in many of the general or semi-general strike move-
ments was often equality of treatment; this was true for the railroad
strike in 1947 and the private-sector strike in Senegal in 1957. There
also occurred in French West Africa a kind of stoppage without
counterpart in the Gold Coast: stoppages aimed at influencing labor
lawmakers and those who applied the law at the local level. This type
of stoppage was common from 1952 to 1954, when the new Labor
Code for the Overseas Territories was being debated in France, and
when it was later applied in Africa.
Explanatory Factors
We have thus far described certain key characteristics of the in-
dustrial relations systems of French West Africa and the Gold Coast,
pointing out similarities and especially differences in the two systems.
Any attempt to explain these differences is complicated by the fact that
in colonial situations whole institutional systems, in industrial rela-
tions as in other spheres, were introduced as part of colonial rule. It is
possible in these circumstances to regard colonial industrial relations
systems as simply little mirror images of metropolitan systems, dis-
torted here and there perhaps but still essentially French or British.
Now it is obvious that the colonial inheritance goes a long way
in explaining why the industrial relations of French West Africa and
the Gold Coast developed as they did up to independence and why they
evolved differently in the two areas. This is especially so in the French
areas, where the relevant institutions were more directly imported and
in greater detail. In British Africa the principle of “voluntarism” in
collective bargaining was reflected in labor law and in a greater
diversity in such matters as wage determination; there was therefore
greater scope for indigenous adaptation.
But neither the French system nor the British system was absorbed
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wholesale. A process of selection and adaptation took place, and
African conditions and needs determined which parts of the colonizers’
industrial relations’ institutions would be rejected or modified. More-
over, even to the extent that most of the differences in patterns can be
explained by reference to the different colonial inheritances, it is still
important to spell out the process involved; certain elements of the
transferred institutions were especially critical in shaping the evolu-
tion of the system as a whole, and these should be identified.
That there were local options, so to speak, is illustrated by certain
aspects of trade union development. With respect to French Africa,
there was much in the local trade union situation that was familiar
from French trade unionism: the ideological and political bent, the
shaky presence of the unions at the shop level, the general indifference
to financial matters, and the casualness of administrative structure. It
could have been otherwise in French Africa, however. The CFTC and
FO centrals, for example, did tend to give higher priority to job-
oriented issues and spoke the language of “non-politicalness”; they
offered significantly different orientations than the CGT unions and
their offshoots. Their audience, however, was always limited; CGT
unions, and unionists in the CGT tradition, remained dominant
throughout the colonial period.
In the Gold Coast, similarly, it is hardly an inherent characteristic
of the British system that the labor movement is non-political; yet in
the Gold Coast, relative non-politicalness was a fact for most of the
unions throughout most of the colonial period.
The evolution of trade union structure suggests even more clearly
the existence of options and the fact that adaptations were made. The
Gold Coast’s unions developed as small autonomous company unions,
and where there was more than one firm in an industry no centralized
industrial union developed, except in mining. But it cannot be said
that this occurred because unions in Britain are this way. Recent
British trade union history has seen the sharp reduction of numbers
of unions and continual amalgamation into bigger units. The Gold
Coast unions might just as easily have developed along general union
lines and still have remained within the British tradition. Elsewhere
in the British Empire, in fact, national unions were the dominant
form, as in Sierra Leone and East Africa, for example.
It is the same with union structure in French West Africa. In
France the national confederations are the center of power. In French
West Africa the West African-level organizations were always weak;
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real power was in the hands of the geographical federations in each
territory. Local unions and industrial federations were, for the most
part, paper organizations, sacrificed to the territorial federation. In
building this kind of union structure, African unionists in French
West Africa often ignored legal requirements as to trade union organi-
zation. For in French Africa, as in France, the labor law said that only
people who worked on the same or related crafts or industries could
join together in unions. But the African trade union leadership
generally disregarded this part of the law. Often they enrolled members
directly into the ranks of the geographical organization, the territorial
federation, even if they belonged to no local union. This was for a
long time the despair of French labor officers, but it was common
practice.^
It is necessary, then, to search for local factors and forces that guided
the process of institutional selection and adaptation and shaped the
development of the local industrial relations systems. Three related
aspects of trade union organization will be considered here: the nature
and extent of the political commitment, trade union structure, and the
intensity of institution-building or organization-oriented activities.
Trade Union Organization. In the Gold Coast a variety of factors “ex-
plain” the distinctive characteristics of the labor movement. An im-
portant element was the wage-setting mechanism, especially the fact
that individual firms retained considerable autonomy in fixing their
wages and terms of employment. This encouraged union concentration
at the enterprise level and the emergence of a company-based or
“house” union as the key organizational unit.
This tendency was reinforced by other aspects of the environment.
In an export economy, where there is in effect no internal competitive
product market, even in the nascent manufacturing sector, there are
no significant product market pressures inducing large-scale organiza-
tion either among unions or employers. Nor was there any ideological
impetus or a general spirit of proselytizing which might have en-
couraged drives to organize the unorganized and thus stimulate units
of organization wider than the firm. Though this was partly due to
9. In 1950 the labor inspector of Guinea reported that the CGT in Guinea con-
sisted of a few regularly constituted unions plus a mass of individuals who were
members only of the geographical federation. (Inspection Territoriale du Travail
de la Guinee Fran^aise, Rapport Annuel 1950, p. 56.) The Inspector General of
Labor in 1951 commented on the generality of this phenomenon and its unde-
sirability. (Inspection Generale du Travail de I’A.O.F., Rapport Annuel 1951,
p. 148.)
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the scarcity of union leadership and funds, it is also evident that there
was little sense of mission among most Gold Coast trade union leaders.
Administrative, organizational, and regional factors further in-
creased the propensity to small-scale organizations on the trade union
side. Where geographically scattered unions existed, central union
headquarters were frequently incapable of servicing the minimum
needs of component units. Slipshod accounting and mishandling of
union funds led local union organizations to hesitate in sending
money to higher echelons for fear that it would be misspent or mis-
appropriated. Fast and loose use of union funds was in fact a major
plague.
Administrative shortcomings and misuse of union funds aggravated
centrifugal tendencies. They added to existing feelings of regional
separateness or ethnic differences, thereby making amalgamation of
unions harder and even stimulating the dissolution along regional
lines of such interregional organizations as existed. The most trouble-
some region was Ashanti, where general sentiment for separatism was
greatest. The Kumasi Branch of the Agricultural Department Workers’
Union broke away from the national union in 1957, and the Ashanti
Branch of the Cadbury and Fry Employees’ Union stopped sending
its dues to headquarters after 1954.
Finally, there appears to have grown up a considerable amount of
loyalty to company or to craft. In the railway and harbor workers
union, first railway enginemen, then maritime workers seceded be-
cause they felt the railway clerks were running the union and that
their interests were not taken into account. Between clerical workers
and manuals there were signs of distrust. Leaders of strong company
unions argued that only workers in one company had the “sense of
oneness’’ necessary to cement a union together; they cited the failure
of the early (1947) Mercantile Workers’ Union, which had quickly
fallen apart.
10. In their 1956 report to the Registrar of Trade Unions, the Patterson Zachonis
Employees Union, for example, noted that branches for some time refused to send
dues to headquarters in Accra because: “We had no cooperation from Accra since
the last Annual Conference held in Accra in 1953; matters referred to Accra had
received no attention and our letters had not been replied to; the HQ is not func-
tioning and its administration has deteriorated.”
11. See, for example, “Joint Report of Inquiries into the Functions of the
Trans-Volta Togoland Regional Union of Agricultural Department Workers Union,
Appendix to Minutes of the 7th Annual Delegates Conference of the Agricultural
Department Workers Union,” mimeographed, 4-5 August 1956; “Report of Com-
mittee of Enquiry, the Obuasi Urban Council Employees Union,” mimeographed,
1956?
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Another set of explanatory facts is “political” in a broad sense,
relating to the creed or ideology of the colonial administrators, the
policies of the administration (which were partly the consequence of
administrators’ ideology) and political forces within the Gold Coast.
The Gold Coast colonial administration, first of all, took a consistently
hard line in support of “voluntarism,” and this led to a legal frame-
work that indirectly encouraged enterprise-wide unionism in a number
of ways. Social legislation was relatively sketchy, restricted largely
to protective laws, and such conditions of employment as were specified
in the law were distinctly minimum (as against “effective”) conditions.
Collective bargaining, conciliation, and negotiation were strongly en-
couraged, and direct government intervention in determination of
private sector wages and conditions was not common.
The law on trade unions probably encouraged the development of
“house” unionism in one special way: it permitted groups of workers
as small as five in number to form themselves into a trade union. This
meant that employers could, if they wanted to, easily disturb or break
a union giving them trouble by stimulating separatist groups to form
their own union. Dissident groups within each union were also allowed
to separate from the union whenever they suspected that their interests
were not being advanced by the leadership of the union.
British administrators and labor officers took a purist position on
the desirability of non-political trade unionism, which they combined
with a devotion to “sound unionism”— i.e., well-organized, well-ad-
ministered, self-supporting unions. It is easy to see why administrative
officers should have taken this position; it was in accord with their
general desire to avoid political disturbances along the carefully laid
path they saw leading to full independence for the Gold Coast. But
there is more to it than this; political expediency does not explain, for
example, why representatives of the British labor movement who were
serving as labor officers in the colonial government or as advisors to
the African unions should have shared this dedication to non-political-
ness and “sound” union development. One factor may have been their
recognition that their role as technical-assistance people could only be
effective to the extent that the Gold Coast unions were anxious to be-
come “real” unions, not political agencies. It also seems probable that
they had an understanding of the needs of basic institution-building,
upon which their vision of “proper” trade union development rested.
In addition to these “positive” factors, there was an important
negative one: that the British administration in the Gold Coast would
not hesitate to crush any serious wandering from the non-political
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path. This was how they reacted to the one political adventure of Gold
Coast unions, the general strike of 1950, and trade unionists knew they
would react the same way if a similar situation arose.
African political dynamics were also important in shaping the Gold
Coast system. The relationship between the Convention People’s
Party, which was the dominant nationalist party after 1949, and the
trade unions was quite complicated.^^ Two aspects are relevant here:
(1) the biggest and best-organized unions (UAC Workers Union,
Public Works Department Union, Mines Employees Union, most of
the railway unions) were not involved or interested in political affairs;
(2) the GPP in the early 1950’s tried to gain control of the unions and
the labor movement as a whole by putting its people in control of the
Trades Union Congress and shifting authority to the TUG. Through-
out the 1950’s, therefore, most important unions were unwilling to give
greater power to the TUG, because to do so would involve control by
the GPP. This was a major factor rendering the TUG impotent until
the situation was changed by law after independence with the In-
dustrial Relations Act of 1958. It also helps explain why union leaders
so insistently argued that unions should be non-political, a view that
was not only a matter of conviction but congenial to their self-interest
as they saw it.
In explaining the distinctive feature of French West African trade
union development, two factors are of major significance. The first is
the peculiar political context: the colonial relationship was ill-defined,
the French were morally and politically committed to an ideology of
equal treatment for Africans and Frenchmen, and the metropolitan
governments of the period were weak and unstable. The general im-
plications of this situation will be considered below; with respect to
trade union development, it encouraged such political propensities as
existed in the unions, gave much potential political bargaining power
to the unions, and made the equality issue an effective bargaining de-
vice. Free movement of people was one of the principles of the French
Union, and many Frenchmen came to work in West Africa, including
so-called petits-blanes, men of little skill or training who competed
with Africans for jobs and provided grist for the equality issue.
The second major factor was the method by which wages were de-
termined. Geographical bargaining meant that geographically-based
union organization was stimulated. That the basic unit of union
12. See Berg and Butler, “Trade Unions.”
13. E. Berg, “The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa,”
American Political Science Review 54 (1960): 397-98.
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sovereignty was the territorial rather than the West Africa-wide organi-
zation is explained partly by political factors—the territory rather than
the French West African federation was the predominant political unit
—and partly by the fact that wage determination was made on a terri-
torial basis. Also, since government determined so much of the wage
structure and conditions of employment, what was most useful was an
agency capable of creating a political impression, one that could call
all the workers out for one- or two-day demonstrations.
The territorially-based general-type unionism that developed in re-
sponse to these conditions was not torn by the centrifugal forces so
much in evidence in the Gold Coast’s unionism. Although clerical-
manual differences existed and were in some territories given official
recognition in separate unions and collective agreements, they do not
appear to have caused the same intraunion conflict; the non-manual
leadership of the unions seems to have given rise to far fewer protests.
Nor did administrative problems, misuse of funds, or regionalist and
ethnic separatism cause comparable strains.
The reasons for this are not entirely clear. One probable factor was
the different role of ideology in the twa areas. As noted earlier,
ideological elements were always more substantial in French West
Africa’s unionism than in the Gold Coast’s. Preachment of the unity
of the working class, especially in the colonial situation, may have
served to dilute separatist sentiment among wage earners. Another
factor was that union administration was not so absorbing an issue to
French African unions as it was in the Gold Coast, and it was less
likely therefore to give rise to internal controversy. Moreover, the
greater role of government in wage determination and in fixing condi-
tions of work and the greater centralization of bargaining gave less
scope for division on the basis of local particularisms. Lastly, the
equality issue, around which so much of the bargaining revolved, was
undoubtedly a unifying force since it involved general grievances
arising from the colonial situation.
Employer Organization. In the Gold Coast there was no stimulus to
employers to bargain together, except in the mining industry. Private
firms were relatively free to adjust their own wages and conditions of
employment. As with the unions, there were few competitive pressures
in product or factor markets to encourage wider organization of em-
ployers. The disparate size of firms was also a factor. Leading firms
such as the United Africa Company felt it preferable to work out their
own conditions on the grounds that they had little to gain from
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joining with other employers, while smaller employers feared domina-
tion by the UAC.
In addition there was a political factor. The main expatriate firms
were reluctant to engage in joint action with each other and with
other employers, partly because the history of such joint action was
bitter to many Africans and evoked fears of imperialist conspiracy.
The Association of West African Merchants, along with the import
quota arrangement from which it benefited in the immediate postwar
period, was one of the main elements in the Gold Coast disturbances
of 1948. To avoid stirring old memories or new fears among Africans,
many of whom tended to regard the expatriate firms as part of the
colonial apparatus, the large employers—virtually all expatriates—shied
away from employer organization.
In French West Africa employers organized more widely and more
readily. French employers are more accustomed to joint negotiation
than are British employers; there were fewer political overtones in
their organizing than in the Gold Coast and, most important, the
wage-setting mechanism in French West Africa was such as to en-
courage them to organize. When they were consulted on the minimum
wage and when they negotiated the wage of skilled workers, all em-
ployers bargained together because all were directly affected by the
outcome. There was also less reason for major firms to be reluctant to
bargain in common, since they had less scope than did employers in the
Gold Coast to determine their own conditions of employment.
The Bargaining Pattern and the Role of Government. The importa-
tion of the French custom of statutory minimum wage determination
by region, with the statutory minimum being not only an effective rate
actually paid to large numbers of workers but also the key rate in the
wage structure, was especially important in shaping the French West
African system of bargaining. It was the same with the highly articu-
lated wage structure, which involved grouping all skilled workers into
six or seven broad categories, all in practice linked to the SMIG. Other
crucial elements, such as permissiveness toward civil servant participa-
tion in trade union affairs, also were in some measure projections of
the French system.
In the Gold Coast there was less of this kind of direct influence, be-
cause the British system was much less structured and because no
particular set of wage-determining institutions or approaches was
“necessary” in the sense that the adoption of French wage-fixing in-
stitutions was necessary.
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There were, nonetheless, alternatives in French West Africa. If, for
example, wages had been determined on an all-French West Africa basis,
instead of by territory, the structure of the labor movement and other
major features of the industrial relations system might have been
different; more authority would probably have gone to all French
West Africa union bodies, for example, and also industrial unionism
would have been stimulated. This was, in fact, beginning to happen
after 1956, when industry-wide collective agreements were negotiated.
Why did the structure of bargaining not take this form from the be-
ginning?
The territory became and remained the major unit of wage deter-
mination because all parties concerned preferred it, and underlying
this preference was the fact that the territories differed substantially in
terms of income levels. Thus, for government a French West Africa-
wide minimum wage would have been too rigid and would have risked
forcing up wage levels in the very poor territories of the interior.
Employers wanted territorial wage determination for the same reason
and because they recognized that the risk of political concessions was
greater the larger the scope of conflict. The unions in the richer
territories were not keen on federation-wide bargaining because it
would have restrained wages in their territories. There was also a
political factor of some importance; the French confederations, to
which the African unions were tied informally, favored territorially-
based unionism and bargaining because they feared the separatist
tendencies manifested from the early 1950’s in all French West Africa-
wide organizations.^^
Differences in the political context, in the nature of the colonial
situation in the two areas, are basic to understanding the variations in
the two industrial relations systems. In the Gold Coast the nature and
outcome of the colonial relationship was never in doubt, nor after
1950 was there much uncertainty even about timing. It was clear to all
concerned that the Gold Coast would be independent, and soon; by
1951, the country already enjoyed a fairly large degree of self-govern-
ment.
French Africa, in contrast, lived under greater uncertainty about
the character of its relationship to the metropole, about the ultimate
outcome of the relationship, and about the timing of change. The
French African territories had some political autonomy after 1945. But
they were not self-governing to any significant extent, and constitu-
14. Bulletin de Liaison des Travailleurs des Pays Coloniaiix, no. 33 (Paris, 1953),
pp. 4-5.
Industrial Relations Systems in French West Africa and the Gold Coast 193
tionally they were part of an indissoluble French Union. They did not
in principle have the right to independence. It was not until 1956 that
the word “independence” even came out into the open in general
political discussion.
These specific differences in the political environment are important
in explaining the differences in the two industrial relations systems.
In all their dealings with African subjects, British administrators in
the Gold Coast could posture as high-minded trustees—holders of a
disinterested stewardship. They could act with that ineffable self-con-
fidence which was so striking a feature of the British colonial style.
They could crush political strikes when they occurred. They could
insist on developing “sound” unionism and properly functioning in-
stitutions, in industrial relations as in other areas. In confrontations
with Africans over wage policy or other economic issues, they could
righteously defend the long-term public interest and demand “re-
sponsible” behavior on the part of trade unionists or other Africans.
French colonial administrators in West Africa, on the other hand,
could not make convincing appeals to economic responsibility. The
uncertainties of the political connection that bound Africa to France
and the need to avoid social disturbances that might raise questions
about the nature of that connection forced them into a much more
defensive position. Most important for them was the keeping of the
peace, particularly after disturbances began to spread in North Africa
in the early 1950’s. The French administrators were caught in special
contradictions created by the doctrine of equality between Frenchmen
and Africans; on both moral and political grounds they were thus
vulnerable to African trade union attack. Under these circumstances it
was extremely difficult for French administrators to maintain a prin-
cipled position and to avoid concessions, especially when any threats
of social disturbance arose.
Conclusion: Environmental Change and
Institutional Adaptation
In one sense, the industrial relations institutions that emerged in
French Africa between World War II and the accession of French West
Africa to independence around 1960 were especially “functional” or
well suited to West African conditions. Trade union organizations
and collective-bargaining relationships were in line with organizational
needs and capacities on the one hand, and in harmony with the struc-
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ture of decision-making power on the other. Few restrictions were put
on civil servants or other public employees in their trade union
activities. Legal requirements regarding registration and financial
reporting were ignored before 1952 and absent from the law after 1952.
The attitude of government and employers toward work stoppages was
in general tolerant. The government largely relieved trade unions of
financial worries by an arrangement allowing civil servants to collect
their pay and serve as full-time union officials. There was relatively
little insistence by government officials or employers on the virtues of
union self-sufficiency and solid organization at the local level. All of
this meant that the trade unions had their hands free, so to speak, for
substantive issues.
Union structure was similarly “functional.” The vaguely delineated
organizational arrangements, with the emphasis on geographically-
based organizations, was an efficient adaptation to French African
realities. Given the centralization of decision-making on labor matters,
the broad scope and coverage of legislation, the tendency for the
SMIG to be the effective rate for unskilled workers and to determine
rates of change of all wages, the existence of labor courts, a solicitous
inspectorate of labor, and the delegues system, there seemed little to be
done at the shop level and hence not much point in building shop-
level institutions of any strength.
From the point of view of the immediate interests of African wage
earners and even the African community as a whole, the system worked
well. The trade unions in French West Africa enjoyed a position of
prominence in political and economic affairs during these years, fn
some of the territories (Guinea and Niger, especially) they provided
top political leadership. On the economic side, the trade unions and
the peculiarities of the bargaining system led to a higher level of real
wages, especially in the public sector and the poorer territories, than
would otherwise have prevailed and to conditions of work and wages
considerably better than those in neighboring countries.
In the Gold Coast the situation was different. In many respects the
policies and institutions that evolved during the same period seemed
out of joint, unsuited to local needs and possibilities. The unions never
had more than a marginal impact in political or economic terms. They
were for the most part half-formed institutions, weak, divided, small,
poor, preoccupied with the forms of trade unionism rather than the
substance, developing organizational machinery, laboring over account
books, sitting in consultative and negotiating bodies that dealt only
with minor issues of the workplace. They never came to grips with
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the fact that big advances might have been possible through legislative
or administrative channels.
Judged only by their serviceability to African wage earners and
their adaptation to local possibilities and local power structures, the
industrial relations institutions of the Gold Coast were thus less
functional or suitable than those in French West Africa. But when
account is also taken of the adaptability of the two systems to condi-
tions of independence, a different judgment is called for. For the
French West African system could not survive in recognizable form
once colonial rule ended. It was too specialized, too dependent on the
peculiar features of the colonial environment at a particular phase of
colonial rule. Independence removed almost entirely the political and
moral force behind demands for equality of treatment between ex-
patriates and locals, and it thus stripped from the unions their main
weapon and removed from the bargaining system what had been its
main concern. Independence also brought the new states face to face
with budget effects of wages policy, which, combined with an aware-
ness of their political fragility, led them to take a far less genial view
of strikes than had the colonial administration—particularly strikes of
civil servants and semi-general protest demonstrations of the kind
common earlier. They did not hesitate, therefore, to forbid such
strikes, requisition strikers when they occurred, and even fire strikers—
an act almost without precedence in the earlier period. They could,
and did, decapitate union leadership by changing the practice of civil
servant detachment for union duty. And they did not hesitate to jail
unionists, freeze wages, and severely control union activity. In most of
French-speaking West Africa, independence thus brought into being
state-dominated trade unions serving mainly ceremonial functions,
and the withering of genuine bargaining.
The colonial system was disfunctional in another sense. It led to
levels of wages and salaries which were too high in the sense that they
severely constrained possibilities for local financing of public-sector
development expenditures. One consequence of this was that the
problems of independence were exacerbated by the need to deflate real
wage levels in French Africa. This brutal confrontation with economic
reality, which was postponed during the colonial period because the
appeal by the French for “responsibility” was always strongly coun-
tered by the African appeal to “justice” and “equality,” has been a
basic source of political and social instability throughout the French-
speaking areas, and particularly in the poorer territories of Dahomey
and Upper Volta.
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In Ghana, also, independence brought dramatic changes. Full
government and party control over the unions was imposed by the
Industrial Relations Act of 1958, and independent trade unions dis-
appeared. Strikes and other union activities were closely regulated,
and the unions were fully absorbed into the machinery of the govern-
ing party. In much of the public sector the negotiation and consulta-
tion machinery fell into disuse. But what is most striking is the extent
to which the system developed under colonial rule .persisted through-
out the N’krumah regime and up to the present. Before the 1966 coup
which ousted N’krumah, the trade unions continued to spend much of
their energy on institution building, on perfecting their organizational
machinery, and on job-oriented issues. In the private sector negotia-
tions and discussions went on much as before. And despite the change
at the top, with the newly dominant TUG playing a major role as the
political and ideological agent of the party, most of the trade union
officials at the lower levels continued to work at negotiations with em-
ployers, grievance handling, and similar matters. In part this was due
to institutional inertia and to the fact that there was not much else that
could be done. But it suggests that precisely because the Gold Coast
system gave priority to local matters and because of the efforts to con-
struct genuine trade union machinery and engage in genuine bargain-
ing with employers, the inherited institutions were able to survive more
recognizably. Unlike the French West African arrangements, the Gold
Coast system did not depend on particular characteristics of the
colonial regime, except in certain respects—the degree of autonomy, or
independence from government. It was more general, based on more
solidly universal and persistent problems arising out of the relation-
ship between employers and the employed.
There is not much doubt, then, that the industrial relations institu-
tions and policies of the Gold Coast involved more institutional
development than did those of French West Africa. It involved rela-
tively more people in dealing with problems of a more basic and
enduring kind, and it taught them more about the complex task of
administering organizations and resolving problems. It created an
institutional base, a set of established procedures and habits of mind
which, though it was neither large nor firmly rooted, could grow and
develop. In this sense the colonial industrial relations experience had
a broader modernizing impact in the Gold Coast than in French
Africa, and this is probably the most important criterion of all in
evaluating any set of institutions in modernizing countries.
The “Protestant Ethic” of
the Mourids of Senegal
bj Mark Karp
It is no exaggeration to say that no Moslem brotherhood in Africa
has attracted as much attention as the Mourids of Senegal. Already
sizable, the literature on the history and life of the Mourids continues
to grow.i Some of it is sympathetic to the Mourids; some is not. Cu-
riously, however, none of it contains more than oblique references to
the brotherhood’s most distinguishing, and indeed quite extraordinary,
feature: its “Protestant ethic.” Though Moslems, the Mourids exhibit
in all essential respects the same “ethic” that Max Weber ascribed to
the Calvinists and their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, the Puritans. To
act in accordance with Mourid principles means that disciples must
work diligently and leaders must save and invest as much as possible,
not in response to material incentives but for the sake of the world
beyond. It is in this respect that the Mourids stand out as a unique
1. The latest additions, in English, are Lucy C. Behrman, Muslim Brotherhoods
and Politics in Senegal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970),
and Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971).
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phenomenon in the Moslem world as well as in the non-Islamic part
of Africa.
The Mourid phenomenon is more than a curiosum. It deserves the
attention of anyone with a broad interest in some of the questions that
the current state of economic development theory poses. Weber’s hy-
pothesis—that a social ethic shaped by certain religious beliefs is the
decisive factor in economic development—has never been effectively
tested, despite the enormous growth of critical literature on the subject
since the publication in 1905 of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism. A major difficulty has been the impossibility of divorcing
the influence of the ethical norms emphasized by Weber from that
of other factors on the economic development of the Western world
given the tacit assumption, shared by Weber’s supporters and critics
alike, that those norms were uniquely associated with the religious
tenets of Protestant sects. With the emergence of Mouridism, that
assumption can no longer be maintained. As will be shown, the re-
ligiously-motivated economic conduct of the Mourids fits Weber’s hy-
pothesis in all its essential elements so well as to provide, by observing
the effects of that conduct in an historical context and environment
vastly different from that of Western Europe and North America, a
useful basis for judging the validity of the hypothesis.
Origin and Growth of the Brotherhood
The Mourid brotherhood was founded by Amadou Bamba in 1886.
While not the first Moslem brotherhood in Senegal, it received un-
usual attention at the time because of the relatively large following
which Bamba was able to attract almost immediately. Much of the
explanation of Bamba’s rapid gain in popularity is that he profited
from the breakdown of the traditional political order and the social
disorganization that occurred among the peoples of the area when the
French tightened their grip over what was to become the colony of
Senegal, now an independent republic.
The influence of the French in Senegal dates back to the seventeenth
century, when they established a number of trading posts there; but
only in the late nineteenth century did they gradually extend their
full military and political control over the interior regions. In 1877
severe friction developed between the French and Lat Dyor, the
thirtieth and last ruler (darnel) of the Cayor. Roughly encompassing
the territory between Saint Louis and Dakar—generally regarded as
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the heartland of the Wolof, the largest ethnic group in Senegal—the
Cayor had been an independent kingdom since the sixteenth century.
The French decision to build a railway between Saint Louis and
Dakar brought vigorous protests from Lat Dyor, who saw the project
as a threat to his state’s independence. In 1882, after a futile exchange
of correspondence with the French authorities, he took up arms against
them. Four years later, at about the same time that Bamba launched
his religious movement, Lat Dyor died in battle and the Cayor fell
under French control.
In these circumstances, the initial French reaction to Bamba and
his religious movement was one of extreme wariness. The French
feared that Bamba would capitalize on his sudden popularity to
start a new war against them. They became particularly suspicious
when they found that several members of Lat Dyor’s family, into
which Bamba’s father had married, and many of the dameVs former
supporters had rallied around him. They also learned that he kept
in close touch with some individuals who had been forced to flee
Senegal because of their anti-French activities. ^ On two occasions they
banished him—the first time to Gabon and the second to Mauritania—
for a total of twelve years. Thereafter the French attitude toward him
gradually changed. After the end of World War I, they even be-
stowed certain honors upon him, partly in recognition of his assistance
in recruiting Senegalese for the French army and partly, one may
surmise, out of a sense of guilt for the mistreatment inflicted upon him
earlier without any real evidence against him. Even so, the French
authorities deemed it prudent to keep him under surveillance until
his death in 1927.
The literature currently available on the rise of the Mourid move-
ment is largely based on the account left to us by Paul Marty, a
remarkable French administrator with a scholarly bent and a con-
temporary of Bamba. Marty was the first to recognize that the Mourids
were more interested in economic than in political power.^ He be-
lieved, however, that the Mourid movement depended on Bamba's
personal leadership to such an extent that it would not survive his
death.^ In this regard he could not have been more mistaken.
In 1912, according to Marty, Bamba had less than 70,000 followers.®
2. Medoune Thiam, Cheickh Ahmadou Bamba (Conakry, 1964), p, 7.
3. Paul Marty, Les Mourides d’Amadou Bamba (Paris: Leroux, 1913), p. 112.
4. Paul Marty, Etudes sur I’Islam au Senegal, 2 vols. (Paris: Leroux, 1917), 1:
287-88.
5. Marty, Les Mourides, p. 144.
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In 1952 a French mission sent to investigate agricultural conditions in
Senegal, the Porteres mission, estimated that about 300,000 adult males
belonged to the Mourid brotherhood. The mission cited no figures for
total membership, but it thought it not unreasonable to suppose that
at least one-third of the country’s population might be Mourid.® In
1957 a French administrative estimate put the number of adult males
belonging to the Mourid brotherhood at approximately 400,000, and
there were some who, on the basis of this estimate, claimed a total
membership of one million.'^ Whatever the true figure, there is no
doubt that the brotherhood’s numerical strength has increased sub-
stantially since Bamba’s death.
Nor did the death of Bamba cause any serious problems of leader-
ship, even though no man could be expected to command as much
prestige within the brotherhood as did the founder. A few days after
Bamba died, a family council met and chose Mamadou Mustapha
Mbacke, his eldest son, to succeed him. When Mamadou Mustapha
died in 1945, he was replaced by his brother Falilou Mbacke. The
present head, or Khalifa-General, of the Mourids is Abdou Lahatte
Mbacke, another son of Bamba, who was elected to the post by a
family council after Falilou’s death in 1968. So far, therefore, only
Bamba’s sons have been elevated to the Khalifate-General. The candi-
dacies of both Mamadou Mustapha and Falilou were contested, the
former’s by two of Bamba’s brothers and the latter’s by Mamadou
Mustapha’s eldest son, Cheickh Mbacke. There was some tension as a
result, but in both cases the Mourids’ strong sense of discipline and
solidarity prevented it from splitting the brotherhood into rival fac-
tions.
It was also after Bamba’s death that the brotherhood’s pyramidal
structure of authority, for which the brotherhood is noted in Senegal,
took on a clearly recognizable form. At the base lies the huge mass of
disciples (talibes). Immediately above them are the sheiks, who are
chosen by the disciples through a ritual act of submission—unlike the
sheiks of other Moslem brotherhoods, who are appointed by higher
authority. The act of submission, called njebbel in Wolof, is voluntary
but total, since a disciple must unflinchingly obey his superior. It is
not, however, irrevocable. Should a disciple become dissatisfied with
his sheik, he might, as he sometimes does, leave him and submit to
6. Mission Roland Porteres, Amenagement de Veconomie agricole et rurale au
Senegal, 3 vols. (Dakar, 1952), 1: 102-4.
7. See Vincent Monteil, L'Islam noir (Paris: Seuil, 1964), pp. 127, 265, and 265n.
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another.® Above the sheiks are the Khalifas, who in turn answer to the
Khalifa-General. The chief source of their power and prestige is de-
scent from some revered Mourid figure, such as a particularly illustrious
relative or disciple of Bamba. Their authority is gradually being
eroded, however, by an increasing tendency among the sheiks to pledge
direct allegiance to the Khalifa-General, whose hand is thus further
strengthened.^
His powers are already considerable. The Khalifa-General acts
as spiritual leader of the brotherhood, as sole organ of the brother-
hood’s formal relations with the outside world, as sponsor of an
annual pilgrimage (Magal) to the tomb of Bamba, and as custodian of
the huge mosque that houses the founder’s tomb at Touba.
What has particularly distinguished the brotherhood and con-
tributed most to its growth, however, has been its economic per-
formance. Throughout Senegal’s recent history, the Mourids have been
in the forefront of economic activity. Around 1912 they launched a
colonization drive that brought many hitherto unused lands under
peanut cultivation. Relying chiefly on the dara, a type of pioneer
settlement in which able-bodied young men led by a sheik work the
land collectively, the Mourids pushed aggressively ahead, overcoming
many hazards. Except for a brief interruption engendered by Bamba’s
death, the drive continued unabated until 1945, when the government,
alarmed by allegations—later disputed!^—that Mourid cultivation prac-
tices threatened to exhaust the soil, took measures to restrain it. Agri-
cultural expansion then gave way to urban migration. Many Mourid
disciples can now be seen working as artisans and petty traders in
cities, and their leaders are known to have made several investments
there, mostly in real estate. Peanut cropping, however, continues to
engage the energies of the majority of the brotherhood’s members.
To appreciate the role of Mourid cultivators in the Senegalese econ-
omy, one must see it in the context of the country’s resource avail-
ability. Senegal has few known economic resources, and of these only
the peanut crop can yield a significant monetary income. Peanuts ac-
count for three-quarters of the country’s exports and for nine-tenths of
the government’s fiscal revenue. How large the Mourid share in
Senegalese peanut production is cannot be said for certain, since it
8. For details, see Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides, pp. 84-88, 101-9.
9. Ibid., p. 123.
10. CINAM et SERESA, “Rapport general sur les perspectives de developpement
du Senegal: La region arachidiere’’ (Dakar, 1961), chap. 1.
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has not been measured statistically. According to one observer, it is
one-quarter;ii according to others, and this is the more common
estimate, it is one-half.^^ Moreover, it has to be remembered that it
was the Mourids who in past years spearheaded the drive for peanut
production. They set an example that induced many others to imitate
themi3 and won them recognition as the most dynamic element in the
country.
The Doctrine of the Two Ladders
In addition to the Mourids, there are two important Moslem
brotherhoods in Senegal: the Khadiriya and the Tijaniya. Founded in
Bagdad twelve centuries ago by Sidi Abdel Khader Jilani, the Kha-
diriya has a sizable following in many parts of the Moslem world,
though its membership in Senegal, while not inconsiderable, is now
smaller than that of the Tijaniya (which claims to have the largest) or
of the Mouridiya. The Tijaniya takes its name from Ahmed el Tijani,
who founded the brotherhood in Morocco near the end of the eigh-
teenth century. It gained many adherents in various parts of North
and West Africa, but its main center of activities remained in Morocco.
Thus both the Khadiri and Tijani brotherhoods of Senegal, though
they function autonomously, are actually branches of organizations that
have their principal centers elsewhere. Both are imported movements
that spread in Senegal as the result of Mauritanian proselytizing efforts
during the nineteenth century.
By contrast, the Mouridiya originated among the Wolof, whose tra-
ditions probably helped to shape some of its most singular features.
This is not to say that the Mouridiya is an ethnic sect. While Wolof
still make up the majority, Serere, Diola, and Toucouleur are now
also found among the brotherhood’s members. Nor is it, strictly speak-
ing, a purely Senegalese movement. Mourid communities have sprung
up in Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and even in Zaire,
though they are too small to enable the brotherhood to exercise much
influence in those countries.
11. Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides, pp. 214-15.
12. Monteil, LTslarn, p. 267.
13. Fernand Quesnot, “Influence du Mouridisme sur le Tidjanisme,” in Notes et
etudes sur ITslam en Afrique noire. Centre de Hautes Etudes Administratives sur
I’Afrique et I’Asie Modernes (Paris: Peyronnet, 1962), p. 122.
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In many respects, the Mouricliya does not differ from the other
Senegalese brotherhoods. They all belong to the mystical world of
Sufi Islam. Sufism began in the Middle East during the ninth
century, possibly earlier,!^ as an ascetic reaction to the increasing
worldliness of established Moslem institutions. In the tenth century
it went through a partial transformation. The belief that Sufi mystics
were endowed with charisma (haraka) gained currency and eventually
led to their veneration as saints. Despite strong objections by orthodox
Moslem scholars, who pointed out that the notion of an intermediary
between man and his Creator was contrary to the letter and the spirit
of the Koran, the cult of saints continued to gain in popularity. Some
Sufis organized their followers into brotherhoods. The movement
spread to North Africa, where it has been particularly strongly en-
trenched ever since the fifteenth century. From there it penetrated the
western part of the continent.
In French-speaking Africa Sufi mystics are popularly referred to as
“marabouts.” Some marabouts play leading roles in brotherhoods, in
which case they usually carry the title of sheik. Those who do not
often serve as religious teachers. In West Africa it was customary in
the past for peasants to support these teachers by growing food for
them on a special field, which became known as the Wednesday field,
for Wednesday was the day the peasants usually reserved for its culti-
vation. Nowadays Wednesday fields are cultivated to provide gifts to
sheiks. This is true of the Mourids, as well as of the Tijanis and the
Khadiris. There are many practices and beliefs that the Mourids share
with the other brotherhoods. The strict discipline observed among the
Mourids, for example, though it has evoked much comment in and
out of Senegal, is not a unique Mourid trait. The difference between
the Mourids and the other brotherhoods is, in this respect, at best only
one of degree. All of them preach that a disciple should obey his sheik.
Much as the Mourids have in common with other maraboutic
groups, there is nevertheless, in addition to differences in origin and
in internal organization which have already been noted, a profound
difference in doctrinal orientation between them. Like all ascetics, the
Mourids aim to achieve spiritual perfection by practicing self-denial,
but they reject the general Sufi idea that the material world is a threat
to spiritual development. Mourid doctrine, which consists of the inter-
pretations the brotherhood’s leadership places upon Bamba’s views on
14. See Monteil, L’Islam, pp. 121-22.
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Islam, holds that asceticism must be practiced not by renouncing the
world but by living in it, by combining ceaseless activity with rigorous
abstention from self-indulgence.
This is clearly shown in the Mourid attitude toward labor. The
doctrinal justification for it is based on two statements attributed to
Bamba: “To work is one of the duties of a slave of God” (in Wolof,
ligey si diamou yalla la bok), and “work is part of the action of follow-
ing God” {ligey si top yalla la bok). In the first statement, Bamba’s
followers are simply asked to recognize the fact that man must work in
order to live. Man has no choice in this matter, if he wants to survive
on this earth, as the reference to him as a slave emphasizes. The ex-
planation offered for the necessity of work is, of course, in purely
theological terms. God has willed that man should work. He is master
of all creation and man is His slave. In the second statement, the
notion of constraint is absent; there is no reference to man as a slave.
Work is a worldly activity that the believer voluntarily undertakes to
prove his faith.^^
A distinction is thus made between the work a Mourid has to do to
support himself and his family and the work he may additionally
engage in to show his religious devotion. But he must not indulge
himself by consuming the fruit of his extra effort. He must part with
it. “He who works in his own interest,” Bamba is reported to have
said, “his toil shall be entirely wasted.”^® The extra labor can have
spiritual value only if its fruit is donated to a superior in the brother-
hood.
One branch of the brotherhood, the Bay Fall, believes that “only
through work can one secure the blessing and the grace of God.”!"^
Its members do not observe any of the customary religious obligations
of a Moslem, such as daily prayers or the Ramadan fast. In this they
follow the late Ibra Fall, one of Bamba’s most devoted disciples, who
held that he had no need of rituals or prayers since he meant his
whole life to be a service to God. The Bay Fall form a small group,
however. Only about 500 families, according to Abdulaye Fall, their
present Khalifa and a son of Ibra Fall, belong to it.^®
For the majority of the Mourids work is not the only means by
15. For details, see Abdulaye Wade, “La doctrine economique du Mouridisme,”
mimeographed (Dakar, 1966), pp. 15-18.
16. Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides, p. 51.
17. Ibid., p. 150.
18. Interview with the author, 9 March 1965.
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which a man can show his faith. He can also do it through prayer.
Work and prayer, said Falilou Mbacke in 1965, are two ladders to
Heaven; the Mourid, who aspires to enter Paradise, may use either
ladder, or both, to climb to his goal.^^ The late Khalifa-General was
thus echoing sentiments expressed earlier by the brotherhood’s founder.
In 1903, in an open letter to his followers, Bamba defined member-
ship in the Mourid brotherhood as limited to those who were willing
to work, to learn to pray, or to do both, and ordered the expulsion of
all others. 20
It is sometimes alleged that among Mourids only agricultural labor
has religious value. It is difficult, however, to find a basis for this no-
tion. Bamba’s writings certainly do not provide it. Most Mourids, it is
true, work on the land, but this is due to the lack of superior economic
alternatives and not to a religiously-dictated preference. One of the
brotherhood’s leading personalities, Mamadou Mahmoun Mbacke,
categorically rejected the claim that Mourid doctrine accords religious
significance to agricultural labor. All remunerative work, he declared,
is religious vocation . 21
The doctrine of the two ladders has no precedent in Islamic tradi-
tion. Vincent Monteil has tried to show the contrary, but the most he
could produce as evidence was a hadith (saying) in which the Prophet
Mohammed indicated his approval of work to support one’s family by
rating it equal to prayer.22 Clearly, this is not the Mourid view of the
religious significance of work. It is the additional labor, the fruit of
which must be donated to a sheik, and not the work done to support
one’s family that, according to Bamba’s doctrine, has spiritual value.
Among Mourids no particular importance is attached to the form of
a disciple’s contribution to his superior. Contributions can be made in
money, goods, or labor services. Most Mourids work as independent
peasant producers who after the harvest contribute as much money
to their sheik as they believe they can afford. Many of them also culti-
vate a Wednesday field for him. Others work on the sheik’s land, or in
daras, especially those who have no land of their own. Khalifas, as well
as the Khalifa-General, also own lands that their personal followers
cultivate. A part of the fees of Mourid urban associations, called
19. Interview with the author.
20. Thiam, Bamba, p. 12.
21. Interview with the author. See also Porteres, Amenagement de Veconomie
agricole, p. 103.
22. Monteil, L’Islam, p. 263.
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dairas, is regularly remitted to religious leaders. City residents also
pay a special fee, the allarba, as a substitute for work on a Wednesday
field. In addition to all these more-or-less regular payments, contribu-
tions are made on numerous special occasions, of which the annual
Magal to Bamba’s tomb is the most important. It is generally esti-
mated that at least 200,000 Mourids gather at Touba during the an-
nual event, leaving the equivalent of nearly one million dollars in
the hands of the Khalifa-General.^^
The Sin of Ostentation
So far it has not proved feasible to estimate, even broadly, the total
amount that Mourid disciples contribute each year to their marabouts.
Nobody doubts, however, that the steady flow of contributions has
enabled a relatively small group of men to accumulate considerable
wealth. Some Mourid marabouts are counted among the wealthiest
people in Senegal. This concentration of economic resources, drawn
from a mass of poor but indefatigable workers, into the hands of a
religious elite has caused much speculation as to how these resources
are ultimately utilized.
There are those who believe that personal consumption takes up
nearly all of the leaders' resources. Others dismiss this notion, pointing
out that had the leaders frittered away their resources on luxurious
living they would not have been able to command the loyalty of their
followers for as long as they have. They maintain that the Mourid
community is a static system of collective security in which reserves are
accumulated by the marabouts and redistributed within the com-
munity as the need for them arises. Finally, there is a group that
argues, with greater reason, that investment absorbs most of the
Mourid elite’s resources.
Like those of other maraboutic groups, the disciples of the Mouri-
diya expect their leaders to live and conduct themselves in a manner
that will reflect prestige upon the brotherhood. A Mourid marabout’s
expenditure on consumption is therefore higher than that of a talibe,
though it is far from lavish—as anyone who has visited the Khalifa-
General and other members of the Mourid elite can attest—and cer-
tainly much smaller than his means allow. His expenditures on charity
23. Ibid., p. 266.
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are also modest. Though he enjoys a reputation for generosity, the
Mourid marabout’s charity is limited to helping those members of
the brotherhood who, for one reason or another, cannot work and
have no other means of support. It is investment that taxes his resources
and energies most. Had it not been for his willingness to invest the
large means put at his disposal, the brotherhood would not have been
able to go through its remarkable economic evolution. It was his
capital that financed the brotherhood’s agricultural expansion between
1912 and 1945 by advancing subsistence means, seeds, animals, and
tools to the cultivators; that, even after the government forbade the
acquisition of new lands, enabled the cultivators to increase agricul-
tural output through intensive methods of cultivation by purchasing
modern mechanical equipment; and that is now financing the Mourid
surge into the cities by advancing funds to disciples who want to
start new businesses and by undertaking various direct investments.
A key question is whether there are any religious principles govern-
ing the economic behavior of the marabout. Curiously, one can find no
mention of this point in the existing literature on the Mourids, which
on the other hand devotes so much space, even if the views expressed
in it are not always accurate, to the influence of religion on the be-
havior of the disciple. The resulting picture is that of a Moslem order
strikingly lacking in doctrinal consistency: the sheiks are presumed
to be free to engage in secular activities to satisfy their personal ma-
terial ambitions, while the disciples must toil to fulfill a religious duty.
The truth is that the Mourid leadership feels no less bound by
Bamba’s teachings to practice asceticism in worldly activities than its
disciplined followers.^^ A marabout is not expected to work, and the
doctrine of the two ladders therefore does not apply to him, but he
must not indulge himself by allowing his personal consumption to
exceed the requirements of his position in the Mourid community.
“Be like the small donkey that carries a load of millet on its back but
does not eat it,” said Bamba,^^ and the Mourid leadership has taken
this statement to mean that a marabout should not consume more than
24. Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of Mourid
,
doctrine as it applies
to the marabouts is based on research conducted in Senegal in the spring of 1965
at the invitation of the Faculty of Law and Economics of the University of Dakar
and with the generous financial assistance of the Ford Foundation. The views
presented are those that were expressed unanimously by the Khalifa-General and
other leading figures of the Mourid movement in separate interviews carried out
with the help of Abdulaye Wade of the University of Dakar.
25. Marty, Les Mourides, p. 52.
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he has to. Were he to do so, he would be guilty of ostentatious conduct,
which Bamba regarded as one of the worst offenses against God. He
repeatedly admonished his followers to avoid it, in any form. “Do not
wear fancy clothes,” he wrote, and “do not pray for the sake of ostenta-
tion, but in order to please God.”^® Consumption in excess of one’s
needs is therefore condemned. It can serve no other purpose, as far as
the Mourids can see, than to satisfy the urge to display one’s wealth.
For the marabout, then, the question is what to do with excess re-
sources. He cannot hoard them. Indeed, he has a positive horror of
hoarding. It is known that Mourid Khalifas and sheiks, nearly all of
whom live in the countryside, keep the large sums they collect from
various sources in their home safes no longer than is absolutely neces-
sary before forwarding them to a bank, where they will earn interest,
or disposing of them in some other way. For the Mourids define
hoarding as “contemplation of wealth,” which is as reprehensible in
their eyes, and for the same reason, as unnecessary consumption.
For Bamba, the justification for the marabout’s accumulation of
wealth was that it could be used to relieve the poverty of the Mourid
community. If used for any other purpose, it could have no religious
or moral value. “He who keeps all his possessions and does not give to
the poor,” he preached, “will be unhappy before he dies.”^^ In taking
this stand Bamba was simply reiterating a basic tenet of Islam—to give
alms to the poor. But the Mourid elite could not take this injunction
literally. Indiscriminate giving could not be reconciled with the doc-
trine of the two ladders, since it would encourage indolence among the
talibes. Hence it was decided that charity should be extended only
to those needy disciples who through no fault of their own could not
temporarily secure employment and to those who because of age, ill-
ness, or some other misfortune were unable to work. The remainder of
the marabouts’ considerable resources was to be invested in such
profitable activities as could be found.
Oddly enough, while the Mourids tend, in a sense, to confuse hoard-
ing with consumption—or, if you will, with “unnecessary” consump-
tion—they are quite clear on the difference between hoarding and
saving. They understand that when an individual saves he parts with
his income and provides resources to others; that saving, in other
words, is a form of spending. They also understand that savings, if
profitably invested, will raise social income. Savings and investment
26. Ibid., pp. 52, 262.
27. Ibid., p. 262.
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are therefore seen as capable of fulfilling Bamba’s expectation that
accumulated wealth would be used to lift the Mourid community out
of its poverty without impairing the doctrine of the two ladders. For
the Mourids, therefore, the chief justification for saving and investing
is religious. It is an activity that, in keeping with their ascetic princi-
ples, must be undertaken continuously, insofar as investment op-
portunities permit, without regard for the increased consumption
possibilities it may offer to the investor in the future.
This economic philosophy, based on religion, determines Mourid at-
titudes toward many aspects of life. The Mourids are not attracted by
political ideology; the need to protect economic interests is all that
inspires their limited participation in political affairs. Though Mourid
leaders have often been accused of opposing modern education for
their followers, their attitude toward it actually depends on what is
proposed to be taught. Apart from religious instruction, which they
themselves provide, they oppose the teaching of subjects that have
strictly cultural value and thus represent a form of consumption, while
they not only endorse but actively encourage any kind of training likely
to lead to increased efficiency of production. It was at their request,
for example, that the French authorities established an agricultural
school in 1932 at Diourbel.^® They favor technological progress. While
showing little entrepreneurial talent themselves, they support and are
sometimes even willing to finance proposed innovations in the hope of
finding greater opportunities for profit-making. This hope is not, of
course, always fulfilled. One of Falilou Mbacke’s brothers, Bassirou,
was persuaded in 1947 to participate in a French project designed to
test the feasibility of mechanized production of peanuts under Sene-
galese conditions. He supplied funds and the labor services of 250 of
his disciples for the experimental work that was carried out under the
supervision of French agricultural engineers on a 15,000-hectare plot
near Boulel, north of Kaffrine. The project, known as Bloc Experi-
mental d’Arachides, ended as a failure in 1953, leaving Bassirou with a
large deficit, which he, however, was able to absorb without undue
difficulty. 29 That Mourid leaders are open to innovation and willing
to take risks does not mean that they do not appreciate the importance
28. “L’Ecole Franco-Mouride de Diourbel,” Bulletin de I’Enseignement de
rAfrique Occidentale Frangaise, no. 80 (Dakar, 1932), pp. 241-42.
29. J. C. Froelich, “Archaisme et modernisme: Les Musulmans noirs et le
Progres,” Cahiers de VInstitut de Science Economique Appliquee, vol. 3, supp. no.
120 (Paris, 1961), p. 90.
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of traditions, which they generally respect—unless they interfere with
the production of monetary revenue. The cultivation of traditional
subsistence crops, such as millet, generates little enthusiasm among
them. They want to see it kept at a minimum because it diverts re-
sources from money-earning activities. There is perhaps no more
forceful way to convey the Mourid elite’s appreciation of the social
benefits that may be derived from a rising monetary income and of its
single-mindedness in the pursuit of monetary gain than to reproduce,
in its stark simplicity, the statement which Modou Khabane, one of
the Mourid elite’s wealthiest members, used to justify his opposition
to subsistence cultivation: “Money begets money, and that is good
because it provides the most effective means of increasing the welfare
of the Mourid community.”
Webefs Hypothesis
A comparison between Calvinism as analyzed by Max Weber and
Mouridism brings out some amazing similarities. There are, of course,
also many differences. The social organization of the Mourids is totally
unlike that of the Protestant dissenters of Western Europe and North
America. Certain basic Calvinist concepts, such as, for example, pre-
destination, do not appear in Mourid theology. Weber’s central in-
terest, however, lay in the economic consequences of Calvinist beliefs,
and it is in relation to these consequences that Calvinism and Mourid-
ism appear to be virtually identical.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism was, as Weber
himself tells us, an attempt to lay bare what he believed were “the
motive forces in the expansion of modern capitalism,” or in con-
temporary parlance, the key factors in the economic development of
the Western world. While Weber implicitly accepted the thesis of the
British classical economists that economic development requires a
steady supply of labor and capital, he doubted their view that purely
economic incentives, such as higher wages and profits, could always be
counted upon to produce it. That view, Weber contended, had to as-
sume a human interest in economic acquisition as an end in itself and
not as a means to an end. Such an attitude was indeed common in
30. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. by
Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner’s, 1958), p. 68.
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modern Western countries, but it was also “unnatural” and needed
explaining. “A man does not ‘by nature’ wish to earn more and more
money,” he wrote, “but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and
to earn as much as is necessary for that purpose.
Weber argued that the prevailing attitude toward economic acquisi-
tion in modern Western countries had been shaped by the Protestant
Reformation, especially Calvinism. He noted that it was particularly
pronounced in Protestant countries and that it was in those countries
that economic expansion had taken place most rapidly. In them, cease-
less toil and systematic investment had not been originally intended
for the sake of material acquisition as the ultimate goal; they had
served a religious purpose.
Calvin had taught that salvation could not be achieved through good
works, because God had determined from eternity whom He would
save and whom He would not. The world existed for no other purpose
but to glorify God; the elected Christian was in it solely to increase the
glory of God, and his social activity had to be directed exclusively to
that end. It followed from the doctrine of predestination that a man
could neither know nor influence his fate. He could only hope that he
was in a state of grace and behave accordingly, by attending with the
utmost diligence to whatever social task engaged his energies. There
could be no room in his life for leisure and enjoyment; to indulge in
them, even to a small extent, would be a symptom of lack of grace.
“The fulfillment of worldly duties” was, as Weber put it, “the only
way to live acceptably to God.”^^
What Calvinism thus required of its followers was ascetic conduct
in a form hitherto unknown to the Christian world. Asceticism had, of
course, been practiced by Christians for centuries, but in its traditional
form it had meant separation from mundane concerns, especially from
the irreligious distractions of customary social life, through withdrawal
into convents and monasteries; whereas Calvinism called for continu-
ous involvement in, not withdrawal from, worldly activities as a matter
of religious duty. Thus, unlike traditional Christian ethics which had
sought to restrain acquisitive activity, Calvinism encouraged it. Yet,
while putting a stamp of religious approval on economic acquisition,
Calvinism condemned unnecessary consumption and ostentatious be-
havior. “The superior indulgence of the seigneur and the parvenu
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. Ibid., p. 81.
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ostentation of the nouveau riche” said Weber in emphasizing this
point, were “equally detestable” to it.^^ Tawney, who strongly sup-
ported Weber’s ideas on the influence of religion on economic behavior,
also stressed this theme. “The enemy of Calvinism,” he stated, was
“not the accumulation of riches, but their misuse for purposes of self-
indulgence or ostentation. ”34 The accumulation of wealth was pri-
marily intended to enhance the welfare of the community. “The pious
man,” wrote Calvin in the Institutes, “owes to his brethren all that
it is in his power to give.”^^ Calvinist asceticism, therefore, meant
money-earning activity combined with abstention from self-indulgence
for the benefit of the community. But this intramundane asceticism,
which Weber called the “Protestant ethic,” is also, as we have seen, the
central feature of Mouridism.
It seemed obvious to Weber that an ethic calling for limitation of
consumption combined with continuous work and reinvestment of
profit, once it is inculcated into the masses, would lead to capital ac-
cumulation and economic development. Economic incentives alone
could not be expected to yield the same results, because they were not
as reliable and effective as the psychological sanctions that an ethic based
on religion places upon the maintenance of the attitudes required by
it so long as the religious belief is alive.^® Weber did not, of course,
pretend that the economic development of the Western world could
be simply explained as the consequence of the Reformation. He readily
admitted that other factors had entered into it.^^ But none could
match the emergence of Protestant asceticism in importance. “The re-
ligious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly
calling” had provided, he claimed, “the most powerful conceivable
lever” for rapid economic expansion.^®
The Mourid case, however, does not support this claim by Weber,
even though there can be no doubt that Mouridism has served as a
positive force in the Senegalese economy. Indeed, the extraordinary
role that Mouridism has played there adds weight to Weber’s argu-
ment about the superiority of religious ethics to economic inducements
in promoting capital accumulation. Nevertheless, it must be observed
33. Ibid., p. 163.
34. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: New Ameri-
can Library, 1947), pp. 93-94.
35. Quoted by Tawney, Rise of Capitalism, p. 104.
36. Weber, Protestant Ethic, p. 197.
37. Ibid., p. 91.
38. Ibid., p. 172.
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that while Senegal has grown faster economically than some countries,
it has lagged behind other countries in tropical Africa, when, accord-
ing to Weber’s logic, it should have outperformed all of them.
This failure of the Senegalese economy, notwithstanding the salutary
effect of Mouridism on capital accumulation, suggests that Weber, and
the classical economists on whose basic ideas he relied, erred in
holding capital accumulation to be the most important element in eco-
nomic development. Perhaps Schumpeter was right in stressing innova-
tion as the critical variable. Perhaps there is more than one critical
variable. Whatever the truth in that regard, the only inference that
can reasonably be drawn from the Mourid case is that capital accu-
mulation is not as important as has so often been maintained and that
Weber, consequently, overstated the impact of the Protestant Refor-
mation on the economic development of Western Europe.
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